[Cite as Fugo v. Rae, 2026-Ohio-834.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TAMI FUGO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115235 v. :
JOHN T. RAE, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 25CV100656
Appearances:
Tony Dalayanis, for appellant.
Michael T. Rae, for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Tami Fugo appeals the municipal court’s judgment awarding her
$1,200 on the general claims asserted in a small-claims complaint. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Fugo and John Rae cohabited for a year and a half in Rae’s house.
During that time, both agreed to renovate the bathroom, and Fugo purchased patio furniture, blinds, bedroom furniture, a bidet, a portable shed, and a cable tv
subscription. The couple separated, and Fugo moved out. At the trial before the
magistrate, at which both parties appeared pro se, Fugo claimed they had an
agreement that she would not be obligated to pay anything toward the mortgage,
but Rae would reimburse her for her half of the expenses attributed to bathroom
renovation and the items she purchased. Rae disagreed and claimed he did not
want renovations or other items, but he split the cost of the bathroom renovation.
In addition, Rae testified that he offered Fugo several opportunities to retrieve the
items Fugo purchased. It is undisputed that Fugo returned to the house after
moving out but inexplicably did not retrieve the shed, blinds, patio furniture, or
bidet. On that visit, Fugo brought police officers despite the lack of any allegations
of misconduct by Rae. At trial, Fugo claimed that Rae’s adult son was the cause of
her requesting the police escort. That too remained unsubstantiated, although
largely unexplored based on relevancy concerns.
In all, and as demonstrated by the objection to the magistrate’s
decision, Fugo claimed $6,048 in damages during the trial before the magistrate,
which she limited to $6,000 based on the jurisdictional amount requested in her
small-claims complaint. See Kime Design v. Aouthmany, 2012-Ohio-3183, ¶ 14
(6th Dist.), quoting Staffilino Chevrolet, Inc. v. Balk, 2004-Ohio-3633, ¶ 11 (7th
Dist.). In addition to the monetary damages, Fugo sought a judgment ordering the
return of a portable shed, patio furniture, bidet, and an heirloom coat rack, which
constitutes replevin relief that is outside the jurisdictional limitations of a small- claims court. Alb United States Auto, Inc. v. Modic, 2013-Ohio-1561, ¶ 12 (8th
Dist.); see also Brake v. Dolezal, 2025-Ohio-338, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.), citing Bragg v.
Maroti, 2015-Ohio-4830, ¶ 4 (11th Dist.) (all citing or referencing R.C.
1925.02(A)(2)(a)(i)); see also Gates v. Praul, 2011-Ohio-6230, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.)
(defining replevin as a claim to recover possession of identifiable property).
Upon the evidence presented at trial, the magistrate awarded Fugo
$1,200 in damages plus 8 percent interest from April 3, 2025, in a general verdict.
Neither party filed a request for findings of fact or conclusions of law under Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a). Instead, Fugo filed an objection asking for the full $6,000 award and
reiterated her request for certain property to be returned. The trial court overruled
the objection and entered a final judgment after adopting the magistrate’s decision.
This appeal timely followed.
In the three assignments of error presented for review, Fugo claims
that the judgment in her favor is in error because the municipal court awarded less
than all of the $6,000 sought at trial. According to her, a valid, oral agreement
existed between Rae and her, or in the alternative, Rae was unjustly enriched by
the improvements to his property or wrongfully converted the specific items to his
possession, either of which would also support an award of $6,000. In essence,
Fugo is claiming that the damages award is against the weight of the evidence.
The weighing of evidence as it relates to the computation of damages
is a factual determination, reviewed under the manifest-weight standard of review.
Motors, L.L.C. v. Kaba, 2025-Ohio-640, ¶ 76 (8th Dist.), citing Revilo Tyluka, LLC v. Simon Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 2011-Ohio-1922, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), and Seasons
Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984). Under that review, the panel “‘weighs
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 387 (1997).
The claims Fugo presented are all based on the alleged oral agreement
between the parties, an agreement that was contested by Rae. The magistrate
concluded that some damages were proven based on an unspecified legal theory.
