Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 16, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-08580
StatusUnknown

This text of Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited (Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 23-8580 PA (JCx) Date October 16, 2023 Title Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited, et al.

Present: The Honorable PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Kamilla Sali-Suleyman Not Reported N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendants: None None Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

Before the Court is a Notice of Removal filed by defendant Burberry Limited (“Defendant”). Defendant contends that this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the action filed by plaintiff Gabriela Cortez (“Plaintiff”) based on the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress.” See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction 1s on the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). To invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Defendant must prove that (1) there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A natural person must be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled in a state to establish “state citizenship” for diversity purposes. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). Persons are domiciled in places they reside with the intent to remain or to which they intend to return. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1989). The citizenship of an LLC is the citizenship of its members. See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[L]ike a partnership, an LLC 1s a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.’’).

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 23-8580 PA (JCx) Date October 16, 2023 Title Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited, et al. Here, Defendant alleges and recognizes in its Notice of Removal that both Plaintiff and individual defendant Ana Fragoso (“Fragoso”) are citizens of California, but alleges that Fragoso is a “sham” defendant, and that her citizenship may be disregarded for purposes of establishing diversity. (Notice of Removal at 5:15-22.) In arguing that Fragoso is a “sham” defendant, Defendant contends that she is fraudulently joined. There is an exception to the complete diversity rule for fraudulently joined or “sham defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). A non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined may be disregarded for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). Fraudulent joinder arises if a plaintiff “fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). If the Court finds that the joinder of a non-diverse defendant is fraudulent, that defendant’s presence in the lawsuit is ignored for the purposes of determining diversity. See Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067. “There is a presumption against finding fraudulent joinder, and defendants who assert that plaintiff has fraudulently joined a party carry a heavy burden of persuasion.” Plute v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001). A claim of fraudulent joinder should be denied if there is any possibility that the plaintiff may prevail on the cause of action against the in-state defendant. See id. at 1008, 1012. “The standard is not whether plaintiffs will actually or even probably prevail on the merits, but whether there is a possibility that they may do so.” Lieberman v. Meshkin, Mazandarani, No. C-96-3344 SI, 1996 WL 732506, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1996); see also Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[T]he defendant must demonstrate that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in State court against the alleged sham defendant.”). “In determining whether a defendant was joined fraudulently, the court must resolve ‘all disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the non-removing party.” Plute, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (quoting Dodson v. Spiliada, 951 F.2d 40, 42-43 (Sth Cir. 1992)). A court should remand a case “unless the defendant shows that the plaintiff ‘would not be afforded leave to amend his complaint to cure [the] purported deficiency.’” Padilla v. AT&T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Burris v. AT&T Wireless, Inc., No. C 06-02904 JSW, 2006 WL 2038040, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2006)). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges eleven causes of action relating to the termination of her employment, including several causes of action based on allegations of disability and sex/gender harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff would not be afforded leave to amend her Complaint to state a viable claim against Fragoso. See Rehmani v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 4th 945, 951, 139 Cal.

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.
704 F.2d 1088 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)
Richard J. Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp.
951 F.2d 40 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA
582 F.3d 1039 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Padilla v. AT & T CORP.
697 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. California, 2009)
Good v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
5 F. Supp. 2d 804 (N.D. California, 1998)
Plute v. Roadway Package System, Inc.
141 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. California, 2001)
Roby v. McKesson Corp.
219 P.3d 749 (California Supreme Court, 2009)
Rehmani v. Superior Court
204 Cal. App. 4th 945 (California Court of Appeal, 2012)
Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc.
167 F.3d 1261 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
236 F.3d 1061 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Gabriela Cortez v. Burberry Limited, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gabriela-cortez-v-burberry-limited-cacd-2023.