Gabriel and Gabriel

501 P.3d 17, 315 Or. App. 280

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: October 20, 2021
• Docket: A168332
• Status: Published

Opinion

Submitted April 3, 2020, affirmed October 20, 2021

In the Matter of the Marriage of Cameron Morin GABRIEL, Petitioner-Appellant, and Mary GABRIEL, Respondent-Respondent. Jackson County Circuit Court 17DR10640; A168332 501 P3d 17

Timothy C. Gerking, Judge. George W. Kelly filed the briefs for appellant. Mary Gabriel filed the brief pro se. Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Mooney, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. Cite as 315 Or App 280 (2021) 281

PER CURIAM In this marital dissolution case, husband appeals a judgment that divides the parties’ property and awards wife compensatory and maintenance spousal support; husband further appeals a supplemental judgment awarding wife half of her attorney fees. Husband contends that the trial court erred in its property division, in awarding compensa- tory support in any amount, in awarding maintenance sup- port in the amount that it did, and in awarding wife attorney fees. We reject without discussion husband’s challenges to the property division, the total amount of spousal support, and attorney fees. And, as we explain below, because hus- band’s argument as to whether any compensatory support is appropriate relies on a view of the facts that is inconsistent with the applicable standard of review, we reject that chal- lenge as well. Accordingly, we affirm. A detailed discussion of the facts and our analysis in this case would not significantly benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. We decline husband’s request for de novo review. ORS 19.415(3)(b); ORAP 5.40(8)(c). Thus, we review the trial court’s conclusion that wife qualified for an award of compensatory support because she made “a signifi- cant financial or other contribution * * * to the education, training, vocational skills, career or earning capacity of” husband, ORS 107.105(1)(d)(B), for legal error. Harris and Harris, 349 Or 393, 401, 244 P3d 801 (2010). We review the court’s implicit and explicit factual findings underlying that ruling for any evidence. Andersen and Andersen, 258 Or App 568, 570, 310 P3d 1171 (2013). Following a two-day trial, the court issued a letter opinion setting out its factual findings and legal conclusions in some detail. In relevant part, the court agreed with wife that she was entitled to an award of compensatory spou- sal support. The court held that “compensatory support is appropriate for her efforts and support, both financial and otherwise, in rehabilitating husband’s career and sacrific- ing her own career and personal goals in order to advance the career goals of husband.” We understand that ruling to reference two sepa- rate phases in the parties’ marriage during which, the trial 282 Gabriel and Gabriel

court reasoned, wife’s efforts and choices contributed to hus- band’s career and earning capacity. The first contribution took place at the beginning of the marriage, when, due to wife providing a home, paying half the mortgage, and shar- ing other bills, husband was able to clear up his substantial debt, his outstanding criminal charges, and his credit rat- ing. In the trial court’s view, wife’s second significant con- tribution occurred when husband persuaded her to move with him to Los Angeles—leaving two jobs and selling her house in the process—so that husband could take a job in which he earned substantially more than he ever previously had. As noted, the threshold showing for an award of compensatory spousal support is that “there has been a significant financial or other contribution by one party to the education, training, vocational skills, career or earning capacity of the other party.” ORS 107.105(1)(d)(B). Husband asserts that wife did not make the necessary showing. In support of that argument, husband points to facts presented at trial that, he contends, demonstrate that wife made no significant contributions to his career or earning capacity. However, husband’s contentions are based on a view of the facts that is inconsistent with the trial court’s explicit and implicit findings. For example, he contends that wife did not contribute to husband’s improved career prospects early in their marriage. The trial court found, however, that during that time, wife’s contributions to husband’s financial stabil- ity and living expenses benefitted his career and earning capacity. Husband further contends that, before the parties moved to Los Angeles in 2012, wife had not in fact been working. Again, however, viewed in the light most favor- able to the court’s conclusion, the record supports a finding that the move to Los Angeles led to wife leaving two jobs. Husband disputes that view of the record and contends that the move did not affect wife’s career, noting that she con- tinued to work for the same company while they were in California and again after the parties returned to Oregon. However, he fails to acknowledge the trial court’s express findings that she worked only a modest amount for her Oregon employer following the move; that her work for that employer was also limited even after their return; and that Cite as 315 Or App 280 (2021) 283

her graphic design business “really [went] nowhere” over the same span of time. Ultimately, husband’s challenge to the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions—which husband con- tends are insufficiently explained—amounts to a different view of the facts rather than any inadequacy in the factual basis for the court’s conclusion. Absent de novo review, we must accept the trial court’s findings if there is any evi- dence to support them; accordingly, that challenge must fail. Andersen, 258 Or App at 570 (review of trial court’s implicit and explicit factual findings is for “any evidence”). That is, husband’s demonstration that the evidence could support different factual findings and, consequently, different legal conclusions does not establish that the trial court erred in its determination that wife made significant financial or other contributions to husband’s education, training, voca- tional skills, career, or earning capacity. Finally, husband contends that, because the dispar- ity in the parties’ respective earning capacities is not great, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding wife compensatory support. Husband does not dispute that his earning capacity exceeds $8,000 per month. He contends, however, that wife could earn $5,000 per month. In hus- band’s view, that difference in earning capacities is insuf- ficient to justify the award. Even assuming that an almost 40 percent greater annual income is not sufficient to jus- tify some amount of support, we must reject that argument. Like husband’s other argument, his contention regarding the parties’ earning capacities fails to account for the trial court’s view of the record. The trial court found that wife was presently disabled and would continue to be so for an additional year or two, such that the $200 per month that she was earning at the time of trial was her earning capac- ity. Given that finding, husband’s argument cannot succeed. Affirmed.