G. Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB)

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 10, 2024
Docket85 C.D. 2022
StatusUnpublished

This text of G. Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB) (G. Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
G. Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB), (Pa. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

German Sanchez, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 85 C.D. 2022 : Submitted: December 4, 2023 Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. : (Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board), : Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: January 10, 2024

German Sanchez (Claimant) petitions for review of an Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming a Decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) that granted the Petition to Modify Compensation Benefits (Modification Petition) filed by Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (Employer) and modified Claimant’s disability status from temporary total disability (TTD) to temporary partial disability (TPD) based upon an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) performed under Section 306(a.3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act), 1 0F

which was added by Section 1 of the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111 (Act 111). Claimant argues Act 111 is a substantive change in the law and its 1F

retroactive application divests him of a vested right in the continuation of workers’ compensation benefits in violation of the Remedies Clause of article I, section 11 of

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 511.3. the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.2 Claimant further recognizes 3F

this Court has rejected such arguments in Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company LLC), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 261 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2021), but nonetheless asks the Court to reconsider that holding. The instant matter raises purely legal issues, and the pertinent facts are not in dispute. On July 15, 2004, Claimant suffered a work injury after being pinned against a wall by a backhoe. (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 3(d).) Claimant suffered what Employer described as a lumber sprain and strain. (Modification Petition, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 4a.) On July 25, 2019, Claimant was ordered by another WCJ to attend an IRE, which was originally scheduled for January 15, 2019. (FOF ¶ 1.) Despite receiving notice of the January IRE, Claimant did not actually undergo the IRE with Christopher Belletieri, D.O. until September 5, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3(c).) Based on his evaluation, Dr. Belletieri determined Claimant had a 33% impairment rating using the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, second printing (Guides). (Id. ¶ 3(c), (i).) On October 16, 2019, Employer filed the 4F

Modification Petition, seeking to have Claimant’s benefits changed from TTD to TPD based upon the IRE. (R.R. at 4a.)

2 The Remedies Clause provides, in relevant part:

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. . . .

PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.

2 Before the WCJ, Employer submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Belletieri, which detailed the IRE and his opinions.3 Claimant testified at a video hearing on his own behalf.4 He did not offer any medical evidence to challenge the impairment rating. (FOF ¶ 6.) While Claimant argued the IRE was premature, the WCJ found the argument unpersuasive and modified Claimant’s benefits to TPD as of January 15, 2019, the date the IRE was originally scheduled. (Id. ¶ 8.) Claimant appealed to the Board arguing Act 111 could not be retroactively applied to him because his injury predated its effective date. Alternatively, Claimant argued an IRE could not be performed until 104 weeks after Act 111 became effective. Noting that constitutional issues are outside its purview, the Board nonetheless stated it was proper for it to apply appellate court precedent that has addressed constitutional issues. Citing Section 3 of Act 1115 and this Court’s interpretation of that provision in Rose Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Espada), 238 A.3d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), and Pierson, the Board

3 Dr. Belletieri’s deposition testimony and related exhibits can be found in the Reproduced Record at pages 124a through 172a and is summarized in finding of fact 3. 4 Claimant’s testimony can be found in the Reproduced Record at pages 59a through 100a and is summarized in finding of fact 4. 5 Section 3 of Act 111 provides:

(1) For the purposes of determining whether an employee shall submit to a medical examination to determine the degree of impairment and whether an employee has received total disability compensation for the period of 104 weeks under [S]ection 306(a.3)(1) of the [WC A]ct, an insurer shall be given credit for weeks of total disability compensation paid prior to the effective date of this paragraph. This section shall not be construed to alter the requirements of [S]ection 306(a.3) of the [WC A]ct.

(2) For the purposes of determining the total number of weeks of partial disability compensation payable under [S]ection 306(a.3)(7) of the [WC A]ct, an insurer shall be given credit for weeks of partial disability compensation paid prior to the effective date of this paragraph.

3 concluded Claimant’s arguments were previously addressed and rejected by this Court and, therefore, affirmed the WCJ’s Decision. Thereafter, Claimant filed a timely Petition for Review with this Court. 6 5F

Claimant argues Act 111 essentially reinstituted the IRE provisions that the Supreme Court had declared invalid.7 Because Act 111 purports to apply to all injuries, regardless of when they occurred, Claimant argues applying Act 111’s provisions to a claimant like him, whose injury predates the effective date of Act 111, results in Act 111 being retroactively applied, despite it being a substantive change in the law. As a result, Claimant asserts it violates his vested right under the Remedies Clause to be free from the IRE process. Even if Act 111 was applicable, Claimant asserts that the IRE was premature because 104 weeks had not passed since Act 111’s enactment. Claimant further argues Pierson, which holds otherwise, was wrongly decided and should be revisited. Employer responds that this Court has previously rejected Claimant’s arguments and substantial, competent evidence supports the grant of its Modification Petition. Thus, the Court should affirm the Board’s Order.

6 Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Minteer), 762 A.2d 328, 331 n.2 (Pa. 2000). 7 In Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the IRE provision found in former Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act, added by Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, repealed by Act 111, as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Act 111 differs from its predecessor in a couple ways. First, it specifies that IREs are to be performed using the Sixth Edition, “second printing April 2009” version of the Guides, instead of “the most recent edition of the . . . Guides,” as the former IRE provision did. Compare 77 P.S. § 511.3, with former 77 P.S. § 511.2.

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Related

Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
762 A.2d 328 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
Protz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
161 A.3d 827 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)

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G. Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/g-sanchez-v-petrolongo-contractors-inc-wcab-pacommwct-2024.