Thus, the award of damages is solely based on the credibility of the parties. Under
the manifest-weight standard, appellate courts can only reverse if it clearly has been
demonstrated that the trier of fact lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of
justice. We must, however, be cognizant that the trier of fact is free to believe all,
some, or none of the evidence presented at trial. State v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-4006,
¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Simply because the trier of fact accepted the defense’s version of
facts as to some of the claimed damages does not rise to the level of demonstrating
a miscarriage of justice warranting appellate intervention. This is because reversing
a judgment based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against’” the verdict.
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983).
This is not that case. Both parties presented their version of the facts and evidence for the
magistrate’s consideration. Rae generally contested the existence of any agreement
to repay Fugo for the renovations, and conversely, Fugo presented evidence that Rae
retained items of some value. Because Fugo failed to request findings of fact, we are
left only to review the $1,200 award based on the trial testimony. Nothing in this
record demonstrates that Rae’s testimony as to the lack of an agreement to repay a
majority of the damages sought was inherently incredible or that the $1,200
judgment in Fugo’s favor is otherwise against the weight of the evidence based on
the arguments presented in this appeal. Although the $1,200 award was less than
requested, it “reflect[s] a reasoned, deliberative process by which some elements of
evidence were discounted, others discarded, and yet others given full weight, at the
end of which a reasonable allocation of damages” was awarded. Alliance Excavating
v. Triangle Real Estate Servs., 2009-Ohio-2761, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.).
It is not for this panel to merely substitute our judgment for that of
the trier of fact. In light of the deference with which manifest-weight review is to be
applied, and when coupled with the limited arguments essentially asking for a de
novo reweighing of the evidence (a form of review not permitted under the manifest-
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[Cite as Fugo v. Rae, 2026-Ohio-834.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TAMI FUGO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115235 v. :
JOHN T. RAE, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 25CV100656
Appearances:
Tony Dalayanis, for appellant.
Michael T. Rae, for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Tami Fugo appeals the municipal court’s judgment awarding her
$1,200 on the general claims asserted in a small-claims complaint. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Fugo and John Rae cohabited for a year and a half in Rae’s house.
During that time, both agreed to renovate the bathroom, and Fugo purchased patio furniture, blinds, bedroom furniture, a bidet, a portable shed, and a cable tv
subscription. The couple separated, and Fugo moved out. At the trial before the
magistrate, at which both parties appeared pro se, Fugo claimed they had an
agreement that she would not be obligated to pay anything toward the mortgage,
but Rae would reimburse her for her half of the expenses attributed to bathroom
renovation and the items she purchased. Rae disagreed and claimed he did not
want renovations or other items, but he split the cost of the bathroom renovation.
In addition, Rae testified that he offered Fugo several opportunities to retrieve the
items Fugo purchased. It is undisputed that Fugo returned to the house after
moving out but inexplicably did not retrieve the shed, blinds, patio furniture, or
bidet. On that visit, Fugo brought police officers despite the lack of any allegations
of misconduct by Rae. At trial, Fugo claimed that Rae’s adult son was the cause of
her requesting the police escort. That too remained unsubstantiated, although
largely unexplored based on relevancy concerns.
In all, and as demonstrated by the objection to the magistrate’s
decision, Fugo claimed $6,048 in damages during the trial before the magistrate,
which she limited to $6,000 based on the jurisdictional amount requested in her
small-claims complaint. See Kime Design v. Aouthmany, 2012-Ohio-3183, ¶ 14
(6th Dist.), quoting Staffilino Chevrolet, Inc. v. Balk, 2004-Ohio-3633, ¶ 11 (7th
Dist.). In addition to the monetary damages, Fugo sought a judgment ordering the
return of a portable shed, patio furniture, bidet, and an heirloom coat rack, which
constitutes replevin relief that is outside the jurisdictional limitations of a small- claims court. Alb United States Auto, Inc. v. Modic, 2013-Ohio-1561, ¶ 12 (8th
Dist.); see also Brake v. Dolezal, 2025-Ohio-338, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.), citing Bragg v.
