Gadson v. Royal/Concord Gardens

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 8, 1996
• Docket: CV-96-001-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Gadson v . Royal/Concord Gardens CV-96-001-M 03/08/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Frederick and Joan Gadson, Plaintiffs, v. Civil N o . 96-1-M

Royal/Concord Gardens Company, Defendant.

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiffs Frederick and Joan Gadson filed an ex

parte motion for temporary restraining order, seeking to

temporarily enjoin their imminent eviction from their federally

subsidized apartment in the Royal/Concord Gardens complex.

An expedited hearing on the motion for TRO was held on March

6, 1996, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiffs and defendant (through counsel)

appeared. See e.g. E.E.O.C. v . Steamship Clerks Union, Local

1066, 48 F.3d 5 9 4 , 608-609 (1st Cir. 1995). Based on the

pleadings and after considering the representations and arguments

presented by all parties, the court concluded that a temporary

restraining order should not issue and denied the motion.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant initiated eviction

proceedings against them for discriminatory reasons based on M r .

Gadson's race (African-American) and because M r . Gadson had

previously made complaints to the property managers related to

safety issues. Defendant denies any discriminatory motive in seeking

plaintiffs' eviction, and describes a procedural history dating

back to August of 1995, when it first served plaintiffs under the

operable lease with a "Notice of Termination of Tenancy and

Requirement to Quit the Premises." In September of 1995,

following receipt of the Notice, plaintiffs filed a complaint

against defendant with the United States Department of Housing

and Urban Development, alleging housing discrimination. In that

complaint, plaintiffs claimed that they were being denied their

rights as tenants and were being retaliated against for having

filed earlier complaints. They also complained that the eviction

action was discriminatory in that it was motivated by plaintiff's

race. According to the form filed by plaintiffs, the

discrimination occurred on August 4 , 1995, or the same day that

the Notice of Termination was signed by defendant's attorney.

The eviction proceeding was contested by plaintiffs, and the

matter was tried in the New Hampshire District Court in Concord

(docket n o . 95-LT-309). On October 1 1 , 1995, that court issued

an order on the merits, holding the eviction to be lawful, and

finding that plaintiffs had breached the terms of their lease by

their continued use of a "burn barrel" in their yard after having

been warned not to do s o , as such use posed a safety hazard and

was not a permitted use of the premises under the lease. That

court also found that defendant initiated the eviction

proceedings based upon plaintiffs' refusal to comply with the

2 terms of the lease and not in retaliation due to M r . Gadson's

petition activities among other tenants or due to his race.

Plaintiffs took an appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,

which court declined the appeal, later reconsidered that

declination, and again declined the appeal, thereby affirming the

district court's findings and rulings.

Similarly, after investigating plaintiffs' September, 1995,

administrative complaint, the Department of Housing and Urban

Development ("HUD") issued a "Notification of Determination of No

Reasonable Cause" on February 1 3 , 1996. HUD found that

"reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory

housing practice has occurred." In an accompanying letter, HUD

explained its bases for determining that no cause existed to

believe that the Fair Housing Act was violated due to

discrimination by defendant.

Plaintiffs then, on February 1 4 , 1996, filed another, nearly

identical, complaint with the New Hampshire Human Rights

Commission ("HRC"). That complaint is pending, and plaintiffs

are seeking an injunction in this court to stop the eviction

proceedings until the state HRC complaint can be investigated and

resolved.

In order to obtain injunctive relief plaintiffs had to show

that: (1) they would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction

were not granted; (2) that such injury would outweigh any harm

inflicted on the defendant if the injunction were granted;

3 (3) that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their

complaint; and (4) that the public interest would not be

adversely affected by the granting of the injunction. Planned

Parenthood League of Massachusetts v . Bellotti, 6 4 1 , F.2d 1006

(1981).

Here, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing

a likelihood of success on the merits. While they allege a

racially discriminatory motive and a retaliatory motive for the

eviction proceedings, all in violation of the Fair Housing Act, a

state court has found against them on the merits of the substance

of those very charges and HUD has found no probable cause to

believe the eviction is in any way violative of plaintiffs'

rights under the Fair Housing Act. If anything, it appears

entirely unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of

their discrimination and Fair Housing Act violation claims.

While the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission may find

otherwise, based upon its own investigation, at this point that

is merely a slender possibility. Nothing suggests that the

outcome of that complaint will likely be different, or that the

plaintiffs' complaint filed in this court will likely be resolved

in their favor. Enjoining the fully litigated eviction order at

this stage, without any reasonable basis to believe plaintiffs

will succeed in proving their racial discrimination and

retaliation claims would be inconsistent with governing law.

Plaintiffs' articulated bases for believing that an unlawful

4 discriminatory animus motivated the eviction are weak and

unpersuasive, consisting of little more than an expression of

that belief.

Accordingly, the motion for temporary restraining order is

denied.

The court does, however, express its appreciation to

defendant's counsel for his having orally agreed at the hearing

to postpone the scheduled March 7 , 1996, eviction for another

week in order to assist plaintiffs' efforts to relocate.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

March 8 , 1996

cc: Frederick Gadson Joan Gadson Harold E . Ekstrom, Esq.