Gabriel Antonio Evans v. El Dorado County Sheriff, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 4, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03408
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GABRIEL ANTONIO EVANS, No. 2:25-cv-3408 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 EL DORADO COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a county inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 without a lawyer. 19 I. Procedural History 20 Shortly after filing the original complaint, plaintiff filed a document styled as an amended 21 complaint (ECF No. 5), which the court construed as a motion to amend because it was not a 22 complete pleading (ECF No. 7). The motion was denied as unnecessary, and plaintiff was 23 instructed to file an amended complaint within thirty days or the court would presume he intended 24 to proceed on the original complaint. Id. Plaintiff proceeded to file a first amended complaint. 25 ECF No. 12. He has also filed a motion for service of summons by the United States Marshal 26 (ECF No. 13), a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 14), a motion for reconsideration of a 27 previous request for counsel (ECF No. 17), and a motion for a sixty-day extension of time (ECF 28 No. 18). 1 II. First Amended Complaint 2 A. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 3 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 5 claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 6 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 7 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Id. at 327. The 8 critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable 9 legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by 10 statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 12 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 13 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). In other words, 14 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 15 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 16 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 17 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 18 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 19 omitted). When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the 20 allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and construe the 21 complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 22 (1969) (citations omitted). 23 B. Factual Allegations of the First Amended Complaint 24 The first amended complaint alleges that defendants El Dorado County Sheriff, 25 Martinova, Lozono, Grover, Hazelet, and Doe violated plaintiff’s rights under the First, Eighth,1 26 1 Plaintiff indicates in the complaint that he was transferred to the jail from the custody of the 27 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, indicating that he is a convicted prisoner and his claims of cruel and unusual punishment therefore arise under the Eighth 28 (continued) 1 and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2025, the El 2 Dorado County Sheriff’s Department housed him in the general population with active gang 3 members even though he is a validated former gang member and snitch, which put his safety at 4 risk. Id. at 4. Upon his arrival, plaintiff twice notified defendant Doe, who he identifies as an 5 intake deputy, about his status as a former gang member and snitch and he requested protective 6 custody. Id. Martinova later told plaintiff that he was being assigned to H-pod, a protective 7 custody housing unit. Id. However, when he was transferred to the housing pod he discovered 8 that it was a general population housing pod, and he was threatened by gang members who told 9 him to leave the pod or he would get hurt. Id. at 5. Upon informing the control tower officer that 10 he had been threatened, plaintiff was escorted by Martinova to solitary confinement where he was 11 housed for sixty days. Id. 12 While in solitary confinement, plaintiff’s food was occasionally contaminated or missing, 13 he was barely given yard time, his requests for forms were either ignored or he was given the 14 wrong forms, and some of his grievances were ignored. Id. He alleges that at one point Hazelet 15 screamed at him to “drop it!” Id. Finally, plaintiff alleges that on January 11, 2026, Hazlet 16 refused to take his outgoing legal mail because he did not have proper envelopes stamped as legal 17 mail, which had never been required in the past. Id. at 6. He asserts that the conduct he was 18 subjected to was discriminatory and retaliatory. Id. at 5-6. 19 C. Failure to State a Claim 20 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 21 complaint does not state any valid claims for relief. Plaintiff has not made any allegations against 22 the El Dorado County Sheriff, Lozono, or Grover and therefore fails to state any claims for relief 23 against them. To the extent plaintiff’s claim that the sheriff’s department placed him in the 24 general population is intended to be a claim against the sheriff, he has not alleged any facts 25

26 Amendment. See Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment is more protective than the Eighth Amendment ‘because the Fourteenth 27 Amendment prohibits all punishment of pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment of convicted prisoners.’” (quoting 28 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004))). 1 demonstrating the sheriff’s personal involvement in his placement. He also has not alleged facts 2 showing that his placement was the result of a policy or practice of the sheriff’s department such 3 that the department or the sheriff would be liable. 4 Although plaintiff has alleged conduct by the Doe defendant, Martinova, and Hazelet, his 5 allegations are insufficient to state any claims for relief against them. There are no facts showing 6 that the Doe defendant failed to report plaintiff’s safety concerns or was responsible for plaintiff’s 7 housing assignment. To the extent he claims Martinova notified him that he was going to H-pod 8 and that it was a protective custody housing unit, while it appears that Martinova was incorrect 9 about the status of H-pod, there are no allegations showing Martinova was aware of plaintiff’s 10 specific safety concerns or had any involvement in plaintiff’s housing assignment. Additionally, 11 while plaintiff alleges Martinova escorted him from H-pod to solitary confinement after he was 12 threatened by other inmates, there are no facts indicating that Martinova was responsible for his 13 extended assignment to solitary confinement. With respect to Hazelet, plaintiff does not explain 14 what Hazelet was referring to when she yelled at him to “drop it,” and even if the court assumes 15 she was referring to a grievance, plaintiff does not identify any additional action by Hazelet 16 related to his pursuit of grievances. A single instance of an officer telling an inmate to drop it, 17 without more, does not constitute conduct that would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from 18 pursuing future protected conduct. Hazelet’s alleged refusal to take plaintiff’s legal mail unless it 19 was in a specific envelope also fails to state a claim for either retaliation or interfering with 20 plaintiff’s access to the courts. There are no facts indicating that Hazelet’s conduct was in 21 retaliation for protected conduct, and plaintiff has not identified what he was trying to mail or 22 how he was injured by the alleged failure to accept the mail unless it was in a marked envelope. 