Fukaya v. Velho

416 F. Supp. 785, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15837
CourtDistrict Court, D. Guam
DecidedMarch 30, 1976
DocketCiv. 74-189
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 416 F. Supp. 785 (Fukaya v. Velho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Guam primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fukaya v. Velho, 416 F. Supp. 785, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15837 (gud 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

DUEÑAS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are the decedents of Hiroyuki Fukaya and have filed a wrongful death action against Ronald Richard Velho, hereinafter referred to as “Velho”, Chrysler Pacific Autos, Inc., hereinafter referred to as “Chrysler”, China Insurance Company, Ltd., hereinafter referred to as “China Insurance”, and State Farm Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as “State Farm”.

The alleged facts are essentially as follows: Velho, a resident of California, visited Guam briefly and rented a car owned by Chrysler. China Insurance allegedly had a policy in effect with Chrysler which made Velho an insured under the policy. On November 21, 1974, Velho, while driving the vehicle owned by Chrysler, allegedly drove the vehicle negligently into the person of Hiroyuki Fukaya resulting in his death. State Farm had issued a policy of insurance to Velho in California, which was in effect on the date of the accident, insuring him for any personal liability which he may incur due to his operation of a motor- vehicle. The territorial limits of the policy covered the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada. State Farm does not deny coverage over the accident.

From the record, it appears that Velho has not been served. State Farm has been served pursuant to Section 406.1 of the Civil Code of Guam as an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in Guam.

“§ 406.1. Service of process on Director of [Revenue and Taxation] in Action Against Unlicensed Foreign Corporation. Every foreign corporation or corporation formed, organized, or existing under any laws, other than those of Guam *786 now or hereinafter doing business in Guam, which fails to comply with the provisions of Section 405 before doing or continuing to do any business in Guam, shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Director of [Revenue and Taxation] as its agent for the service of process in any action against such corporation arising out of acts or omissions of such corporation within Guam, including, without limitation, any action to recover the statutory forfeiture and penalties for failure to be so licensed and all taxes, fees, and other obligations for which the corporation might be liable to the government of Guam. Such agency for the purpose of service of process shall continue as long as any obligations against such corporation are outstanding even though such corporation has ceased to do business in Guam. Pursuant to such service, suit may be brought in the District Court of Guam. Such service shall be made upon the Director of [Revenue and Taxation] by leaving with him duplicate copies of such process, together with an affidavit of the plaintiff or one of the plaintiff’s attorneys, showing the last known address of such corporation, and, except in actions in which the government of Guam is plaintiff, a fee of [twenty dollars] $20 which shall be included as taxable costs in case of judicial proceedings. Upon receipt of such process, affidavit, and fee the Director of [Revenue and Taxation] shall forthwith give notice by radiogram to the corporation at the address specified in the affidavit and forward to such address by registered mail, with a request for return receipt, a copy of such process.
The Director of [Revenue and Taxation] shall retain a copy of such process in his files, keep a record of any such process served upon him, and record therein the time of such service and his action thereafter with respect thereto.
This sectton does not affect any right to serve process upon a foreign corporation in any other manner permitted by law.”'

The cause of action against State Farm is based on Guam’s direct action statute, § 43354 of the Government Code of Guam:

“§ 43354. Liability policy: direct action. On any policy of liability insurance the injured person or his heirs or representatives shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy, whether or not the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in Guam, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided that the cause of action arose in Guam. Such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer.”

State Farm has filed a motion with the Court asking it to quash the service of process pursuant to § 406.1 on the ground that State Farm is not doing business in Guam within the definition of the statute nor within the Constitutional definition as set forth in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, and International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. State Farm especially relies upon the cases: White v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., (1945 La.App.), 22 So.2d 137, and Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Lejeune, (1951 C.A. 5th Cir. La.), 189 F.2d 521, cert. den., 342 U.S. 869, 72 S.Ct. 111, 96 L.Ed. 653.

However, this Court is more impressed with the authority cited by plaintiff, namely Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. M/V John E. Coon, 207 F.Supp. 45 (E.D.La.1962); and McClanahan v. Trans-America Insurance Co., 149 Cal.App.2d 171, 307 P.2d 1023 (1957). Both Humble and McClanahan concern liability insurance policies as opposed to life insurance policies.

This Court finds that State Farm is doing business within the Territory of Guam within the definition of § 406.1 of the Civil Code and within the Constitutional definition as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra, and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., supra.

*787 State Farm determined the terms of the policy and determined them in such a way to specifically include the Territory of Guam. It knowingly chose to protect its insureds while driving a motor vehicle in Guam. Such was the case in McClanahan.

In McClanahan, the defendant insurance company was sued after it failed to pay a claim made by the plaintiff based upon a judgment plaintiff had obtained against defendant’s insured in California involving an automobile accident in California. The defendant appeared and challenged the service of process on the ground that it was not doing business within the State of California. It was true that defendant’s principal place of business was in Montgomery, Alabama, and that defendant apparently issued and solicited the sale of insurance policies in only three states. The Court in McClanahan

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Bluebook (online)
416 F. Supp. 785, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15837, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fukaya-v-velho-gud-1976.