Fuwei Films (Shandong) Co., Ltd. v. United States

837 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 2012 CIT 69, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1583, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 71, 2012 WL 1959327
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJune 1, 2012
DocketConsol. 11-00061
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 837 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (Fuwei Films (Shandong) Co., Ltd. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Fuwei Films (Shandong) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 2012 CIT 69, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1583, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 71, 2012 WL 1959327 (cit 2012).

Opinion

OPINION and ORDER

GORDON, Judge:

This consolidated action involves an administrative review conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) of the antidumping duty order covering Polyethylene Terephthalate (“PET”) Film from the People’s Republic of China. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film from the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed.Reg. 9,758 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 22, 2011) {“Final Results”) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum, A-570-924 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://ia. ita.doe.gov/frn/summary/prc/2011-3909-1. pdf (last visited June 1, 2012) {“Decision Memorandum”). Before the court are motions for judgment on the agency record filed by Fuwei Films (Shandong) Co., Ltd., and Shaoxing Xiangyu Green Packing Co., Ltd. (“Green”), respondents in the administrative proceeding (collectively “Respondents”), and DuPont Teijin Films, Mitsubishi Polyester Film, Inc., SKC, Inc., and Toray Plastics (America), Inc. (collectively “DuPont”), petitioners in the administrative proceeding. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006), 1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006).

Respondents challenge Commerce’s (1) surrogate valuation of labor inputs, (2) alleged clerical errors for Green’s packing material and per-unit electricity and water, and (3) surrogate valuation of PET chips. 2 DuPont also challenges the surrogate valuation of Respondents’ PET chips. For the reasons set forth below, this matter is remanded to Commerce.

I. Standard of Review

For administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders, the court sustains determinations, findings, or conclusions of the U.S. Department of Commerce unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing agency determinations, findings, or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court assesses whether the agency action is reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed.Cir.2006). Substantial evidence has been described as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dupont Teijin Films USA v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Substantial evidence has also been de *1350 scribed as “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). Fundamentally, though, “substantial evidence” is best understood as a word formula connoting reasonableness review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 9.24[1] (3d. ed. 2011). Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence issue raised by a party, the court analyzes whether the challenged agency action “was reasonable given the circumstances presented by the whole record.” Edward D. Re, Bernard J. Babb, and Susan M. Koplin, 8 West’s Fed. Forms, National Courts § 13342 (2d ed. 2010).

II. Discussion

A.Voluntary Remand

Commerce has requested a voluntary remand to (1) address Respondents’ arguments regarding the surrogate value for the labor input, and (2) correct a clerical error in Green’s per-unit water and electricity costs, which the court will grant. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed.Cir.2001).

B.Green’s other Clerical Error Allegation

When calculating Green’s packing material expenses for the preliminary results, Commerce included a space between a parenthesis and a slash mark in a line of computer code. Green did not raise this issue in its case brief, nor did Green raise the issue as a clerical error submission following issuance of the Final Results. Green has instead raised this issue for the first time in its opening brief in this action, alleging that the extra space caused an error in the conversion (or non-conversion) of units from tons to kilos.

The extra space actually has no effect whatsoever on the calculation. Defendant explains that the software computes each instruction line as a whole. Def.’s Br. at 16 n. 5, Nov. 30, 2011, ECF No. 55 (quoting-SAS Institute, Inc., SAS 9.3 Language Reference: Concepts 21 (Cary, NC SAS Institute, Inc. 2011) (“A blank [space] is not treated as a character in a SAS statement unless it is enclosed in quotation marks .... [therefore, you can put multiple blanks any place in a SAS statement where you can put a single blank. It has no effect on the syntax.”)). In its reply brief, Green raises an entirely new argument about an apparently different clerical error affecting the converted or calculated weight of Green’s plastic caps. See Respondents’ Reply Br. at 11-12, Jan. 4, 2012, ECF No. 58-1 (“Plaintiffs initially believed that this error was reflected in the identified instruction. Apparently it was not.”). The time of one’s reply brief, however, is not the opportune moment to figure out the specifics of one’s argument, and introduce a brand new theory. See Scheduling Order at 6, July 14, 2011, ECF No. 36 (“The reply brief may not introduce new arguments.”). The court will therefore sustain Commerce’s treatment of Green’s packing expenses.

C.Surrogate Valuation of PET Chip Inputs

When valuing the factors of production in a non-market economy proceeding, Commerce must use the “best available information” when selecting surrogate data from “one or more” surrogate market economy countries. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l), (4). Commerce’s regulations provide that surrogate values should “normally” be publicly available and from a single surrogate country. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c) (2008). Commerce prefers data that reflects a broad market average, is publicly available, contemporaneous with *1351

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837 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 2012 CIT 69, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1583, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 71, 2012 WL 1959327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuwei-films-shandong-co-ltd-v-united-states-cit-2012.