Gabriel Miranda Jr., Maria Fuentes, Gabriel Miranda Sr., Alexandria Suzanne De Leon, Reuben Antonio De Leon III and Jon Hidalgo Doe v. Norma Jean Farley

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 18, 2019
Docket13-18-00645-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Gabriel Miranda Jr., Maria Fuentes, Gabriel Miranda Sr., Alexandria Suzanne De Leon, Reuben Antonio De Leon III and Jon Hidalgo Doe v. Norma Jean Farley (Gabriel Miranda Jr., Maria Fuentes, Gabriel Miranda Sr., Alexandria Suzanne De Leon, Reuben Antonio De Leon III and Jon Hidalgo Doe v. Norma Jean Farley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Gabriel Miranda Jr., Maria Fuentes, Gabriel Miranda Sr., Alexandria Suzanne De Leon, Reuben Antonio De Leon III and Jon Hidalgo Doe v. Norma Jean Farley, (Tex. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

NUMBER 13-18-00645-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

GABRIEL MIRANDA, JR., DECEASED, MARIA FUENTES, GABRIELMIRANDA, SR., ALEXANDRIA SUZANNE DELEON, REUBEN ANTONIO DELEON, III AND JON HIDALGO DOE, Appellants,

v.

NORMA JEAN FARLEY, M.D., Appellee.

On appeal from the 398th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

This attempted appeal is from an order signed August 21, 2018, granting a motion

to dismiss filed by appellee pursuant to section 74.351(b) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. On March 4, 2019, appellee filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction on the ground that the order being appealed was not a final, appealable

judgment. Appellants filed a response to appellee’s motion on April 1, 2019.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har–Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When orders do not dispose of all pending

parties and claims, the orders remain interlocutory and unappealable until final judgment

is entered unless a statutory exception applies. Id. at 205 (stating that “when there has

not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes

of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly

and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.”).

In their response, appellants claim section 51.014(a)(9) allows the filing of this

interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (West,

Westlaw 2017 through 1st C.S.). Section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas Civil Practices and

Remedies Code provides that an appeal may be brought from an interlocutory order that:

(9) denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351;

Id. Appellants also argue that section 51.014(a)(7) and (8) allow for an interlocutory

appeal under these circumstances. See id. §§ 54.014(a)(7),(8) (West, Westlaw 2017

through 1st C.S.). Section 51.014(a)(7) and (8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code provides that an appeal may be brought from an interlocutory order that:

(7) grants or denies the special appearance of a defendant under Rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except in a suit brought under the Family Code;

(8) grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001;

2 Id. “Because section 51.014’s authorizing of interlocutory appeals is a narrow exception

to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, we must strictly

construe it.” Academy of Oriental Medicine, L.L.C. v. Andra, 173 S.W.3d 184,186 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). In this case, the trial court granted relief sought by a motion

under Section 74.351(b). We lack jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of such an

order because it is neither an order denying relief sought by a motion under 74.351(b),

nor one granting relief sought by a motion under section 74.351(I). Id.; see also Du Bois

v. Irfan, No. 14-15-01032-CV, 2016 WL 1533746, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Apr. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, appellee’s motion is granted and the appeal is ordered dismissed. All

remaining pending motions are dismissed as moot.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice

Delivered and filed the 18th day of April, 2019.

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Related

Academy of Oriental Medicine, L.L.C. v. Andra
173 S.W.3d 184 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)

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Gabriel Miranda Jr., Maria Fuentes, Gabriel Miranda Sr., Alexandria Suzanne De Leon, Reuben Antonio De Leon III and Jon Hidalgo Doe v. Norma Jean Farley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gabriel-miranda-jr-maria-fuentes-gabriel-miranda-sr-alexandria-suzanne-texapp-2019.