Gabbard v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Gabbard v. State

744 So. 2d 1075, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 12516, 1999 WL 743924

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 22, 1999

DocketNo. 99-0788

StatusPublished

This text of 744 So. 2d 1075 (Gabbard v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Gabbard v. State, 744 So. 2d 1075, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 12516, 1999 WL 743924 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

STEVENSON, J.

Bruce W. Gabbard, the appellant, contends that section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes, which prescribes increasingly severe punishment for successive convictions of driving with a suspended license, is unconstitutionally vague. Gabbard argues that the statute’s failure to define “conviction,” combined with this court’s decision that a withheld adjudication is a “conviction” under the statute,¹ renders the statute vague by failing to provide the average person with notice of the proscribed conduct. The record reveals, however, that, at the time of his plea, Gabbard had twelve prior convictions in the “commonly accepted” meaning of the word, i.e., adjudications of guilt. Thus, since Gabbard’s conduct falls within the scope of that clearly prohibited by the statute, he lacks standing to raise this constitutional challenge. See Jean v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1392, — So.2d -, 1999 WL 393477 (Fla. 4th DCA June 16,1999).

AFFIRMED.

WARNER, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur.

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STEVENSON, J.

Bruce W. Gabbard, the appellant, contends that section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes, which prescribes increasingly severe punishment for successive convictions of driving with a suspended license, is unconstitutionally vague. Gabbard argues that the statute’s failure to define “conviction,” combined with this court’s decision that a withheld adjudication is a “conviction” under the statute,¹ renders the statute vague by failing to provide the average person with notice of the proscribed conduct. The record reveals, however, that, at the time of his plea, Gabbard had twelve prior convictions in the “commonly accepted” meaning of the word, i.e., adjudications of guilt. Thus, since Gabbard’s conduct falls within the scope of that clearly prohibited by the statute, he lacks standing to raise this constitutional challenge. See Jean v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1392, — So.2d -, 1999 WL 393477 (Fla. 4th DCA June 16,1999).

AFFIRMED.

WARNER, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur.

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744 So. 2d 1075, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 12516, 1999 WL 743924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gabbard-v-state-fladistctapp-1999.

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