23 Finally, plaintiff has not stated any claims for relief based on his placement in solitary 24 confinement because he has not identified any individual responsible for his conditions of 25 confinement. He also fails to state any claims for discrimination because he has not alleged any 26 facts showing that he was treated differently because of his membership in a protected class or 27 that he was treated differently than other similarly situated prisoners without any legitimate 28 reason. 1 Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding 2 whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with the relevant legal standards 3 governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this order. See Attachment A. 4 Because the complaint does not state any cognizable claims, plaintiff’s motion for service of the 5 complaint will be denied.2 6 D. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 7 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 8 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 9 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named 10 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 11 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 12 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 13 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 14 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 15 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 16 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 17 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 18 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 19 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 20 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 21 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 22 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 23 III. Motions for Appointment of Counsel and for Reconsideration 24 Plaintiff has filed a second motion for appointment of counsel in which he seeks 25

26 2 Plaintiff is informed that it is unnecessary to request service of the complaint because he has been granted in forma pauperis status, which entitles him to service of the complaint by an officer 27 of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“officers of the court shall issue and serve all process”). In the event plaintiff files a complaint for which service is appropriate, the court will order service 28 by the United States Marshal without the need for a motion. 1 appointment on the grounds that he is indigent and suffers from PTSD and ADHD. ECF No. 14. 2 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require 3 counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 4 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the 5 voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 6 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 7 “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the 8 likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims 9 pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 10 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). The burden 11 of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances common to 12 most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish 13 exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. 14 The circumstances outlined by plaintiff are common to most inmates. Moreover, plaintiff 15 has not explained how his PTSD or ADHD prevent him from pursuing this case without 16 assistance of counsel. For these reasons, plaintiff has not shown the existence of extraordinary 17 circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. 18 Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of the denial of his previous motion for appointment of 19 counsel on the ground that he intends to file a Brady/Johnson motion, which requires counsel 20 because “Pitchess inquiries involve ex-parte communications, in camera hearings, and are subject 21 to confidential and privileged personel [sic] records.”3 ECF No. 17. However, the procedures 22 plaintiff references apply to California state or criminal proceedings and are not applicable here. 23 To the extent plaintiff’s motion is based on the argument that he requires counsel to conduct 24 discovery generally, the request is premature. Plaintiff has not yet stated a cognizable claim for

25 3 Plaintiff appears to be referring to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (recognizing 26 prosecutor’s due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence); People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696 (2015) (holding a criminal defendant may use Pitchess procedures to 27 obtain disclosure of Brady material in an officer’s personnel file); and Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974) (establishing process for discovery of otherwise confidential personnel 28 records in California). 1 relief and discovery has therefore not begun. Moreover, once discovery commences, plaintiff can 2 always file a motion to compel if he believes his requests for discovery are inappropriately 3 denied. Plaintiff therefore fails to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances 4 warranting the appointment of counsel and the motion for reconsideration will be denied. 5 IV. Motion for Extension of Time 6 Plaintiff has filed a motion for a sixty-day extension of time. ECF No. 18. However, he 7 does not identify the deadline he seeks to extend and at the time he filed the motion there were no 8 deadlines pending. The motion will therefore be denied. 9 V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 10 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 11 claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If 12 you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this 13 order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights. 14 Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 15 CONCLUSION 16 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. Plaintiff’s request for service (ECF No. 13) is DENIED. 18 2. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 14) is DENIED. 19 3. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 17) is DENIED. 20 4. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 18) is DENIED. 21 5. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 23 6. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 24 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 25 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 26 number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 27 7. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 28 recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 |} Procedure. 2 8. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 3 || form used in this district. 4 | DATED: May 4, 2026 ~

