Funaki v. Starbucks Corp.
This text of 2025 NY Slip Op 30583(U) (Funaki v. Starbucks Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Funaki v Starbucks Corp. 2025 NY Slip Op 30583(U) February 21, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 153275/2020 Judge: Judy H. Kim Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 153275/2020 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 89 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/21/2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JUDY H. KIM PART 04 Justice -----------------------X INDEX NO. 153275/2020 KOHEi FUNAKI, MOTION DATE 10/24/2024 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 002 - V -
STARBUCKS CORPORATION D/B/A STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, HIGHGATE SECURITY & DECISION + ORDER ON LOCKSMITH LLC, MOTION
Defendants. --------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 were read on this motion for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION
In a decision and order dated September 23, 2024, this Court granted defendant Starbucks
Corporation's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment 1 (the "Prior Decision"). Plaintiff now moves for leave to reargue the Prior Decision and,
upon reargument, seeks an order from this Court denying Starbucks's motion and granting
plaintiff's motion. The instant motion is granted and, upon reargument, Starbucks's motion for
summary judgment is denied and the Court adheres to its previous denial of plaintiff's summary
judgment motion.
A motion to reargue "shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or
misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion ... " (CPLR 2221 [d][2]). "Reargument
is not designed to afford the unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues
1 The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and incorporates herein the factual and procedural history set out in the Prior Decision.
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previously decided ... or to present arguments different from those originally asserted" (Setters v
AI Properties and Developments (USA) Corp., 139 AD3d 492, 492 [1st Dept 2016] [internal
citations and quotations omitted]).
Plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked plaintiff's deposition testimony that he did not
recall the yellow caution signs placed on the ground in front of each door depicted in the
photographs submitted by defendant (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 80 [Marked Photos] and 79 [Funaki
EBT at pp. 48, 50, 144]) and misapplied the law in concluding that the three paper signs affixed to
the functioning door (the "Signs") unambiguously warned of the specific danger at issue (the
unhinged door to its right). The Court is not persuaded by plaintiff's first point, because its
conclusion in the Prior Decision was based on the Signs posted on the Starbucks's door "directing
customers to use a different entrance" (Funaki v Starbucks Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op. 33332[U], 3
[Sup Ct, NY County 2024]) rather than the presence of the yellow caution signs. However, the
Court agrees that it erred in concluding that the Signs affixed to the working entrance door were
sufficient warning as a matter of law such that summary judgment was warranted.
"[T]he question of what, if any, warning is reasonable under the circumstances is usually
a question of fact for the jury" (Van Alstine v Kentucky Fried Chicken ofCalifornia Inc., 292 AD2d
737, 738 [3d Dept 2002] [internal citations omitted]; see also Hewett v Conway Stores, Inc., 266
AD2d 13 7, 13 7 [1st Dept 1999] ["If a jury determines that defendants had adequate notice of the
hazard, there is also a triable issue as to whether they took sufficient precautions to minimize the
danger to pedestrians in the area by placing rugs, mats or warning signs either on the store entrance
or on the steps where plaintiff fell"]). While this question may, on occasion, be resolved as a matter
of law when a warning "sufficiently conveyed the specific danger to which claimants ... would be
exposed" (Arsenault v State, 96 AD3d 97, 102 [3d Dept 2012] [emphasis added]), it does not apply
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here. Rather, given the Signs' directive that patrons should use the "side door" with arrows
pointing toward the unhinged door, the Court agrees with plaintiff that it is for the factfinder to
determine whether the Signs---on their own or in conjunction with the yellow caution signs, to the
extent it is established that these caution signs were present at the time of the incident-adequately
warned plaintiff of the danger presented by the unhinged door or whether plaintiff reasonably
understood these Signs to be directing him to use that unhinged door.
The cases cited by plaintiff are inapplicable, as they involve unambiguous warnings of
specific hazards through signage (see Rivero v Spillane Enterprises, Corp., 95 AD3d 984, 985 [2d
Dept 2012]; Hammond v Intl. Paper Co., 161 AD2d 914, 914-15 [3d Dept 1990]), speech (see
Fernandez v Rutman, 120 AD3d 545, 546 [2d Dept 2014]), the presence of an employee of
defendant addressing the condition (see McMullin v Martin's Food of S. Burlington, Inc., 122
AD3d 1103, 1105 [3d Dept 2014]) or all of the above (see Stasiak v Sears, Roebuck and Co., 281
AD2d 533, 533-34 [2d Dept 2001]).
In addition, since a question of fact exists as to the sufficiency of Starbucks' s warnings,
the principle enunciated in Arsenault v State that where a sign sufficiently warns of a specific
danger the fact that "another type or configuration of warning sign---one that was larger in size,
brighter in color or stronger in tone" may have been more effective does not present a bar to
summary judgment (Arsenault v State, 96 AD3d 97, 101-03 [3d Dept 2012]) does not apply.
Finally, this issue of fact also precludes summary judgment for plaintiff, and the Court therefore
adheres to so much of the Prior Decision as denied plaintiff's motion for that relief.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to reargue is granted; and it is further
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ORDERED that, upon reargument, Starbucks Corporation's motion for summary
judgment is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court adheres to so much of the Prior Decision as denied plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment; and it is
ORDERED that plaintiff is to serve a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry,
upon defendants as well as on the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk
of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119); and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General
Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on
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