Fullhart Maytag Company v. Stapleton

1960 OK 219, 356 P.2d 350, 1960 Okla. LEXIS 470
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedOctober 25, 1960
Docket38813
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 1960 OK 219 (Fullhart Maytag Company v. Stapleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fullhart Maytag Company v. Stapleton, 1960 OK 219, 356 P.2d 350, 1960 Okla. LEXIS 470 (Okla. 1960).

Opinion

JACKSON, Justice.

Four hearings have been held before the State Industrial Court, in connection with this claim, to-wit: on December 14, 1955, February 7, 1956, May 12, 1959, and July 8, 1959. At the conclusion of the last hearing an award was entered which is quoted, in part, as follows:

“That as a result of said injury, claimant has been temporarily totally disabled to perform ordinary manual labor since the date of the accident, but has been gainfully employed at various jobs not requiring ordinary manual labor through August, 1955, and worked 3 weeks for Organic Products in 1956 in a job not requiring ordinary manual labor.
“That claimant is and has been temporarily totally disabled since September 1, 1955, for which time he is entitled to compensation for 220 weeks to July 4, 1959, less 3 weeks for which claimant received wages, which leaves 217 weeks compensation due claimant at the rate of $28.00 per week, or the total amount of $6,076.00 to July 4, 1959; and that from July 4, 1959, respondent or insurance carrier continue the payment of compensation to claimant at the rate of $28.00 per week, for and during the period of claimant’s temporary total disability, not to exceed 300 weeks, and furnish claimant with reasonable and necessary medical attention, including an operation for claimant’s shoulder injury, at the hands of a competent physician to be selected by respondent or insurance carrier.”

The undisputed evidence shows that claimant sustained a fractured right clavicle as the result of an automobile accident in 1952, and underwent an operation for that condition in a Veterans Administration Hospital at Fayetteville, Arkansas. He entered the employ of petitioner Fullhart in February, 1954, performing duties requiring manual labor. On June 21, 1954, he fell from a ladder while engaged in the duties of said employment, allegedly fracturing the right clavicle and causing the injury and disability for which compensation was awarded.

Petitioners’ first contention is that the claim was barred under provisions of 85 O.S.1951 § 43, to the effect that the right to claim compensation shall be barred unless a claim is filed within one year after the injury or after the date of last payment of any compensation or remuneration in lieu of compensation.

It is well settled that the one-year limitation period is tolled during the time employer furnishes medical treatment for the injury. Bowling v. Blackwell Zinc Co., Okl., 347 P.2d 1027.

The trial court found, in its order of May 25, 1956:.

“That the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the respondent furnishing treatment to claimant in November, 1954, at the hands of Dr. (R.).”

On the date of the alleged injury, June 21, 1954, claimant was sent by his employer to Dr. R., who examined claimant and gave him a heat treatment. Claimant testified that he returned to Dr. R. several times in the latter part of 1954 and received additional heat treatments, with the knowledge of petitioners and at the suggestion of his employer. That this last visit to Dr. R. was in June, 1955, and that the last visit before that was in November, 1954. The claim herein was filed on September 15, 1955. Dr. R. stated in a letter that claimant was not seen by him-after June 23, 1954, in -regard to the injury, but that he filled out some papers for claimant on June 20, *353 1955, so that claimant could be examined at a veterans hospital.

We have held that where the issue of whether a limitation statute has been tolled or waived is a question of fact, the finding of the State Industrial Court thereon will not be disturbed on review when reasonably supported by competent evidence. Cupit v. Dancu Chemical Co., Okl., 316 P.2d 593; Determan v. Wilson & Co., Okl., 304 P.2d 1060. The court evidently believed claimant’s testimony, which is competent and sufficient to support the finding that the statute of limitations was tolled by the furnishing of medical treatment to claimant by petitioners in November, 1954. The State Industrial Court is the sole judge of credibility of witnesses appearing before it, and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Skelly Oil Co. v. Ellis, 176 Okl. 569, 56 P.2d 891.

Petitioners next contend that there is insufficient medical evidence to support the award, asserting that “in order for the claimant in the instant case to recover, he must have at least some ‘expert’ evidence to the effect that his disability is a result of the injury he sustained in June 1954, and not as a result of some other injury.”

Petitioners devote several pages in their brief to an argument as to the weight of the medical testimony adduced by petitioners and claimant. Our concern is whether there is any competent medical evidence to support the award. Howze v. State Industrial Commission, 208 Okl. 462, 257 P.2d 502.

Dr. K. examined claimant on August 26, 1955. We quote from his letter-report of October 5, 1955, as follows:

“Mr. Stapleton reported to my office August 26, 1955, and requested that I examine him regarding a disability to his right shoulder. * * *.
“ * * * I have examined this man this date and he has pain over the right shoulder and clavicle, pain over the neck and a deformity of the outer third of the right clavicle. There is definite crepitation over this area when pressure is made over the clavicle. I x-rayed his right shoulder and clavicle and found that he had a fracture of the junction of the middle and outer third of the clavicle complete with non-union. There is considerable over-lapping of the fragments. I considered, at the time, that the pain from the broken clavicle was causing most of the pain in his neck and back. This man very definitely has some disability due to non-union of the fracture of the clavicle. It is possible also that one of the fragments of the fractured clavicle is causing some pressure on the brachial plexus on the right side. The fractured clavicle certainly interferes with the normal motion of his shoulder and there is, of course, weakness of the shoulder region caused by this fractured clavicle.
“ * * * While I think he can do some light work, it is impossible for him to carry on his regular work since most of this is rather hard manual labor. (Emphasis added.)
“There naturally arises the question whether or not this original injury to the clavicle had healed. I am in no position to answer this question. But, it seems reasonable to me that the Veterans Hospital at Wichita would not have released him to return to work without fairly good union of the fractured clavicle. Also, the fact that he had another injury which was of sufficient violence to have produced a fractured clavicle, I took the position that his present disability is the direct result of the injury which occurred June, 1954. It will be necessary for him to have an open reduction with internal fixation and a bone graft to insure union. During the period of time he will be convalescing from this operative procedure, he will of course be totally disabled.

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Bluebook (online)
1960 OK 219, 356 P.2d 350, 1960 Okla. LEXIS 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fullhart-maytag-company-v-stapleton-okla-1960.