Fuller Bros. v. International Marketing, Inc.

928 F. Supp. 1042, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8101, 1996 WL 324719
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 6, 1996
DocketCivil No. 93-JL105-FR
StatusPublished

This text of 928 F. Supp. 1042 (Fuller Bros. v. International Marketing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fuller Bros. v. International Marketing, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1042, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8101, 1996 WL 324719 (D. Or. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION

FRYE, District Judge:

The matter before the court is the motion of the defendani/eounterclaim plaintiff, International Marketing Inc., for summary judgment (# 168).

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff/counterclaim defendant, Fuller Brothers, Inc. (Fuller Brothers), manufactures, sells and distributes “Tire Life,” a liquid formula that extends the life of truck tires when it is placed inside the tires at the time that they are mounted.

The defendant/counterclaim plaintiff, International Marketing, Inc. (International Marketing), manufactures, sells and distributes “Equal,” a dry, powder-like formula that reduces vibration and eliminates radial and lateral force variation when it is placed inside the tires during the balancing part of the wheel-assembly procedure.

Although Tire Life and Equal do not perform the same function, Tire Life and Equal cannot be used together in a truck tire. In other words, Tire Life and Equal cannot be used in combination to extend the life of truck tires and to reduce vibration and eliminate radial and lateral force variation.

In April of 1993, Fuller Brothers (Tire Life) filed a complaint against International Marketing (Equal) with the Regional Office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In the complaint filed with OSHA, Fuller Brothers asserted that Equal releases formaldehyde which creates a health hazard to workers removing tires from vehicles for repair or replacement because the component of inert urea formaldehyde in Equal continuously breaks down, emitting formaldehyde at levels far greater than 0.1 parts per million.

In August of 1993, Fuller Brothers mailed packets of information to the tire industry, including past and future potential customers of International Marketing. The information included the words, “Equal = Formaldehyde” (Exhibit C to Concise Statement of Facts in Support of IMI’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1); and the sentence, “According to OSHA standards, Equal is a hazardous, potentially carcinogenic product that is regulated under 40 pages of OSHA rules and regulations” (Id. at 2); and the language, “IMI has been distributing false and misleading MSDS and product safety information” (Id. at Exhibit E, p. 1).

On September 7, 1993, Fuller Brothers filed its complaint against International Marketing alleging a claim for the intentional interference with economic advantage. International Marketing filed an answer to Fuller Brothers’ complaint and counterclaims alleging that Fuller Brothers violated the Lanham Act, libeled International Marketing, and tortiously interfered with the business of International Marketing.

On July 14, 1994, this court granted the motion of International Marketing for partial summary judgment on the claim of Fuller Brothers for the intentional interference with economic advantage.

On September 30, 1994, Fuller Brothers filed a first amended complaint alleging claims for relief under the Lanham Act, a claim for the violation of unfair and deceptive business practices under applicable state laws, and a claim for the intentional interference with economic advantage.

On December 21, 1994, this court granted the motion of International Marketing to dismiss the claim of Fuller Brothers under the Lanham Act ruling that recovery under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is confined to injury to competitors; that the product of Fuller Brothers and the product of International Marketing do not perform the same functions; and that Fuller Brothers cannot maintain an action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. This court also ruled in its opinion of December 21, 1994 that Fuller Brothers’ second claim for relief in its first amended complaint, which is a claim for relief under “applicable state statutes,” does not adequately state a claim for relief.

On March 22, 1995, this court granted leave to Fuller Brothers to file a second amended complaint in order to cure the specificity problem found by the court in Fuller Brothers’ first amended complaint.

[1044]*1044CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

International Marketing contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on each of Fuller Brothers’ consumer protection claims under fourteen state statutes because (1) Fuller Brothers does not have standing to assert the claims in its remaining counts; (2) Fuller Brothers has suffered no injury since it is neither a consumer nor a competitor of International Marketing; (3) International Marketing’s product, Equal, is not a consumer product; and (4) Fuller Brothers has no evidence to support the allegations in its second amended complaint.

International Marketing also contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on its common law counterclaims of disparagement, trade libel, and the intentional interference with business claims.

Fuller Brothers contends that International Marketing is not entitled to summary judgment on its state law claims because (1) Equal is a consumer product; and (2) Fuller Brothers does meet the state standing requirements.

Finally, Fuller Brothers contends that International Marketing cannot prevail on any element of its claims of disparagement, trade libel, and the intentional interference with business claims, and therefore is not entitled to summary judgment.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The initial burden is on the moving party to point out the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

Once the initial burden of the moving party is satisfied, the burden shifts to the opponent to demonstrate through the production of probative evidence that there remains an issue of fact to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-moving party must make a sufficient showing on all essential elements of the case with respect to which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id.

The decision faced by the court is essentially the same decision faced by a court on a motion for a directed verdict — that is, whether the evidence on the motion for summary judgment presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence in the record, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Id.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

1. International Marketing’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining Claims in Fuller Brothers’ Second Amended Complaint

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
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504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
928 F. Supp. 1042, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8101, 1996 WL 324719, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuller-bros-v-international-marketing-inc-ord-1996.