Fuller v. City of Dothan

Alabama Court of Appeals

Fuller v. City of Dothan

153 So. 666, 26 Ala. App. 91, 1934 Ala. App. LEXIS 33

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 20, 1934

Docket4 Div. 15.

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 153 So. 666 (Fuller v. City of Dothan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Fuller v. City of Dothan, 153 So. 666, 26 Ala. App. 91, 1934 Ala. App. LEXIS 33 (Ala. Ct. App. 1934).

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Opinion

SAMFORD, Judge.

The evidence for the city tends to prove that defendant was carrying on a merchandise business in the corporate limits of Dothan, Ala., for which he had paid a license, but that he had not paid a license as required for the running of a meat market. The evidence further tends to prove that on one occasion defendant sold to a “stool-pigeon” of the city 15 cents worth of meat and on another occasion 10 cents worth of chops and 10 cents worth of sausage. An officer of the city searched the store and found in defendant’s ice box 50 cents worth of steak, 50 cents worth of pork chops, and 20 cents worth of fish. There is nothing to indicate whether this meat was kept for sale or whether for his own use. Certainly, the amount would not indicate a business carried on in these articles, and the two isolated sales above noted fall far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was pursuing the occupation of a dealer in meat as a livelihood or as a source of profit, which the city must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before it would be entitled to a conviction. Harris v. State, 50 Ala. 127; Weil v. State, 52 Ala. 21.

It will be noted that the ordinance of the city introduced in evidence does not require a license for the sale of meat. The license required is for a “Retail meat market.” There is no sufficient evidence to support the charge that defendant was engaged in such a business. Non constat the small amount of meat and fish found in defendant’s ice box may have been for his own use and the two small isolated sales would not indicate the carrying on of a “Market” for profit or for a livelihood.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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SAMFORD, Judge.

The evidence for the city tends to prove that defendant was carrying on a merchandise business in the corporate limits of Dothan, Ala., for which he had paid a license, but that he had not paid a license as required for the running of a meat market. The evidence further tends to prove that on one occasion defendant sold to a “stool-pigeon” of the city 15 cents worth of meat and on another occasion 10 cents worth of chops and 10 cents worth of sausage. An officer of the city searched the store and found in defendant’s ice box 50 cents worth of steak, 50 cents worth of pork chops, and 20 cents worth of fish. There is nothing to indicate whether this meat was kept for sale or whether for his own use. Certainly, the amount would not indicate a business carried on in these articles, and the two isolated sales above noted fall far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was pursuing the occupation of a dealer in meat as a livelihood or as a source of profit, which the city must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before it would be entitled to a conviction. Harris v. State, 50 Ala. 127; Weil v. State, 52 Ala. 21.

It will be noted that the ordinance of the city introduced in evidence does not require a license for the sale of meat. The license required is for a “Retail meat market.” There is no sufficient evidence to support the charge that defendant was engaged in such a business. Non constat the small amount of meat and fish found in defendant’s ice box may have been for his own use and the two small isolated sales would not indicate the carrying on of a “Market” for profit or for a livelihood.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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153 So. 666, 26 Ala. App. 91, 1934 Ala. App. LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuller-v-city-of-dothan-alactapp-1934.

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