Gagetta v. Walmart, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 1, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-03757
StatusUnknown

This text of Gagetta v. Walmart, Inc. (Gagetta v. Walmart, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gagetta v. Walmart, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SUSAN GAGETTA, et al., Case No. 22-cv-03757-AMO

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 v. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO ENLARGE DEADLINE TO FILE 10 WALMART, INC., CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION AND AMEND SUBSEQUENT 11 Defendant. DEADLINES 12 Re: Dkt. No. 66

13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ administrative motion to enlarge the deadline to file their 15 motion for class certification and amend subsequent deadlines. Defendant Walmart Inc. opposes 16 the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. 17 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs’ motion is improperly before the Court as an 18 administrative motion under Civil Local Rule 7-11 rather than a properly noticed motion under 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and Civil Local Rule 16-2. Compare Civil L.R. 7-11 20 (authorizing motions “with respect to miscellaneous administrative matters, not otherwise 21 governed by a federal statute, Federal Rule, local rule, or standing order of the assigned Judge”) 22 with Civil L.R. 16-2 (authorizing a party to “seek relief from an obligation imposed by Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 16” “[b]y serving and filing a motion with the assigned Judge pursuant to Civil L.R. 7”); 24 but see Gilmore v. Safe Box Logistics, Inc., No. 21-cv-06917-AMO, 2023 WL 7106883, at *2 25 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023) (deciding motion for extension of time under Civil Local Rule 7-11 26 where scheduling order expressly allowed an administrative motion for that purpose). Plaintiffs’ 27 failure to properly present their motion to the Court is by itself grounds for denial. Nonetheless, 1 who are experienced litigators and frequently appear in this Court and others in the district. Going 2 forward, the Court expects strict compliance with the Federal Rules, the Local Rules, and the 3 General and Standing Orders of this Court. The Court may summarily deny or strike any non- 4 compliant filings. 5 Setting aside the procedural defect, Plaintiffs’ administrative motion fails to support the 6 full extension requested. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) requires “good cause” and “the 7 judge’s consent” to modify a scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good 8 cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 9 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “The pretrial schedule may be 10 modified ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” 11 Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mammoth 12 Recreations, 975 F.2d at 609). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party 13 opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the 14 inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Mammoth Recreations, 975 15 F.2d at 609 (citation omitted). If the moving party fails to show diligence, “‘the inquiry should 16 end.’” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mammoth 17 Recreations, 975 F.2d at 609). 18 Plaintiffs seek a 120-day extension of all deadlines set in the October 2, 2023 Case 19 Management Scheduling Order, ECF 64, primarily their deadline to file their motion for class 20 certification, and claim they diligently pursued discovery. The record shows otherwise. Plaintiffs 21 served their first set of document requests on February 9, 2023.1 See ECF 66 at 2. Walmart’s 22 responses to those requests, served March 30, 2023, indicated that any document production 23 would be subject to the parties reaching a stipulation regarding the discovery of electronically 24 stored information (“ESI”) and the entry of a protective order. Id. Though Plaintiffs provided 25

26 1 The timing of these requests is not the basis for the Court’s ruling. The Court notes that the prior presiding judge directed the parties to engage in targeted discovery “essential to a productive 27 private mediation, which should occur within three months of the settling of the pleadings.” ECF 1 Walmart drafts of a proposed stipulated protective order and a proposed ESI stipulation on January 2 27, 2023, the parties did not file those documents until July 19, 2023, and September 11, 2023, 3 respectively. ECF 57, 59. Knowing that this was the state of discovery, on September 28, 2023, 4 Plaintiffs proposed a schedule. See ECF 63 at 8. The Court largely adopted the case deadlines 5 Plaintiffs proposed, see ECF 64, which Plaintiffs now claim they are unable to meet. 6 Plaintiffs devote the majority of the five-pages of the motion at bar to pointing the finger at 7 Walmart for all the reasons why discovery is not on track. ECF 66 at 2-3. Plaintiffs blame 8 Walmart for failing to specify an end date for its document productions as required by Federal 9 Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(4)(B),2 for delaying entry of the protective order and ESI 10 stipulation, for dragging its feet on negotiating ESI search terms,3 for waiting until December 28, 11 2023 to make its first document production and then including 3,300 redacted pages in a 12 subsequent February 2, 2024 document production, and for refusing to produce certain sales data 13 absent a ruling on a motion to compel. Id.; see also ECF 66-1 ¶¶ 2-3. 14 However, the reasons why Plaintiffs are unable to meet the existing deadlines appear to be, 15 at least in part, of their own making. If the responses Walmart served on March 30, 2023 failed to 16 specify an end date for production, Plaintiffs should have promptly requested to meet and confer 17 with Walmart to address that deficiency. If the parties failed to reach agreement, Plaintiffs should 18 have promptly sought compliance as allowed by this Court’s Civil Standing Order instead of 19 waiting almost a year to alert the Court to the issue in an administrative motion. If negotiations on 20 a protective order and an ESI stipulation had become protracted, the parties could have sought 21 assistance from the Court, or at least agreed to be bound by the district’s model protective order 22

23 2 Rule 34(b)(4)(B) provides that “[t]he production must then be completed no later than the time 24 for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(4)(B). The advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendments to Rule 34 further 25 provides that “[w]hen it is necessary to make the production in stages the response should specify the beginning and end dates of the production.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) advisory 26 committee’s note to 2015 amendment.

27 3 In the declaration in support of their administrative motion, Plaintiffs indicate that they proposed 1 and/or an interim production protocol while the parties finalized versions for entry by the Court.4 2 If search term negotiations had devolved into a game of “go-fish,” see, e.g., Moore v. Publicis 3 Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 4 No. 11 CIV. 1279 ALC AJP, 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

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Related

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.
232 F.3d 1271 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Moore v. Publicis Groupe
287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. New York, 2012)

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