Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation

CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 18, 2025
DocketCAAP-22-0000019
StatusPublished

This text of Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation (Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation, (hawapp 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 18-MAR-2025 07:51 AM Dkt. 86 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

MARK FUKUDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEICO INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Fukuda

appeals from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's June 27,

2022 Final Judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Geico

Insurance Corporation. 1

According to Fukuda's complaint, he was involved in a

two-car accident in a parking lot. Fukuda and the other driver

exchanged phone numbers and insurance information; both were

1 The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.

Geico indicates the caption is incorrect and should read Geico Indemnity Company rather than Geico Insurance Corporation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

insured by Geico but Fukuda did not have collision coverage

under his policy. A Geico representative determined that Fukuda

"was half liable for the accident." Fukuda declined Geico's

settlement and indicated he would sue instead.

Fukuda filed a complaint naming Geico as the defendant

and alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) fraud, and

(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Geico moved for summary judgment, which the circuit

court granted. Fukuda appeals, asserting he was not allowed to

amend his complaint. 2

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve this

appeal as discussed below, and vacate and remand.

Fukuda contends the circuit court "erred in

misrepresenting that I didn't have the right to amend the

pleading as discussed at the hearing for the" motion for summary

judgment. Fukuda argues that the circuit court "should have

allowed for me to amend the pleading[,]" relying on Hawai‘i Rules

of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 14(a).

2 Fukuda asserts a second point of error challenging the granting of summary judgment on his fraud claim. Based on our decision, we need not reach this point.

2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

However, HRCP Rule 14(a) is inapplicable here because

it applies when a "defendant may bring in [a] third-party" and

Fukuda was the plaintiff – not the defendant - in the underlying

case. (Emphasis omitted.)

HRCP Rule 15(a)(1) explains, before trial, a party may

amend a pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before

a responsive pleading is served[.]" Otherwise, "a party may

amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written

consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires. . . ." HRCP Rule 15(a)(2).

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has held that "unless there

is an apparent reason indicating otherwise, under HRCP

Rule 15(a), leave to amend shall be freely given to a party to

amend its complaint when justice so requires" and "undue delay

alone is an insufficient basis for denying leave to amend a

complaint[.]" Carvalho v. AIG Hawai‘i Ins., 150 Hawai‘i 381,

385, 386, 502 P.3d 482, 486, 487 (2022) (citation omitted). 3

"This court reviews a denial of leave to amend a

complaint under HRCP Rule 15(a) or (b) under the abuse of

3 But see Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 89 Hawai‘i 157, 162, 969 P.2d 1275, 1280 (1998) (explaining that "federal courts have observed that '[a] motion for leave to amend is not a vehicle to circumvent summary judgment'") (quoting Schlacter-Jones v. Gen. Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) and Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("It is generally inappropriate to grant leave to amend a complaint while summary judgment is pending.")).

3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

discretion standard." Id. at 384, 502 P.3d at 485 (citation

omitted). And abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court

has "disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the

substantial detriment of a party litigant." Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Fukuda filed his complaint on March 26, 2021.

Fukuda did not file an amended complaint before Geico filed its

answer, and he does not cite to where in the record he requested

leave to file an amended complaint before the December 9, 2021

hearing on Geico's motion for summary judgment.

During the December 9, 2021 hearing on Geico's motion

for summary judgment, Fukuda and the circuit court discussed

filing an amended complaint:

THE COURT: . . . . My point is you seem to be arguing that [defense counsel] is blocking you from suing the insured because you don't have her address. You don't need her address to sue her. So that makes no sense.

MR. FUKUDA: Okay. Well, now I'll do it to paper then.

. . . .

MR. FUKUDA: And I can still get the -- I can still get everything done. I can file for the first amended. I have that all written up already. I have everything written up. It's just that we had to sit here today so I decided just, you know, I mean, there's no sense to file all kinds of papers if there's a MSJ blocking it, I mean, possibly.

(Emphases added.)

The circuit court noted, "we've talked about you

bringing a claim against the driver at the last hearing, so

4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

nothing's happened since then." Fukuda then asserted, "I have

it all written up. It's already ready. If you like proof, I

can email it to you." The circuit court responded, "No. The

point is what's in the record as of now."

The circuit court orally granted Geico's motion at the

end of the hearing.

According to the docket list for the underlying case,

the prior hearing was on November 2, 2021, about a month before

the December 9, 2021 hearing on Geico's motion for summary

judgment. 4

Thus, it appears the circuit court relied on Fukuda's

failure to file an amended complaint between the November 2,

2021 and December 9, 2021 hearings in denying Fukuda leave to

amend his complaint; in other words, the circuit court relied on

undue delay. Applying the supreme court's determination that

undue delay alone is insufficient to deny leave to amend a

complaint, and taking into account Fukuda's self-represented

status as well as the lack of information as to how the

complaint would be amended, we hold the circuit court abused its

discretion. See Carvalho, 150 Hawai‘i at 386, 502 P.3d at 487.

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Related

Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School District
903 F. Supp. 1377 (C.D. California, 1995)
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Transamerica Insurance Co.
969 P.2d 1275 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1998)
Nelson v. University of Hawai'i
54 P.3d 433 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 2002)
Gurrobat v. HTH Corporation.
346 P.3d 197 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 2015)
Carvalho v. AIG Hawaii Insurance Company, Inc.
502 P.3d 482 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 2022)

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Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fukuda-v-geico-insurance-corporation-hawapp-2025.