Maroti, 2015-Ohio-4830, ¶ 4 (11th Dist.) (all citing or referencing R.C.
1925.02(A)(2)(a)(i)); see also Gates v. Praul, 2011-Ohio-6230, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.)
(defining replevin as a claim to recover possession of identifiable property).
Upon the evidence presented at trial, the magistrate awarded Fugo
$1,200 in damages plus 8 percent interest from April 3, 2025, in a general verdict.
Neither party filed a request for findings of fact or conclusions of law under Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a). Instead, Fugo filed an objection asking for the full $6,000 award and
reiterated her request for certain property to be returned. The trial court overruled
the objection and entered a final judgment after adopting the magistrate’s decision.
This appeal timely followed.
In the three assignments of error presented for review, Fugo claims
that the judgment in her favor is in error because the municipal court awarded less
than all of the $6,000 sought at trial. According to her, a valid, oral agreement
existed between Rae and her, or in the alternative, Rae was unjustly enriched by
the improvements to his property or wrongfully converted the specific items to his
possession, either of which would also support an award of $6,000. In essence,
Fugo is claiming that the damages award is against the weight of the evidence.
The weighing of evidence as it relates to the computation of damages
is a factual determination, reviewed under the manifest-weight standard of review.
Motors, L.L.C. v. Kaba, 2025-Ohio-640, ¶ 76 (8th Dist.), citing Revilo Tyluka, LLC v. Simon Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 2011-Ohio-1922, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), and Seasons
Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984). Under that review, the panel “‘weighs
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 387 (1997).
The claims Fugo presented are all based on the alleged oral agreement
between the parties, an agreement that was contested by Rae. The magistrate
concluded that some damages were proven based on an unspecified legal theory.
Thus, the award of damages is solely based on the credibility of the parties. Under
the manifest-weight standard, appellate courts can only reverse if it clearly has been
demonstrated that the trier of fact lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of
justice. We must, however, be cognizant that the trier of fact is free to believe all,
some, or none of the evidence presented at trial. State v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-4006,
¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Simply because the trier of fact accepted the defense’s version of
facts as to some of the claimed damages does not rise to the level of demonstrating
a miscarriage of justice warranting appellate intervention. This is because reversing
a judgment based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against’” the verdict.
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983).
This is not that case. Both parties presented their version of the facts and evidence for the
magistrate’s consideration. Rae generally contested the existence of any agreement
to repay Fugo for the renovations, and conversely, Fugo presented evidence that Rae
retained items of some value. Because Fugo failed to request findings of fact, we are
left only to review the $1,200 award based on the trial testimony. Nothing in this
record demonstrates that Rae’s testimony as to the lack of an agreement to repay a
majority of the damages sought was inherently incredible or that the $1,200
judgment in Fugo’s favor is otherwise against the weight of the evidence based on
the arguments presented in this appeal. Although the $1,200 award was less than
requested, it “reflect[s] a reasoned, deliberative process by which some elements of
evidence were discounted, others discarded, and yet others given full weight, at the
end of which a reasonable allocation of damages” was awarded. Alliance Excavating
v. Triangle Real Estate Servs., 2009-Ohio-2761, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.).
It is not for this panel to merely substitute our judgment for that of
the trier of fact. In light of the deference with which manifest-weight review is to be
applied, and when coupled with the limited arguments essentially asking for a de
novo reweighing of the evidence (a form of review not permitted under the manifest-
weight review), Fugo’s assignments of error are overruled. She has not
demonstrated a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting appellate intervention.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that in his appellee briefing, Rae
seeks to have the verdict vacated. No cross-appeal was filed. Under App.R. 3(C)(1),
an appellee is required to file a cross-appeal when seeking to change or reverse the final judgment. Because no cross-appeal was timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to
entertain that request. See Ohio Valley Business Advisors L.L.C. v. AER Inv. Corp.,
2017-Ohio-1283, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); Smith v. Smith, 2016-Ohio-3223, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.).
The final judgment entered in Fugo’s favor is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR