Fuller v. Evergreen Title Servs., L.L.C.

2024 Ohio 5322

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 7, 2024
• Docket: 113666
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Fuller v. Evergreen Title Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-5322.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JONATHAN FULLER, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellants, : No. 113666 v. :

EVERGREEN TITLE SERVICES, LLC, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellees. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 7, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-21-944318

Appearances:

Fanger & Davidson LLC, Jeffrey J. Fanger, and Gerry Davidson, for appellants.

Michael P. Meehan, pro se.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Plaintiffs-appellants, Jonathan Fuller and Lee Fuller (collectively “the

Fullers”), appeal an order granting a motion for relief from judgment filed by

defendant-appellee, Michael P. Meehan (“Meehan”), pro se. Appellants claim the

following errors: 1. The trial court’s decision granting a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) was an abuse of discretion.

2. The trial court’s decision granting a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

3. The trial court’s decision granting a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) did not properly apply the GTE test and as such was an abuse of discretion and/or a failure to properly apply the law.

4. Defendant Meehan failed to meet his burden under Civ.R. 60(B) and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for relief.

5. The trial court’s decision granting a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) was precluded by res judicata and therefore was an abuse of discretion and/or a failure to properly apply the law.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief from

judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) and reverse the trial court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In February 2021, the Fullers filed a complaint against Meehan and

defendants Evergreen Title Services, L.L.C. (“Evergreen Title Services”), Evergreen

Title Agency Ltd., Heidi Meehan (“Heidi”), Cynthia Gordon (“Gordon”), and WFG

National Title Insurance Company (“WFG”). The complaint alleged that Meehan

and Heidi were title agents and escrow agents and that while Heidi was an employee

of Evergreen, Meehan was an “organizer” of Evergreen. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Gordon

was an escrow manager and an employee of Evergreen, and WFG allegedly

underwrote Evergreen’s escrow funds. In January 2014, the Fullers purchased real property in South Euclid,

Ohio and a deed for the property was recorded in February 2014. As part of the

purchase, Lee Fuller contracted with Evergreen to establish an escrow account

pending the correction of certain housing code violations on the property. Gordon

notified the South Euclid Housing Department that Evergreen Title Services was

holding funds in escrow for repairs on the property and that it would release the

funds upon receipt of a contractor’s invoice.

Meanwhile, Lee Fuller executed a notarized statement assuming the

housing code violations. Shortly thereafter, an official from the South Euclid

Housing Department notified Gordon by mail that Lee Fuller had filed the necessary

paperwork to assume the existing violations on the property, that the Fullers had

completed the necessary repairs, and that the escrow funds could now be transferred

to the Fullers. According to the complaint, the Fullers repeatedly requested that

Evergreen Title Services release the funds held in escrow, but the defendants failed

to release the funds. As a result, the Fullers filed their complaint asserting claims

for breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and

punitive damages. They alleged damages in the amount of $7,830.

After each of the defendants answered the complaint, the Fullers

voluntarily dismissed Gordon and Evergreen Title Ltd. without prejudice and

dismissed WFG with prejudice. When Heidi obtained summary judgment in her

favor, Meehan and Evergreen were left as the only remaining defendants. Meehan registered with the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts to use the

court’s e-filing system and provided the court with his email address for

communications purposes when he filed his answer on April 21, 2021. Throughout

the pendency of the case, the court sent notices to that email address and, on

February 8, 2023, the trial court notified the parties that the case was scheduled for

trial on February 21, 2023. On February 9, 2023, the court issued another notice

indicating that trial briefs, jury instructions, witness lists, and exhibit lists were due

to be filed by February 14, 2023.

The case was called for trial as scheduled on February 21, 2023, and

Meehan failed to appear. The court’s judgment entry of that date states, in relevant

part:

Case called for trial at 10:00 a.m. Counsel for plaintiffs and plaintiffs appeared. Defendant Michael Meehan did not appear at the Justice Center either at Courtroom 17-C or 18-B. Defendant did not appear at the old courthouse at Courtroom 2A as instructed by the court via email on 2/17/2023. Defendant was sent all notices of court filings and journal entries to the email address he provided to the court.

Ex parte trial held.

Based on the evidence provided, plaintiff has proven damages in the amount of $7,830.00. The court awards punitive damages of treble the plaintiff’s damages and attorneys fees.

Judgment is granted in favor of plaintiffs Jonathan Fuller and Lee Fuller and against Michael Meehan on all claims in the amount of $23,490.00. Defendant to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees in the amount of $27,617.00. Total judgment amount is $51,107.00. Defendant to pay post-judgment interest on the amount of $51,107.00 at the statutory rate of 5% from the date of judgment and the costs of this matter. Final. A judgment lien was filed on February 27, 2023, and Meehan did not

file a timely appeal of the trial court’s judgment. Instead, on March 21, 2023,

Meehan filed a motion for new trial along with several other motions. On April 4,

2023, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Thereafter, he filed a series of

affidavits attempting to disqualify various judges who had presided over the case,

including Judge Michael Russo, Judge Brendan Sheehan, and visiting Judge Janet

Burnside. The Ohio Supreme Court denied all the requests for disqualification.

On August 18, 2023, the trial court conducted a non-oral hearing on

Meehan’s motion for new trial and motion to vacate the judgment entry. Thereafter,

on August 29, 2023, Meehan filed a renewal of all motions as well as new motions

to disqualify a magistrate who had been assigned to assist with the case and to

appoint a visiting judge.

