VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
In this case we are called on to decide whether claimant’s mental disorder resulting from an occurrence at work is an “injury” or an “occupational disease” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
See
ORS 656.005(7) (regarding compensable injuries);
ORS 656.802 (regarding occupational diseases).
We also must decide whether claimant’s mental disorder was compensable. The Court of Appeals
affirmed an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) denying compensability.
Fuls v. SAIF,
129 Or App 255, 879 P2d 869 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The facts are not disputed. In 1976, claimant sustained an on-the-job injury. Diagnostic tests were carried out between 1976 and 1985 which revealed no pathological, orthopedic, or neurological problem. A number of examiners who saw claimant believed that his condition may have had a strong psychological component. However, before February 1990, no treatment for that condition was recommended.
In 1989, claimant went to work for SAIF’s insured, Chuck’s Texaco, as an attendant. Based on an incident that occurred at work on February 23, 1990, claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim with SAIF’s insured.
SAIF denied that claim, and claimant sought a hearing.
The referee found in part:
“On February 23,1990, while at work at Chuck’s Texaco, [claimant] sustained a minor shaking incident when he was grabbed from behind in a ‘bear hug.’ This led to a complete collapse, including loss of sensation, strength in the legs, and paralysis from the neck down. Claimant was immediately seen at the emergency room where Dr. Lewis found no physical problem at all. He was diagnosed as having an hysterical reaction and discharged without treatment,[
]
“Despite severe symptoms, claimant remained medically stationary. He returned to work on regular duty two days later. He continues to be symptomatic in the same areas as prior to the February 1990 incident. There is no change in symptoms and no new objective findings.
“[Claimant] did not return to see Dr. Paluska [who had previously treated claimant for his compensable 1976 injury] until .August of 1990, approximately six months after the shaking incident. Additional diagnostic tests were again negative. Dr. Paluska found no new injury, no pathological worsening of the pre-existing condition, and at best a recurrence of symptoms dating from the prior injuries of 1976 and 1980.”
The referee concluded that “the shaking incident of February, 1990, is not a material contributing cause of any new physical injury” and, therefore, “that claimant has not established the compensability of any new injury.” The referee further found that, “ [i] n the absence of any objective findings
of any worsening of [his] left shoulder condition, claimant has failed to establish an aggravation of the 1976 injury.”
However, concerning claimant’s conversion reaction, the referee found:
“Claimant has an hysterical condition, a conversion reaction. Claimant has had an emotional condition since the 1976 injury. By Stipulation of July 10,1978, claimant agreed that this psychological condition was not compensable and not the responsibility of Travelers.
“Following the 1990 incident, claimant was diagnosed as having a conversion reaction. This diagnosis is an actual diagnosis of a mental condition recognized in the medical community. See DSM III, Sec. 100.11. There is substantial evidence in this record to indicate that claimant has this condition, and has had at least elements of it since 1976.
I
(‡ # J*i :{i sj«
“The February 1990 event was the material contributing cause of the conversion reaction and need for medical treatment. Claimant has established the compensability of the conversion reaction.
“[T]he 1990 event produced a new injury, a psychological condition. I have found that condition to be compensable; consequently responsibility shifts to the second carrier, here SAIF Corp.”
The referee rejected SAIF’s argument that ORS 656.802, specifically subsection (3) of that statute relating to occupational diseases in the form of mental disorders, applied to claimant’s claim for his conversion reaction. Accordingly, the referee set aside SAIF’s
“de
facto” denial of claimant’s claim for a conversion reaction.
SAIF requested review by the Board, seeking to set aside the portion of the referee’s order regarding the compensability of claimant’s psychological condition. Claimant did not seek Board review of the referee’s order.
On review, the Board adopted the referee’s findings of fact. The Board described the event as follows:
“On February 23, 1990, claimant was working as a gas station attendant for SAIF’s insured. While he stood at the cash register processing a credit card purchase, a customer
walked up behind him and greeted him by grasping his upper arms and briefly shaking him. Claimant immediately lost control of his legs and collapsed to the floor. He was able to stand up and walk to a chair, but then he felt completely paralyzed from the neck down. He was taken to the hospital emergency room strapped to a back board with a cervical collar. Approximately four hours later, claimant felt severe pain from his neck to his feet. He was diagnosed with conversion hysteria.”
