G. W. S. Service Stations, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.

75 Misc. 2d 40, 346 N.Y.S.2d 132, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1782
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 27, 1973
StatusPublished

This text of 75 Misc. 2d 40 (G. W. S. Service Stations, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
G. W. S. Service Stations, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 Misc. 2d 40, 346 N.Y.S.2d 132, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1782 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1973).

Opinion

J. Courtney McGroarty, J.

This action is brought by a ■group of gas service station operators in the Borough of Brook[41]*41lyn' against Amoco Oil Co. (hereinafter referred to as the Company) wherein they seek a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to fill all their orders for gasoline with reasonable promptness. By orders to show cause dated May 10,1973, plaintiffs were granted a stay until the return date of the motion, and defendant was ordered and restrained from refusing to fill all orders made by the plaintiffs of the defendant for gasoline with reasonable promptness. The stay continues in effect and the trial of the action has now been had.

The plaintiff Salvatore ft. Civello operates a station at 6302 Avenue N under the name of G. W. S. Service Stations, Inc.; the plaintiff Gideon Tung and one Seymour Leopold operate a station at 2570 East 17th Street under the name of Dial Motor Sales, Inc.; the plaintiff Reynaldo Grullion operates a station at 865 Rogers Avenue under the name of Grullion Bros. Auto Service, Inc.; the plaintiff Mahfus Allan operates a station at 4001 Fourth Avenue under the name of Allan Bros. Auto Service, Inc.; the plaintiffs Konstantinos Hatzizisis and George Varikos operate a station at 7310 New Utrecht Avenue; and the plaintiff Tona Benyaminy operates a station at 1775 Coney Island Avenue under the name of Double Four Way Car Wash Corp.

All of the plaintiffs except Konstantinos Hatzizisis and George Varikos and plaintiff Tona Benyaminy operate under written dealers agreement signed on behalf of the defendant, and plaintiffs Konstantinos Hatzizisis and Tona Benyaminy have been receiving deliveries under contracts signed by them but not signed on behalf of the defendant, reference to which will be made hereinafter. The contracts are all similar in form and in substance provide that the Company agrees to sell and deliver and the dealer agrees to purchase such quantities of specified type of Amoco gasoline as the dealer may order from titile to time during the one-year period of the agreement. Paragraph 4 thereof provides as follows: “ Company agrees to fill all orders with reasonable promptness but shall not be held responsible for losses resulting from delays in filling orders or failure to make delivery by reason of interruption of transportation, fires, strikes, picketing, or any cause beyond Company’s control. Company reserves the right to comply with any order or request of any governmental authority or agency. If such compliance results in any change in the quantity, price or point of delivery, or in the performance of any other obligations of Company under this contract, all future obligations of both parties shall cease unless such change is satisfactory to Dealer.”

[42]*42Among the affirmative defenses interposed in the Company’s answer is section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. That section provides in part :

Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance :
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
“ (b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller’s capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.”

Equity took jurisdiction of this case on a showing by plaintiffs that the failure of the Company to make daily deliveries as required under the terms of its contract constituted a continuing breach which ultimately would result in a multiplicity of suits, and the failure of the Company to meet their demands would result in irreparable injury to them and effect a loss of their business.

Equity has from early times decreed that mandatory injunctions are not readily granted and constitute one of the most severe forms of provisional remedies when granted on a preliminary or final basis. They can be fraught -with extreme danger and should therefore be granted with extreme caution inasmuch as the granting thereof may result in as much injustice as it would promote justice (Brown v. Newall [1837], 2 Myl. & Cr. 558, 570).

In Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. Co. (Fed. Cas. No. 1,617 [1830]), Baldwin, J., wrote: “ There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing [of] an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.” (V. 3, p. 827.) Every case therefore must depend upon its own circumstances and- the [43]*43court will not interfere by way of mandatory injunction except in cases in which extreme, or in all events very serious damage will ensue from withholding thereof (Durell v. Pritchard [1865], 1 Ch. App. 244; see, also, Lexington & Fortieth Corp. v. Callaghan, 281 N. Y. 526; Veal v. Scheiner, 18 Misc 2d 962).

■The justification for granting a mandatory injunction and the circumstances under which it will properly lie are well summarized in High on Injunctions (vol. 1, 7th ed., 5-6, 1905) as follows: “ While the jurisdiction of equity by way of mandatory injunction is rarely exercised, and while its existence has even been questioned, it is nevertheless too firmly established to admit to doubt * " * It is to be observed, however, that courts of equity rarely interfere to command the doing of a positive act, but the same result is obtained by framing the injunction in an indirect form and prohibiting the defendant from doing the reverse of what he is desired to do. Even then the jurisdiction is exercised with extreme caution * * * And in determining whether to grant relief by way of mandatory injunction courts of equity will take into consideration the relative convenience and inconvenience which would result to the parties from granting or withholding the relief

It is on that basis that the court considers the determination of the issues here presented, having in mind that equity will not hesitate to act when justice requires its intervention.

On May 23, 1973 the Department of the Treasury issued a voluntary program for the allocation of crude oil and refinery products (38 Fed. Reg., p. 13588). The regulation contains guidelines for allocation established by the Federal Government. The general policy direction is vested in the Oil Policy Committee and day-to-day administration of the program has been assigned to the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior. The regulation requires suppliers to make available to their customers the same percentage of their total supply of crude oil and products that they provided during the corresponding quarter of the base period.

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Related

Lexington & Fortieth Corp. v. Callaghan
24 N.E.2d 316 (New York Court of Appeals, 1939)
Veal v. Scheiner
18 Misc. 2d 962 (New York Supreme Court, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
75 Misc. 2d 40, 346 N.Y.S.2d 132, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1782, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/g-w-s-service-stations-inc-v-amoco-oil-co-nysupct-1973.