Gabriel Eckard v. Alta Langdon

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 19, 2023
• Docket: 21-35729
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GABRIEL ECKARD, AKA Gabriel Allen No. 21-35729 Eckard, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00579-JCC Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

ALTA LANGDON, Health Services Administrator, Snohomish County Jail; JACOB TAYLOR, Mental Health Professional Lead, Snohomish County Jail,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2023**

Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Gabriel Eckard appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). indifference to his serious medical needs while he was a pretrial detainee. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sandoval v.

County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Eckard failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ decision not to

provide him with the specific mental health care he requested was unreasonable

under the circumstances. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125

(9th Cir. 2018) (identifying elements of a pretrial detainee’s inadequate medical

care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, including that “the defendant did not

take reasonable available measures to abate [the risk of suffering serious harm],

even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the

high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct

obvious”); see also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099,

1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment is appropriate where “the nonmoving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eckard’s motions

for additional time to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion and seeking

to extend the discovery deadline. See Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v.

Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 612, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2017) (setting

2 21-35729 forth standard of review and explaining that to prevail on a Rule 56(d) request, a

party must state in an affidavit the specific facts it seeks in further discovery, and

show that such facts exist and are essential to oppose summary judgment); Johnson

v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that a district court has broad discretion to

manage its docket and a moving party must demonstrate “good cause” to modify a

pretrial scheduling order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eckard’s motion for

leave to amend his complaint. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t

of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review

and explaining that denial of leave to amend is warranted if amendment “would

cause prejudice to the opposing party . . . or creates undue delay”); see also

Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court’s

discretion is “particularly broad” where it has previously granted leave to amend).

To the extent Eckard sought to supplement his complaint, denial was not an abuse

of discretion because Eckard’s proposed filing sought to add numerous new

defendants and unrelated causes of action. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v.

Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (a supplemental pleading under Rule

15(d) “cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct, and new cause of action”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

3 21-35729 To the extent Eckard challenges the district court’s order denying his motion

for a preliminary injunction, the issue is moot because Eckard was transferred to a

different institution. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991)

(transfer to another facility moots inmate’s claim for injunctive relief absent

reasonable expectation of being transferred back).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Eckard’s request for a copy of the opening brief, set forth in the opening

brief, is granted. The Clerk will mail Eckard a copy of his opening brief received

at Docket Entry No. 16. All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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