Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation
This text of Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation (Fukuda v. Geico Insurance Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 18-MAR-2025 07:51 AM Dkt. 86 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
MARK FUKUDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEICO INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)
Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Fukuda
appeals from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's June 27,
2022 Final Judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Geico
Insurance Corporation. 1
According to Fukuda's complaint, he was involved in a
two-car accident in a parking lot. Fukuda and the other driver
exchanged phone numbers and insurance information; both were
1 The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.
Geico indicates the caption is incorrect and should read Geico Indemnity Company rather than Geico Insurance Corporation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
insured by Geico but Fukuda did not have collision coverage
under his policy. A Geico representative determined that Fukuda
"was half liable for the accident." Fukuda declined Geico's
settlement and indicated he would sue instead.
Fukuda filed a complaint naming Geico as the defendant
and alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) fraud, and
(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Geico moved for summary judgment, which the circuit
court granted. Fukuda appeals, asserting he was not allowed to
amend his complaint. 2
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve this
appeal as discussed below, and vacate and remand.
Fukuda contends the circuit court "erred in
misrepresenting that I didn't have the right to amend the
pleading as discussed at the hearing for the" motion for summary
judgment. Fukuda argues that the circuit court "should have
allowed for me to amend the pleading[,]" relying on Hawai‘i Rules
of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 14(a).
2 Fukuda asserts a second point of error challenging the granting of summary judgment on his fraud claim. Based on our decision, we need not reach this point.
2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
However, HRCP Rule 14(a) is inapplicable here because
it applies when a "defendant may bring in [a] third-party" and
Fukuda was the plaintiff – not the defendant - in the underlying
case. (Emphasis omitted.)
HRCP Rule 15(a)(1) explains, before trial, a party may
amend a pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served[.]" Otherwise, "a party may
amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires. . . ." HRCP Rule 15(a)(2).
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has held that "unless there
is an apparent reason indicating otherwise, under HRCP
Rule 15(a), leave to amend shall be freely given to a party to
amend its complaint when justice so requires" and "undue delay
alone is an insufficient basis for denying leave to amend a
complaint[.]" Carvalho v. AIG Hawai‘i Ins., 150 Hawai‘i 381,
385, 386, 502 P.3d 482, 486, 487 (2022) (citation omitted). 3
"This court reviews a denial of leave to amend a
complaint under HRCP Rule 15(a) or (b) under the abuse of
3 But see Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 89 Hawai‘i 157, 162, 969 P.2d 1275, 1280 (1998) (explaining that "federal courts have observed that '[a] motion for leave to amend is not a vehicle to circumvent summary judgment'") (quoting Schlacter-Jones v. Gen. Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) and Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("It is generally inappropriate to grant leave to amend a complaint while summary judgment is pending.")).
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discretion standard." Id. at 384, 502 P.3d at 485 (citation
omitted). And abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court
has "disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of a party litigant." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Fukuda filed his complaint on March 26, 2021.
Fukuda did not file an amended complaint before Geico filed its
answer, and he does not cite to where in the record he requested
leave to file an amended complaint before the December 9, 2021
hearing on Geico's motion for summary judgment.
During the December 9, 2021 hearing on Geico's motion
for summary judgment, Fukuda and the circuit court discussed
filing an amended complaint:
THE COURT: . . . . My point is you seem to be arguing that [defense counsel] is blocking you from suing the insured because you don't have her address. You don't need her address to sue her. So that makes no sense.
MR. FUKUDA: Okay. Well, now I'll do it to paper then.
. . . .
MR. FUKUDA: And I can still get the -- I can still get everything done. I can file for the first amended. I have that all written up already. I have everything written up. It's just that we had to sit here today so I decided just, you know, I mean, there's no sense to file all kinds of papers if there's a MSJ blocking it, I mean, possibly.
(Emphases added.)
The circuit court noted, "we've talked about you
bringing a claim against the driver at the last hearing, so
4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
nothing's happened since then." Fukuda then asserted, "I have
it all written up. It's already ready. If you like proof, I
can email it to you." The circuit court responded, "No. The
point is what's in the record as of now."
The circuit court orally granted Geico's motion at the
end of the hearing.
According to the docket list for the underlying case,
the prior hearing was on November 2, 2021, about a month before
the December 9, 2021 hearing on Geico's motion for summary
judgment. 4
Thus, it appears the circuit court relied on Fukuda's
failure to file an amended complaint between the November 2,
2021 and December 9, 2021 hearings in denying Fukuda leave to
amend his complaint; in other words, the circuit court relied on
undue delay. Applying the supreme court's determination that
undue delay alone is insufficient to deny leave to amend a
complaint, and taking into account Fukuda's self-represented
status as well as the lack of information as to how the
complaint would be amended, we hold the circuit court abused its
discretion. See Carvalho, 150 Hawai‘i at 386, 502 P.3d at 487.
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