NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2179-24
GABRIELE PIETZ-VOGEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CATHY OLIVER-HOMMES,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted May 5, 2026 – Decided May 15, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1940-24.
Gabriele Pietz-Vogel, self-represented appellant.
Conte Clayton & Austin, PA, attorneys for respondent (Michael A. Austin, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Gabriele Pietz-Vogel, self-represented, appeals from the January
2, 2025 trial court order granting defendant Cathy Oliver-Hommes' motion to dismiss plaintiff's libel complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). Plaintiff also appeals from the April 22, 2025 court
order awarding defendant attorney's fees. Following our review of the parties'
arguments, record, and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
Defendant filed a Probate Part action seeking guardianship of her mother,
Emma Oliver. Defendant has one brother, Boyd Oliver. 1 Plaintiff intervened in
the guardianship proceeding, believing she should be Emma's guardian.
Plaintiff is not related to Emma.
On June 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging "libel" and seeking
"compensation," "an injunction," and "a retraction" of defendant's statements
made relating to the guardianship proceeding. Plaintiff alleged defendant made
false statements consisting of: medical knowledge misrepresentations, financial
misconduct accusations, forgery and fraud allegations, family life implications,
and racial discrimination. Plaintiff submitted with her complaint an attachment
directed to the probate judge, which alleged she learned of defendant's actions
after the guardianship "court appointment." Plaintiff averred defendant "ha[d]
1 Because this matter involves family members with the same surname, we refer to Emma Oliver and Boyd Oliver by their first names. We intend no disrespect. A-2179-24 2 engaged in a pattern of slanderous behavior intended to undermine [her]
reputation and discredit [her] efforts to support Emma . . . and her son, Boyd."
She alleged defendant was defaming and harassing her with "false[]
accus[ations]" of "improper conduct and . . . motivations in helping Emma."
Plaintiff requested "compensation for [her] services, not from Emma nor
Boyd, but solely from . . . [defendant]," because defendant's "malfeasance . . .
[required] Emma . . . to seek [plaintiff's] help." Plaintiff allegedly "devot[ed]
over 100 hours of pro bono services to assist Emma . . . in recovering her . . .
documents and managing her affairs." Plaintiff asserted "[t]he market value of
[her] services" was comparable to "a law firm" and valued between "$10,000 to
$20,000."
On August 26, 2024, defense counsel served plaintiff with a frivolous
litigation letter pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, demanding
plaintiff withdraw her claim within the twenty-eight-day safe harbor period.
Defendant asserted plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for an act of
slander or libel, noting "the statements . . . allege[d] were made . . . in the context
of" or "in relation to . . . [Emma's] guardianship proceeding." Additionally,
defendant posited plaintiff's claim for damages had no legal support.
A-2179-24 3 On August 29, 2024, plaintiff responded to the letter, arguing she had
"consult[ed] with legal counsel" and "maintain[ed] confidence in the merit of
[her] claims against . . . [defendant], which stem[med] from actions that ha[d]
significantly impacted [her] both personally and professionally." Plaintiff
"noted" defendant's "assertion of [the] litigation privilege" but maintained her
"understanding" that it did "not universally apply" and alleged her position was
"supported by legal counsel." She acknowledged defendant's "statements" were
based on "written submissions and [made] within the courtroom setting" during
the guardianship proceeding but alleged they were not protected by the litigation
privilege because they "exceed[ed] the scope of the proceedings and cause[d]
external harm." Regarding the "ongoing legal proceedings," plaintiff alleged
she "witnessed behavior from [defendant] that seriously call[ed] her credibility
and ethics into question."
After plaintiff did not withdraw her complaint, defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim on September
10, 2024. Defendant argued plaintiff's claim was frivolous because the alleged
libelous or defamatory statements stemmed from the guardianship action, which
were protected under the litigation privilege.
A-2179-24 4 On October 31, 2024, the court heard argument on defendant's motion.