The Board agreed with SAIF that claimant’s claim should be analyzed as an occupational disease claim. The Board reversed the referee’s conclusion that claimant’s conversion reaction was compensable. Claimant sought judicial review.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, because claimant is seeking to establish the independent compensability of a mental disorder, his claim must be analyzed as an occupational disease claim under ORS 656.802.
Fuls,
129 Or App at 261.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
In this case we are called on to decide whether claimant’s mental disorder resulting from an occurrence at work is an “injury” or an “occupational disease” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
See
ORS 656.005(7) (regarding compensable injuries);
ORS 656.802 (regarding occupational diseases).
We also must decide whether claimant’s mental disorder was compensable. The Court of Appeals
affirmed an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) denying compensability.
Fuls v. SAIF,
129 Or App 255, 879 P2d 869 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The facts are not disputed. In 1976, claimant sustained an on-the-job injury. Diagnostic tests were carried out between 1976 and 1985 which revealed no pathological, orthopedic, or neurological problem. A number of examiners who saw claimant believed that his condition may have had a strong psychological component. However, before February 1990, no treatment for that condition was recommended.
In 1989, claimant went to work for SAIF’s insured, Chuck’s Texaco, as an attendant. Based on an incident that occurred at work on February 23, 1990, claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim with SAIF’s insured.
SAIF denied that claim, and claimant sought a hearing.
The referee found in part:
“On February 23,1990, while at work at Chuck’s Texaco, [claimant] sustained a minor shaking incident when he was grabbed from behind in a ‘bear hug.’ This led to a complete collapse, including loss of sensation, strength in the legs, and paralysis from the neck down. Claimant was immediately seen at the emergency room where Dr. Lewis found no physical problem at all. He was diagnosed as having an hysterical reaction and discharged without treatment,[
]
“Despite severe symptoms, claimant remained medically stationary. He returned to work on regular duty two days later. He continues to be symptomatic in the same areas as prior to the February 1990 incident. There is no change in symptoms and no new objective findings.
“[Claimant] did not return to see Dr. Paluska [who had previously treated claimant for his compensable 1976 injury] until .August of 1990, approximately six months after the shaking incident. Additional diagnostic tests were again negative. Dr. Paluska found no new injury, no pathological worsening of the pre-existing condition, and at best a recurrence of symptoms dating from the prior injuries of 1976 and 1980.”
The referee concluded that “the shaking incident of February, 1990, is not a material contributing cause of any new physical injury” and, therefore, “that claimant has not established the compensability of any new injury.” The referee further found that, “ [i] n the absence of any objective findings
of any worsening of [his] left shoulder condition, claimant has failed to establish an aggravation of the 1976 injury.”
However, concerning claimant’s conversion reaction, the referee found:
“Claimant has an hysterical condition, a conversion reaction. Claimant has had an emotional condition since the 1976 injury. By Stipulation of July 10,1978, claimant agreed that this psychological condition was not compensable and not the responsibility of Travelers.
“Following the 1990 incident, claimant was diagnosed as having a conversion reaction. This diagnosis is an actual diagnosis of a mental condition recognized in the medical community. See DSM III, Sec. 100.11. There is substantial evidence in this record to indicate that claimant has this condition, and has had at least elements of it since 1976.
I
(‡ # J*i :{i sj«
“The February 1990 event was the material contributing cause of the conversion reaction and need for medical treatment. Claimant has established the compensability of the conversion reaction.
“[T]he 1990 event produced a new injury, a psychological condition. I have found that condition to be compensable; consequently responsibility shifts to the second carrier, here SAIF Corp.”
The referee rejected SAIF’s argument that ORS 656.802, specifically subsection (3) of that statute relating to occupational diseases in the form of mental disorders, applied to claimant’s claim for his conversion reaction. Accordingly, the referee set aside SAIF’s
“de
facto” denial of claimant’s claim for a conversion reaction.
SAIF requested review by the Board, seeking to set aside the portion of the referee’s order regarding the compensability of claimant’s psychological condition. Claimant did not seek Board review of the referee’s order.
On review, the Board adopted the referee’s findings of fact. The Board described the event as follows:
“On February 23, 1990, claimant was working as a gas station attendant for SAIF’s insured. While he stood at the cash register processing a credit card purchase, a customer
walked up behind him and greeted him by grasping his upper arms and briefly shaking him. Claimant immediately lost control of his legs and collapsed to the floor. He was able to stand up and walk to a chair, but then he felt completely paralyzed from the neck down. He was taken to the hospital emergency room strapped to a back board with a cervical collar. Approximately four hours later, claimant felt severe pain from his neck to his feet. He was diagnosed with conversion hysteria.”
The Board agreed with SAIF that claimant’s claim should be analyzed as an occupational disease claim. The Board reversed the referee’s conclusion that claimant’s conversion reaction was compensable. Claimant sought judicial review.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, because claimant is seeking to establish the independent compensability of a mental disorder, his claim must be analyzed as an occupational disease claim under ORS 656.802.
Fuls,
129 Or App at 261. The court found that claimant’s claim was for an “occupational disease” and agreed with the Board’s determination that claimant’s February 1990 workplace incident was not compensable, because the greeting from the customer “was not outside the range of behavior or physical interaction that occurs in every working situation.”
Id.
at 262.
On review in this court, claimant argues that his condition is an injury, not an occupational disease, because it had a “sudden onset” and, therefore, that ORS 656.802(3) does not apply. Alternatively, claimant argues that, if ORS 656.802(3) does apply, “conditions generally inherent in every working situation” cannot include acts such as the customer’s shaking of claimant, which claimant describes variously as “unconsented,” “unlawful,” “criminal,” or “tortious.”
SAIF responds that the text of ORS 656.802(3) establishes that any mental disorder must be treated as an occupational disease under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and that this interpretation is consistent with this court’s recent pronouncements in
Mathel v. Josephine County,
319 Or 235, 241-42, 875 P2d 455 (1994),
and DiBrito v. SAIF,
319 Or 244, 875 P2d 459 (1994). SAIF also asserts that the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 656.802(3) indicate that a customer’s physical greeting of a worker, such as the one shown here, is a condition generally inherent in every working situation and, thus, a mental disorder caused by such conduct is not compensable.
This court’s task is to discern the legislative intent behind ORS 656.802, in order to determine whether a condition such as claimant’s is to be treated as an “occupational disease” under that statute. The text of that statute is the starting point for interpretation.
See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing method of statutory construction).
Claimant argues that, despite the language of ORS 656.802, a “sudden onset injury in the form of a mental disorder” should not be analyzed under ORS 656.802 but, rather, should be treated as an “injury,” as defined in ORS 656.005(7). It is true that this court’s cases have drawn a distinction between occupational diseases and occupational injuries along the lines that occupational diseases are gradual rather than sudden in onset.
See, e.g., James v. SAIF,
290 Or 343, 624 P2d 565 (1981) (so indicating);
see also Mathel,
319 Or at 240-42 (citing
James,
noting that heart attack was sudden onset condition, and rejecting argument that it was an occupational disease). However, ORS 656.802(l)(b) specifically includes “[a]ny mental disorder” within the definition of “occupational disease,” without regard to the suddenness of its onset.
Claimant concedes that the condition for which he seeks compensation — conversion disorder — is a mental disorder.
See
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 257-59 (3d ed (revised) 1987) (describing features of “conversion disorder” or “hysterical neurosis, conversion type”). Our analysis of the statute proceeds from that concession. Because the sole condition for which claimant seeks
compensation is a “mental disorder” by claimant’s concession, his claim is not compensable, pursuant to the unambiguous terms of ORS 656.802(3), unless paragraphs (a) through (d) of that subsection are satisfied.
We next turn to the question whether claimant’s mental disorder is compensable under ORS 656.802.
The dispute centers on ORS 656.802(3)(b), over whether the conditions that produced claimant’s need for treatment for his conversion disorder were “conditions other than conditions generally inherent in every working situation.”
Before we analyze the statute, we reiterate the Board’s finding as to the nature of the “employment conditions” that produced claimant’s conversion disorder. A customer, with whom claimant was acquainted, “walked up behind him and greeted him by grasping his upper arms and briefly shaking him.”
Our purpose is to discern whether the legislature intended to exclude mental disorders produced by such contacts from compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law, on the basis that such contacts
are1 ‘
conditions generally inherent in every working situation.”