On September 3, 2023, the trial court issued a lengthy judgment entry

ruling on the pending motions. The court observed that although Meehan

represented himself pro se, he was a former attorney who had appeared “in front of

at least one judge on the case on multiple occasions” and that he nevertheless “failed

to appear for this trial as ordered by the Court.” The court also recounted the lengthy

history of the case and concluded, among other things, that “[a]llowing Meehan to

perpetuate his antics through a new trial would have a materially adverse effect on

the confidence of the Plaintiffs in judicial proceedings.” Accordingly, the trial court

denied all of Meehan’s motions. On October 4, 2023, Meehan filed a motion for relief from judgment

pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), seeking to have the court “vacate judgment entries dated

2/21/2023 and 9/3/2023.” He argued that the judgment entries were “composed

of material falsehoods” and that “many of such falsehoods and scandalous matters

are copied from an unsworn statement that was submitted to the Supreme Court of

Ohio by Judge Burnside in response to this Defendant’s motion to disqualify her.”

On October 5, 2023, before the court could rule on the motion for relief

from judgment, Meehan filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was summarily

dismissed as untimely. Thereafter, the Fullers filed a brief in opposition to the

pending motion for relief from judgment, and the case was assigned to a new judge.

On January 30, 2024, a new judge granted the motion for relief from judgment,

citing “discrepancies in the record.” This timely appeal followed.

II. Law and Analysis

In the first and second assignments of error, the Fullers argue the trial

court’s decision granting the motion for relief from judgment was an abuse of

discretion and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In the third

assignment of error, they argue the trial court did not properly apply the test

outlined in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Arc Indus., Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976),

when it granted relief from judgment. And, in the fourth assignment of error, the

Fullers argue that Meehan failed to meet his burden under Civ.R. 60(B). We discuss

these assigned errors together because they all relate to the trial court’s application

of the test set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in GTE Automatic Elec. We review a trial court’s judgment on a motion for relief from

judgment for an abuse of discretion. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d

17, 20 (1988). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. This court has held that an abuse of

discretion may be found where a trial court “applies the wrong legal standard,

misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”

Thomas v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). In other words, courts do

not have discretion to erroneously apply the law. Johnson at ¶ 39 (“We take this

opportunity to make it clear that courts lack the discretion to make errors of law,

particularly when the trial court’s decision goes against the plain language of a

statute or rule.”).

Civ.R. 60(B) provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R.

60(B), the moving party must demonstrate (1) a meritorious defense or claim to

present if relief is granted, (2) entitlement to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (B)(5), and (3) the timeliness of the motion. GTE

Automatic Elec., Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d at 150-151. These requirements are

independent and written in the conjunctive; therefore, all three must be clearly

established before relief may be granted. Rose Chevrolet, Inc., 36 Ohio St.3d at 20.

Furthermore, a party seeking relief under Civ.R. 60(B) is required to allege

“operative facts” that support the claim or defense with sufficient specificity so that

the trial court can determine whether the moving party is entitled to relief. Syed v.

Poulos, 2013-Ohio-5739, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). “‘Broad, conclusory statements’” do not

satisfy this requirement. Rodeno at ¶ 35, quoting Natl. Collegiate Student Loan

Trust 2007-2 v. Tigner, 2018-Ohio-4442, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.).

In his motion for relief from judgment, Meehan argues the trial court

perpetrated a fraud by lying about who presided over the ex parte trial and by

claiming that he did not appear in the Justice Center on the day of trial. He also

raises a discovery dispute that was resolved long before the trial. He makes no

argument and alleges no operative facts to support any meritorious defense to the

judgment against him.

Meehan attached several exhibits to his motion for relief from

judgment, but the exhibits are composed of (1) Judge Burnside’s response to

Meehan’s affidavit for disqualification filed in the Ohio Supreme Court; (2) an email

to the magistrate who was assigned to the case regarding the judge who presided

over the ex parte trial; (3) a transcript of a criminal proceeding that occurred before

Judge Burnside on February 21, 2023, the same day as the ex parte trial in this case; and (4) an email to the Fullers’ lawyer regarding Meehan’s request for surveillance

videos of the Justice Center from the day of the ex parte trial. He never even denied

the allegation that he wrongfully withheld the escrow funds owed to the Fullers. He,

therefore, failed to allege sufficient operative facts to support a meritorious claim or

defense under the first prong of the GTE test.

The second prong of the GTE test requires the movant to demonstrate

entitlement to relief under one of the grounds listed in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5).

GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio St.2d at 150-151. Meehan does not argue entitlement

to relief under any ground listed in Civ.R. 60(B), except for fraud. His fraud

allegations were directed at multiple judges and staff, whom he claims were biased.

However, the Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated these claims and determined that

they lacked merit. Moreover, the trial court did not grant relief from judgment on

the basis of fraud; it granted relief due to some unspecified “discrepancies in the

record.” We find no discrepancies in the record. To the contrary, our review of the

record shows that Meehan failed to establish any ground for relief listed in Civ.R.

60(B)(1) through (5).

As previously stated, the party seeking relief under Civ.R. 60(B) must

establish all three requirements of the GTE test before relief may be granted. Rose

Chevrolet, 36 Ohio St.3d at 20. Meehan failed to allege sufficient operative facts to

support a meritorious defense under the first prong of the GTE test and failed to

demonstrate entitlement to relief under any of the grounds listed Civ.R. 60(B) under

the second prong of the GTE test. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by granting relief from judgment without properly applying the requirements for relief

in Civ.R. 60(B) as articulated in GTE Automatic Elec. We, therefore, sustain the

first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error.

Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), Meehan’s fifth assignment of error in

which he argues that Meehan’s relief from judgment is barred by res judicata, is

moot.

The trial court’s judgment is reversed.

It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR