Funderburk v. Southwestern Iron Corp.

180 So. 2d 4, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4042
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 28, 1965
DocketNo. 10446
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 180 So. 2d 4 (Funderburk v. Southwestern Iron Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Funderburk v. Southwestern Iron Corp., 180 So. 2d 4, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4042 (La. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

"GLADNEY, Judge.

This srtit was instituted under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (LSA-R.S. 23 :1021-23:1351) for total and permanent disability benefits and for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees. After trial on the merits of the case the court held the employee had sustained an employment accident as described by him and that it was a compensable injury. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and compensation awarded at the rate of $14.91 per week, not to exceed 300 weeks. Also the court assessed a penalty of 12% on the total amount of compensation granted and fixed attorney’s fees at $250.00. Plaintiff and defendant have appealed.

The issues raised by this appeal concern the extent and duration of the disability, computation of the weekly payments of compensation, and the assessment of penalties and attorney’s fees.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant to disassemble and dismantle old automobile motors in furtherance of the defendant’s scrap metal business. It is alleged the employee sustained an employment injury which necessitated amputation of the middle finger of his right hand. Funderburk, a 38 year old father of seven children, had lost his left arm by amputation as a result of a childhood accident. On July 2, 1964 the middle finger of his right hand received a mashing injury. He explained that the injury occurred when a sledge hammer having a steel shaft handle pinched and mashed the finger against a motor block he was cleaning. The account of the injury as related by plaintiff was corroborated by plaintiff’s brother-in-law who witnessed the accident and by his wife who dressed the wound when her husband returned to his home.

The injury required clinical treatment on July 4, 1964 at the Confederate Memorial Plospital in Shreveport, and, after medication had proved ineffective, the finger was amputated by the resident orthopedic surgeon at the hospital. An inflamed and tender condition developed in the stump of the finger with inability to close a “tight fist” with the right hand. Tenderness at the stump of the amputated finger was still present at the time of the trial and a preponderance of the medical testimony indicated that the employee could not resume the work he was performing prior to his injury.

The defendant employer did not carry workmen’s compensation insurance. After being notified of the accident, and upon the request of the injured employee, “advances” of $20.00 per week were made, totaling $192.00, the last payment being made on September 11, 1964. Thereafter, notwithstanding demands made, the defendant refused to make further payments.

The record contains the testimony of five doctors of medicine and one osteopath, all of whom testified with respect to the extent and duration of the injury and the disability involved. In reaching the conclusion the employee had sustained temporary total disability as distinguished from permanent total disability, the trial court obviously was of the opinion recovery would result within three hundred weeks without diminution of earning capacity. The position taken by the employer is that the amputation of the middle finger of the right hand has not caused any loss of the ability of the employee to earn as much as he did prior to the injury.

As of the date of trial, approximately six months after the accident, all of the medical examiners found tenderness and [6]*6inflammation at the stump of the missing finger with inability to close a “tight fist”, and it was thought such condition would clear up after treatment. Of more importance, however, is the question as to the loss of use of the hand and arm as occasioned by the amputation of the finger and whether or not disability in this respect would permanently impair the ability of the employee to earn a living.

Medical testimony was given by Doctors Paul Campbell, osteopath, Ray E. King and Edwin Simonton, orthopedic surgeons, I. F. Hawkins, general practitioner, and Herbert Plauche and Herman May, resident and intern doctors at the Confederate Memorial Hospital. We briefly refer to the testimony of these witnesses. Dr. Campbell expressed the opinion the amputation had injured tendons and this prevented plaintiff from making a fist with his right hand. After administering physiotherapy he decided his treatments were ineffective and referred the patient to an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Campbell thought plaintiff would never ably perform any work that required gripping an object and could not do any work requiring the use of a sledge hammer. Dr. May was of the opinion the employee would not be able to swing a sledge hammer more than a few times continuously and could not perform a full day’s work. Dr. Plauche was of a similar opinion. Dr. Hawkins at the time of trial found plaintiff could not close his hand but thought with six weeks of physiotherapy he would be able to close his hand and resume the work which he had previously done. Dr. King after examining the hand during the trial testified the stump was tender and plaintiff could not make a full fist. He was of the opinion the employee would have difficulty in competing in the labor market, explaining that the amputation of the finger is a secondary cause to the prior loss of the lower portion of plaintiff’s left arm, that the employee could perform the same work as prior to the amputation but with decreased efficiency and occasional pain. Dr. Simonton’s opinion was that plaintiff would not be able to change tires without difficulty, nor could he lift a sledge hammer and continuously use it without considerable difficulty. After weighing these opinions we think it improbable that plaintiff could obtain employment at a service station or the work he was doing at the time of the accident. The plaintiff’s work record reveals no previous employment other than in a service station and at the job with defendant. He was not qualified through his education for employment except at jobs requiring physical labor.

The impact of such evidence is that the employee will necessarily find it most difficult to perform the same work in the future even if there should be complete healing of his finger and hand. Any work performed must be accomplished with four instead of five fingers. Thus it seems purely speculative to expect the hand will be as useful with the finger missing.

Our holding is that plaintiff must be considered as totally and permanently disabled under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Our courts have firmly established the principle that the employer must take the worker as he finds him and as a consequence of this rule in determining disability the loss of plaintiff’s left hand plays a significant part in this decision. Recognized also is the legal principle:

“It is well settled that even though a common laborer is not completely incapacitated, he may nevertheless be considered as totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the compensation statute if the injury has substantially decreased his ability to compete with ablebodied workers in the flexible general labor market. Olivier v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 La. 745, 131 So.2d 50; Blanchard v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., La. App., 59 So.2d 384; Lathers v. Schuylkill Products Co., Inc., La.App., 111 So.2d 530; Malone, Louisiana Workmen’s [7]*7Compensation Law and Practice, sec. 275, p. 334.” [Ball v. American Marine Corp., 245 La. 515, 159 So.2d 138-139 (1963)]

The wages paid by the defendant to plaintiff were at the rate of .75‡ for each motor cleaned, the employment being solely on a “piece-work” basis.

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Bluebook (online)
180 So. 2d 4, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/funderburk-v-southwestern-iron-corp-lactapp-1965.