ALLISON CLAIRE 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 Attachment A 2 This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may 3 apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an 4 amended complaint. 5 I. Failure to Protect 6 “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. 7 First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or 8 omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer 9 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, 10 the prison official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, “one of deliberate 11 indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 12 official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an 13 excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. He must then fail to take reasonable 14 measures to lessen the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. Negligent failure to protect an 15 inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 835. 16 II. Conditions of Confinement 17 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 18 inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks and 19 citation omitted). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 20 requirements are met.” Id. at 834. 21 “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. (quoting 22 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). To be sufficiently serious, “a prison official’s act or 23 omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. 24 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the 25 prison setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 26 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth 27 Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 28 “More modest deprivations can also form the objective basis of a violation, but only if such 1 deprivations are lengthy or ongoing.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 732. Placement in administrative 2 segregation, by itself, does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Anderson 3 v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (“administrative segregation, even in a 4 single cell for twenty-three hours a day, is within the terms of confinement ordinarily 5 contemplated by a sentence” (citation omitted)). 6 Second, the prison official must subjectively have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” 7 “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations 8 omitted). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 9 that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. He 10 must then fail to take reasonable measures to lessen the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 11 847. If a prison official’s response to a known risk is reasonable, they “cannot be found liable.” 12 Id. at 845. Negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 13 835. 14 III. Retaliation 15 To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege defendants (1) took adverse action 16 against plaintiff (2) because of (3) plaintiff’s protected conduct, and that the action (4) would chill 17 an inmate of reasonable firmness from future protected conduct and (5) lacked a legitimate 18 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 19 An adverse action is an act (or failure to act) by prison officials which causes harm, and 20 “the mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out.” 21 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). To show 22 defendants retaliated “because of” the plaintiff’s actions, the plaintiff must show the defendants 23 were motivated by his protected conduct. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998) 24 (proof of defendant’s general animosity toward plaintiff would not necessarily show her conduct 25 was motivated by plaintiff’s protected conduct). Protected conduct refers to acts taken by the 26 plaintiff that are protected by the First Amendment and may include lawsuits and grievances, as 27 well as verbal complaints or threats to sue. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (prisoners have a First 28 Amendment right to file prison grievances and pursue civil litigation); Shepard v. Quillen, 840 1 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 2016) (prisoners have “First Amendment right to report staff 2 misconduct”); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015) (threats to sue constitute 3 protected conduct); Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) (form of complaint, 4 including verbal, “is of no constitutional significance”). 5 IV. Equal Protection 6 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 7 similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 8 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 9 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him 10 based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th 11 Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, a 12 plaintiff may state an equal protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were 13 intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate government 14 purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). 15 V. Access to the Courts 16 A prison’s interference with legal mail may violate an inmate’s right of access to the 17 courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due 18 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th 19 Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the 20 courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. 21 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 22 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the 23 courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to 24 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 25 frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 26 VI. Personal Involvement and Supervisory Liability 27 “Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,” 28 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 1 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 2 rights violations are not sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) 3 (citations omitted). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, 4 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 5 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 6 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 7 1978) (citation omitted). In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff 8 must link each individual defendant with some affirmative act or omission that shows a violation 9 of plaintiff’s federal rights. 10 Furthermore, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983,” Taylor v. 11 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), which means that a supervisor 12 cannot be held responsible for the conduct of his subordinates just because he is their supervisor. 13 “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor 14 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 15 them.” Id. A supervisor may also be liable, without any personal participation, if he 16 “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 17 rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 18 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)). 19 VII. County Liability 20 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 21 employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is 22 when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 23 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 24 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. To properly plead a Monell 25 claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) 26 he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; 27 (3) such policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the 28 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 1 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the 2 result of a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of 3 the local government entity.” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. 4 City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28