Gaffney v. Colvill

6 Hill & Den. 567
New York Supreme Court·Decided July 15, 1844·Published

Opinion

By the Court, Bronson, J.

I shall first consider the several objections which have been taken to the declaration in the suit against Colvill. The defendant is sued as a director of the Lafayette Bank, for several alleged violations of the statute containing regulations to prevent the insolvency of moneyed corporations, and to secure the rights of their creditors and stockholders.” The first section of the article provides, that it shall not be lawful for the directors of any moneyed corporation to make dividends, except from the surplus profits ; to divide or reduce the capital stock without the consent of the legislature; to discount notes for a particular purpose; to make loans or discounts [572] to directors beyond a certain amount; or to do other specified acts of the same general nature. (1 R. S. 589, § 1.) (a) The charter of the bank provides, that the stock, property and concerns of the corporation shall be managed by thirteen directors. (Sess. Laws of 1834, p. 369, § 14.) A majority of the directors may form a board for the transaction of business; and a majority of the board may do corporate acts. (1 R. iS. 600, § 6.) The acts of which the plaintiff complains are not such as could be [573] done by a single director. They could only be done by a board of directors, which could not be formed without the presence of seven directors at the least, of whom four must have concurred in the order which was made. I do not see, therefore, how it is possible to support the counts which allege that the defendant alone did the wrong. We see from the nature of the case that the thing was impossible. This objection applies to the third, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth counts.

There are other counts which are not subject to this objection. But as the acts complained of could only be done by a board of directors, it is insisted that the action cannot be maintained against one alone—that all the wrongdoers, or at least so many of them as must necessarily have concurred, should have been joined. The case has been likened to the old action for a conspiracy, where the writ must be against two persons at the least; and if all but one are acquitted by the jury, the plaintiff cannot have judgment. But the rule is otherwise in the modern action on the case in the nature of a conspiracy. There, the plaintiff may have judgment against one, although all the others are acquitted. (Jones v. Baker, 7 Cowen, 445.) And as a general rule, when a number of persons have been engaged in an illegal and tortious act, they may be sued severally or jointly at the election of the injured party. It must be admitted, however, that those are cases where the wrong was of such a nature that it might have been done by a single individual; and I should feel some difficulty in saying that an action could be maintained against a single director, unless the case has been provided for by the legislature. We think it has. The statute upon which the action is founded, after declaring that it shall not be lawful for the directors to do certain things, provides in the 10th section, that “ every director who shall violate, or be concerned in violating any provision in the preceding sections of this article contained, shall be liable personally to the creditors and stockholders respectively of the corporation of which he shall be a director, to the full extent of any loss they may respectively have sustained from such violation.” In the preceding sections the word directors,” in the plural, had been [574] used; and we think the change in the .10th section to the words “ every director,” was made for the purpose of giving a several action against each of the wrongdoers. The argument against this construction is based upon the fact 'that the law of 1825 made the directors “jointly and severally” liable ; (Sess. Laws of 1825, p. 448, § 2.) And an alteration of the law is inferred from the change of phraseology. But we know that one object of the late revision was to amend the language of the law where there was no intention to alter the law itself. And besides, it is settled as a principle, that the mere change of phraseology in a revision of the statutes does not work a change in the law, unless it evidently appears that such was the intention of the legislature. (Matter of Brown, 21 Wend. 316.) No such intention can be inferred in this case. Indeed, it is difficult to suppose that the words “ every director” were not used for the very purpose of giving a several action against each one of them. They may be- sued separately, because the statute has so provided. But in declaring against one it must be alleged that he had the concurrence of others in doing the act, for the reason that he could not have done it alone.

The next objection goes to all the counts. It is, that the charter of the Lafayette .Bank is a private act, which should have been set out in pleading. Although it is a private act, the action is not founded upon the charter; but upon the general statute relating to moneyed corporations, which is a public act, of which we must take judicial notice. The objection is not well founded.

The action is given to creditors and stockholders respectively, who may recover to the full extent of any loss they may have Sustained. (§10.) The plaintiff sues as a stockholder; and in the first count, after stating the illegal act of the directors in making a dividend out of the capital stock, and not out of surplus profits, it is alleged that thereby the plaintiff’s stock became depreciated and of less value than it would otherwise have been; and the plaintiff thereby, and in consequence of such violation of the act, lost a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of fifteen thousand dollars. This shows with sufficient certainty [575] that the plaintiff has sustained a loss by the wrongful act of the defendants, and is entitled to some damages. It is said that the pleader should have shown how or in what manner the illegal act complained of caused a depreciation in the value of the stock. But I cannot think such a statement necessary. It is enough that the fact of depreciation is directly alleged. How it maybe proved is another question. This answer goes to the same objection taken to each of the other counts. They are not defective in the way of showing loss and damage to the plaintiff.

The first count is for making illegal dividends to the stockholders. It is said that the plaintiff must have received his dividend, and therefore that he cannot sue—that he is estopped to complain of the illegal act to which he was a party. There are- two answers, at the least, to the objection. It does not clearly appear that the plaintiff received the dividend. It may well he that other stockholders were paid, while the plaintiff received nothing. At the most, payment to the plaintiff can only be made out by argument and inference, and, in pleading, the fact on which an estoppel depends must be directly and expressly alleged. Again: if the plaintiff received the money he would not be concluded by that fact, unless he knew that the dividend was made from capital, and not from surplus profits. When a dividend was declared by the directors, the plaintiff had a right to presume that it was legally made. A man cannot be cheated into an admission which will conclude him as an estoppel in pais.

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Gaffney v. Colvill, 6 Hill & Den. 567 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1844).

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