Gaekwar v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 6, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01551
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7

8 CHANDRASI GAEKWAR,

9 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-1551-BJR v. 10

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 11 AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, RECONSIDERATION

12 Defendant.

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Chandrasi Gaekwar (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Amica 17 Mutual Insurance Company (“Amica”) for breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of the 18 19 Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”), as well as the Washington Consumer Protection Act 20 (“WCPA”). Currently before the Court is Amica’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s 21 November 28, 2023 Order denying Amica’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“the 22 November 2023 Order”). Dkt. Nos. 52 and 46, respectively. Having reviewed the motion, 23 opposition thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authority, the Court will deny the 24 motion. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 25

26 27 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 The facts underlying this lawsuit are set forth in the November 2023 Order and will not be 3 restated here. It is sufficient to state that in August 2023, Amica requested that this Court grant 4 the insurer summary judgment on Plaintiff’s extracontractual claims, which this Court denied in 5 the November 2023 Order. Amica now moves this Court to reconsider its determination that 6 7 Amica is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims alleging violation of the IFCA, 8 for bad faith, and violation of the WCPA. Amica asserts that this Court committed manifest error 9 in determining that a dispute of material fact exists as to whether Amica conducted a reasonable 10 investigation of Plaintiff’s underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim and in determining that Plaintiff 11 has alleged damages sufficient to state a claim under the WCPA. 12 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule 7(h), which provides as follows: 14 15 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing 16 of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence. 17 Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent 18 19 highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 20 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Kona 21 Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 389 Orange Street 22 Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 A. The IFCA and Bad Faith Claims 25 Amica asserts that this Court’s ruling on the IFCA and bad faith claims is manifestly 26 27 erroneous for two reasons. First, Amica argues that the ruling is erroneous to the extent that it 1 relies on the fact that Amica did not send “all of the records in its possession” to its expert, Dr. 2 Kearney, before relying on Dr. Kearney’s opinion in determining what amount it would offer 3 Plaintiff to settle his UIM claim. Dkt. No. 52 at 8. Second, Amica argues that this Court’s ruling 4 “does not hold Plaintiff to his burden of proving that some act in the claim handling was frivolous 5 or unfounded.” Id. 6 7 Amica misinterprets this Court’s ruling. The Court did not deny Amica’s request for 8 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s IFCA and bad faith claims because Amica failed to provide Dr. 9 Kearney with a complete set of Plaintiff’s medical records; rather, the Court denied Amica’s 10 motion because the case “record contains contradictory evidence” as to whether Amica’s offer to 11 resolve the UIM claim was unreasonably low and further creates a “dispute of material fact” as to 12 “whether Amica completed a reasonable investigation before refusing to pay for Plaintiff’s knee 13 surgery [.]” Dkt. No. 46 at 8, 11. The record evidence establishes that Amica was aware that 14 15 Plaintiff had a history of left knee pain but that he had been doing well in the months prior to the 16 accident. Amica suggest that it was not aware of this evidence prior to extending its UIM 17 settlement offer but the record contradicts Amica’s claim. See e.g., Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 at 71-72 18 (Claim file notes stating “Arthroplasty discussed, but he had been getting along well before the 19 crash, he elected to save the option of surgery for last”; stating that knee pain was “aggravated by 20 MVA”); Ex. 3 at AMICA 0062 (Demand letter acknowledging that Plaintiff had preexisting knee 21 issues but stating that “any remotely relevant historical conditions were dormant by the time of 22 23 this crash”). Moreover, the November 4, 2020 demand letter refer includes Plaintiff’s medical 24 records from before the accident. There is a question as to whether those medical records were 25 included in the version of the demand letter sent to Amica. This is not a dispute of fact that the 26 Court can resolve on summary judgment and, even if the Court did resolve that issue in favor of 27 1 Amica, it would still be for the jury to determine whether Amica’s failure to request the reference 2 medical records was reasonable. In short, Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a dispute 3 of material fact rendering summary judgment on the IFCA and bad faith claims inappropriate. 4 B. The WCPA Claim 5 Next Amica claims that this Court committed manifest error when it “appl[ied] Peoples v. 6 7 United Servs. Auto. Ass’n” to Plaintiff’s WCPA claim. Dkt. No. 66 at 1. Amica had moved for 8 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s WCPA claim, arguing that Plaintiff cannot maintain such a 9 claim because he does not allege any injury to his business or property, a required element for a 10 WCPA claim. Relying on Peoples v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 194 Wash.2d 771, 779 (2019) in 11 which the Washington Supreme Court concluded that “the deprivation of contracted-for insurance 12 benefits is an injury to ‘business or property’” for purposes of the WCPA, this Court rejected 13 Amica’s argument. Amica now argues that it was manifest error for this Court to rely on Peoples 14 15 because the decision “centered on PIP coverage” and had not been extended to apply to WCPA 16 claims arising under UIM policies. Dkt. No. 66 at 1. 17 This Court disagrees with Amica. While the Peoples Court did not expressly address 18 WCPA claims in the context of UIM coverage, there is no reason to conclude that the Court’s 19 reasoning does not apply equally in such cases. Indeed, as stated in the November 2023 Order, 20 courts in this district following the Peoples decision have allowed insureds to maintain WCPA 21 claims against their insurers in the context of UIM coverage. See Santiago v. GEICO Advantage 22 23 Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5802523, *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2023) (stating WCPA claim for alleged 24 wrongful denial of UIM benefits); Jin v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., 2023 WL 7212543, *4-*5 25 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2023) (same). 26

27 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY DENIES Amica’s motion for 3 reconsideration of the November 2023 Order [Dkt. No. 52]. 4 Dated this 6th day of January 2024. 5

6 A 7 8 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein U .S. District Court Judge 9 10 11

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