PGE,
317 Or at 611-12.
. We turn to the text of the relevant portion of ORS 656.802(3): “conditions generally inherent in every working situation.” Something that is “inherent” is “structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something : belonging by nature or settled habit.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (unabridged ed 1993), 1163. “Every” includes “each individual or part of a class or group whether definite or indefinite in number without exception.”
Id.
at 788. We conclude that the phrase “conditions generally inherent in every working situation” describes conditions which, by nature or settled habit, arise in all working situations, without exception.
However, the presence of the word “generally” at the beginning of this phrase qualifies that meaning. As used in this context, “generally” means “in a reasonably inclusive
manner : in disregard of specific instances and with regard to an overall picture.”
Id.
at 945. The presence of the word “generally” at the beginning of the phrase may indicate a legislative intent to disregard specific instances and focus, rather, on the overall picture of what occurs in working situations. To do so, however, would alter the “without exception” meaning of the term “every.”
Because “every” and “generally” as used in the text have somewhat conflicting meanings, and the context sheds no light on the legislature’s intent in choosing this phrase, we turn to the legislative history of this provision.
ORS 656.802(3) was amended significantly by House Bill 2271 in 1987, adding the criterion regarding “conditions generally inherent in every working situation.” Or Laws 1987, ch 713, § 4. As introduced, this provision indicated that “a mental disorder is not compensable under this chapter * * * unless the employment conditions producing the psychologic stress are extraordinary in nature.” At a public hearing, it was suggested that the term “extraordinary” was too vague and, as a result, the House Committee on Labor amended the phrase to read: “Unless the employment conditions producing the mental disorder are conditions other than conditions inherent in every working situation.” Public Hearing, House Committee on Labor, March 6, 1987, Tape 48, Side A; A-Engrossed House Bill 2271.
In response to
other concerns brought out at public hearings, that the “inherent in every working situation” language was too narrow, the Senate Committee on Labor added the qualifier of “generally” to the beginning of the phrase. Senator Hill said that this change was proposed, because the current language would make it difficult for employers to defend mental disorder claims; it would be impossible to demonstrate that a condition was inherent in absolutely
every
working situation. Senate Committee on Labor, April 23, 1987, Tape 120, Side A.
See also
Senate Committee on Labor, June 8, 1987, Exhibit A (Chairman Hill’s proposed amendment); B-Engrossed House Bill 2271.
Although the legislative history reveals that the legislature considered how broad or narrow this exception should be, it does not reveal whether the legislature intended the specific type of condition at issue in this case to be excluded or included from “conditions generally inherent in every working situation.” From the context and the legislative history of this provision, we are able to discern, though, that the legislature intended to curtail compensable claims for mental disorders based on on-the-job stressors.
See, e.g.,
Public Hearing, Senate Committee on Labor, April 23, 1987, Tape 120, Side A (comments by legislators that bill was intended to limit stress claims).
Based on this information, we turn to the question whether the Board’s decision that claimant’s mental disorder was the result of “conditions generally inherent in every working situation” appears to be within the legislative policy that inheres in the statutory term.
Human interactions are “conditions generally inherent in every working situation.”
Although the amount and type of interaction with supervisors, coworkers, or customers may vary depending on the type of working situation, some interaction is inherent. Human interaction involves greeting.
Claimant has asserted that the customer’s greeting of him, which is at issue in this case, can be seen as tortious, and that it would be against public policy to hold that such contact could be conditions generally inherent in every working situation. We reject the characterization of the conduct in question as tortious, because the agency’s unchallenged findings and claimant’s own statements show that the greeting was simply that — a greeting — which lacked any intent on the part of the customer to bring about harm.
See generally Bakker v. Baza’r, Inc.,
275 Or 245, 249, 551 P2d 1269 (1976) (battery requires actor to have intended to bring about a harmful or offensive contact or put the other party in apprehension thereof). We also reject claimant’s similar assertion that the conduct in question could have constituted a criminal assault, because claimant concedes that he did not suffer a physical injury.
See
ORS 163.160-.185 (assault requires “physical injury”).
We affirm the Board’s characterization of this type of conduct by a person with whom one is expected to interact in the workplace, which does not result in a physical injury, as a condition that is “generally inherent in every working situation.”
Thus, claimant’s need for treatment of his mental disorder brought about by this greeting is not compensable under ORS 656.802.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.