Defendant argued dismissal was warranted because the litigation privilege
immunized her alleged statements as they related to the guardianship litigation
and were a product of that action. Plaintiff argued in opposition that defendant
should not have been permitted to "slander" and "talk badly about [her] for four
full court days," "spread[ing] . . . slander in documents that go [to] . . . agencies,
organizations, [and] . . . a lawyer." Plaintiff conceded she did "inject [her]self
into Emma['s] . . . guardianship case" and asserted, "if not for" defendant's
statements made in the proceeding, she "could have become Emma's guardian."
She maintained defendant was being permitted "to hide . . . behind" the litigation
privilege.
On January 2, 2025, the court issued an order accompanied by an oral
decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss. In addressing plaintiff's cause
of action, the court highlighted her "five specific groups of allegations" and
acknowledgment that defendant's alleged misconduct stemmed from the
guardianship proceeding. The court found plaintiff's complaint failed "to state
a claim . . . upon which relief can be granted because[,] even if . . . plaintiff
establishe[d] that the statement was actually made, the alleged libelous
statements made by . . . defendant [we]re protected by the litigation privilege."
A-2179-24 5 The court further reasoned that plaintiff's allegations were "focused on an
excerpt from a certification submitted by . . . defendant in the guardianship
proceeding."2 The court determined dismissal was appropriate, reasoning that
defendant's alleged statements: "were made during the course of the
guardianship proceeding"; stemmed from "defendant [being] a litigant in the
guardianship action"; "were made to achieve the objects of the litigation"; and
"had some connection or logical relation to [defendant's] guardianship
application" that "plaintiff injected herself into."
The court also determined plaintiff's argument that dismissal should be
denied because defendant acted maliciously by filing a frivolous litigation letter
was without merit. It explained defendant was permitted by the court rules and
statute to file a frivolous litigation letter. Regarding damages, the court found
plaintiff's request for compensation for her "services . . . ha[d] no connection to
. . . defendant's allegedly libelous statements." The court noted plaintiff
provided no "legal or logical basis" to support that defendant was obligated to
pay for plaintiff's "services."
2 We note the court references documents it considered with the motion to dismiss that plaintiff has not provided on appeal. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I) (stating the appendix must contain parts of the record "essential to the proper consideration of the issues"). A-2179-24 6 After plaintiff's complaint was dismissed, defendant moved for frivolous
litigation sanctions, which plaintiff opposed. On February 28, 2025, the parties
appeared for oral argument. Initially, the court asked plaintiff if she had filed
an appeal, but she indicated she had not. Defendant argued plaintiff "pursu[ed]
the[] claims in bad faith and for the [purpose] of inflicting harm by increas[ing]
litigation costs against" defendant. To defend against plaintiff's action,
defendant maintained she was forced to incur counsel fees, which were outlined
in defense counsel's certification of services.3
Plaintiff then asserted that she intended to appeal, alleging the court had
not provided her with an opportunity to be heard at the previous hearing, that it
was difficult to find an attorney, and reiterating she would have been Emma's
guardian if defendant had not "slandered her in court." Plaintiff argued
defendant was "a thief, a liar," and "malicious." Plaintiff expressed the court
was "too . . . focused on the rules."
The court found plaintiff failed to demonstrate her complaint "was not
frivolous." The court noted defendant served plaintiff with a frivolous litigation
letter on August 26, 2024, and provided plaintiff notice that defendant would
"seek fees" if she did not withdraw the complaint. Because plaintiff failed to
3 We note defendant's certification of services was not provided on appeal . A-2179-24 7 withdraw the complaint, defendant moved to dismiss, which the court granted.
The court explained if plaintiff wanted to file an appeal, she needed to follow
the court rules and be mindful of the forty-five-day period to file. At the
conclusion of the proceedings, the court advised it would reserve decision.
On April 22, 2025, the court rendered an oral decision accompanied by a
memorializing order granting defendant's motion and awarding $12,642.80 in
frivolous litigation fees.4 After citing N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, the court stated that
a "party who advances the claim or defense raised in bad faith or without a
reasonable basis in law or equity may be held liable for litigations costs and
attorney's fees." Further the court recognized under Rule 1:4-8 "that an attorney
or party proceeding [self-represented,] who signs a pleading, . . . motion, or
other paper in litigation[,] may be subject to sanctions if the document is
presented for an improper purpose or in bad faith."
The court found: plaintiff filed a frivolous complaint and acted in bad
faith, defendant's statements were protected by the litigation privilege, plaintiff
knew the statements were made in the context of the guardianship litigation, and
plaintiff failed to "articulate a connection between her alleged damages and . . .
4 On appeal, plaintiff did not provide the underlying submissions the court considered in support of defendant's motion for Rule 1:4-8 fees. See R. 2:6- 1(a)(1)(I). A-2179-24 8 defendant's statements." Further, the court questioned plaintiff's inconsistent
assertions about obtaining counsel, indicating "her lack of transparency" as to
"the source of her purported legal assistance or the scope of . . . [counsel's]
involvement" suggested bad faith because "she deliberately withheld disclosure
to maintain a procedural advantage often afforded to [self-represented]
litigants."
After a review of the invoices attached to defense counsel's certification
of services "show[ing] the time and expenses expend[ed]," the court found the
fee request and expenditure were reasonable under the Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.5(a). Further, the court recognized that plaintiff did not challenge the
"particular . . . fees" in the submitted certification. The court noted no appeal
was filed but expressed that if an appeal was filed and served, it would be
sufficient cause to stay the order until the Appellate Division rendered a
decision.
Defense counsel advised the court no notice of appeal had been served.
Plaintiff then indicated she had filed an appeal. The court advised plaintiff "if
there was in fact an appeal, . . . [the] order w[ould] be stayed." Plaintiff
thereafter perfected her appeal. On June 9, 2025, we granted plaintiff's motion
A-2179-24 9 to file an amended notice of appeal regarding the court's April 22, 2025 order
awarding defendant attorney's fees.
On appeal, plaintiff contends reversal is warranted because the court:
erred in dismissing the complaint as she sufficiently alleged a libel claim;
improperly awarded attorney's fees, incorrectly found bad faith and frivolous
conduct; should have determined defendant's defamatory statements were not
protected by litigation privilege and are actionable under New Jersey law; and
demonstrated judicial bias and permitted structural errors, depriving plaintiff of
a fair hearing.
II.
We review de novo a trial court's order dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). See
Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021). "A pleading
should be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not
provide one." Arsenis v. Borough of Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195, 205
(App. Div. 2023) (quoting Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone,
423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011)). "When deciding a motion to
dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), the test to determine 'the adequacy of a pleading'
is 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by the facts.'" Doe v. Est. of C.V.O.,
A-2179-24 10 477 N.J. Super. 42, 54 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting MasTec Renewables Constr.
Co. v. SunLight Gen. Mercer Solar, LLC, 462 N.J. Super. 297, 309 (App. Div.
2020)). "[A] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
Strickland v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 27, 38 (App. Div. 2023)
(alteration in original) (quoting Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552
(2019))
"'In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider "allegations in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and
documents that form the basis of a claim."'" AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guar.
& Liab. Ins. Co., 256 N.J. 294, 310-11 (2024) (quoting Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.
Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015)). Courts "may consider
documents specifically referenced in the complaint 'without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment.'" Myska, 440 N.J. Super. at 482
(quoting E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 361 N.J. Super. 362,
365 n.1 (App. Div. 2003), aff'd, 179 N.J. 500 (2004)).
"[T]o establish a prima facie case of defamation (whether denominated
libel or slander), a plaintiff must show that defendant communicated to a third
person a false statement about plaintiff that tended to harm plaintiff's reputation
A-2179-24 11 in the eyes of the community or to cause others to avoid plaintiff." McLaughlin
v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, 331 N.J. Super. 303, 312 (App. Div. 2000). "In
deciding whether a statement is defamatory[,] a court must examine three
factors: content, verifiability, and context." Ibid.
However, "[a] statement made in the course of a judicial proceeding is
absolutely privileged and wholly immune from liability." Williams v.
Kenney, 379 N.J. Super. 118, 133 (App. Div. 2005). Whether a defendant is
entitled to "immunity is a question of law to be decided [as] early in the
proceedings as possible, preferably on a properly supported motion for
summary judgment or dismissal." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J.
375, 387 (2000).
Further, "[i]t is well-settled that a witness in a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding enjoys an absolute immunity from civil suit for his words and
actions relevant to the judicial proceedings." Durand Equip. Co. v. Superior
Carbon Prods., Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 581, 583 (App. Div. 1991). "This
absolute privilege applies 'even if the words are spoken maliciously, without
any justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger . . . .'"
Williams, 379 N.J. Super. at 134 (quoting DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J. Super.
453, 457 (App. Div. 1988)).
A-2179-24 12 The litigation privilege applies to "any communication (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
have some connection or logical relation to the action." Hawkins v. Harris,
141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 369
(Cal. 1990)). It "is not limited to statements made in a courtroom during a
trial; 'it extends to all statements or communications in connection with the
judicial proceeding.'" Ibid. (quoting Ruberton v. Gabage, 280 N.J. Super.
125, 133 (App. Div. 1995)); see also Williams, 379 N.J. Super. at 134
(holding the privilege "is not limited to statements made under oath").
III.
We address together plaintiff's contentions that the court erroneously
dismissed her complaint because she sufficiently stated a claim and found
defendant's defamatory statements were protected by litigation privilege. After
our de novo review of the record, we discern no error.
Plaintiff's claims of libel and slander stem from defendant's statements
made in connection with the guardianship action. Plaintiff's pleading
acknowledged that she learned of defendant's statements after an in-court
guardianship proceeding and from related ongoing legal proceedings. Further,
A-2179-24 13 she admitted injecting herself in the guardianship action and asserted she should
have been Emma's guardian. The record supports the court's finding that
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a viable cause of action because defendant's
statements were protected under the litigation privilege. After a liberal review
of plaintiff's complaint, with included an attached "outline," we reject her
assertion that she sufficiently suggested a cause of action. We therefore discern
no reason to disturb the court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff also challenges the court's award of frivolous litigations fees and
costs. The trial court's decision to award sanctions pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J.
Super. 379, 390 (App. Div. 2009); Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193
(App. Div. 2005).
We first note plaintiff does not challenge the amount of the award or
extent of services rendered but instead asserts the court failed to find facts
supporting bad faith or frivolous conduct warranting a fee award. A review of
the court's oral decision demonstrates otherwise.
The court provided well-supported factual findings regarding plaintiff's
bad faith conduct, specifically her continued litigation of unsupported and
frivolous claims against defendant. The court accurately highlighted plaintiff's
A-2179-24 14 refusal to withdraw the complaint after receiving the frivolous litigation letter,
noting she failed to show any good faith basis for pursuing the complaint. We
also reject plaintiff's additional contention that the court committed "a
jurisdictional error" because she had not served a filed notice of appeal on the
court or defendant. See R. 2:5-1(c)(1) (explaining that "[t]he appellant must
provide a copy of the notice of appeal, transcript request form, and case
information statement to the trial judge . . . who rendered the decision under
review"). Plaintiff does not refute that she failed to serve notice of her appeal
on the court and defendant. The court clearly indicated if an appeal was filed
the award would be stayed. Thus, we are convinced the court appropriately
awarded fees, committing no abuse of discretion.
Finally, we address plaintiff's assertion that the court demonstrated
judicial bias and deprived her of due process. A detailed review of the record
demonstrates plaintiff's claims are without merit. The court fairly considered
plaintiff's submissions, provided her with an ample opportunity to argue, took
the time to explain the court rules, and demonstrated no bias. The court fully
afforded plaintiff "due process," providing "an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106
(1995).
A-2179-24 15 To the extent that we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining contentions,
they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2179-24 16