Fuentes v. Tilles

Second Circuit

Fuentes v. Tilles

376 F. App'x 91

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMay 10, 2010

Docket09-2954-cv

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 376 F. App'x 91 (Fuentes v. Tilles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fuentes v. Tilles, 376 F. App'x 91 (2d Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Michael Andrew Fuentes sued defendants for alleged violations of myriad federal laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The district court approved and adopted Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s recommendation that Fuentes’s complaint be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. *92 § 1915(e) as lacking an arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). We review such a dismissal de novo. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). While we give “special solicitude” to pro se submissions, Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2006); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that, after Twombly and Iqbal, “we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”), Fuentes’s complaint plainly fails to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, Fuentes does not contend that he should have been permitted leave to amend. Our de novo review of his complaint and his arguments to this court confirms that, in any event, amendment would have been futile. See, e.g., Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir.2003).

We have considered Fuentes’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Michael Andrew Fuentes sued defendants for alleged violations of myriad federal laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The district court approved and adopted Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s recommendation that Fuentes’s complaint be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. *92 § 1915(e) as lacking an arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). We review such a dismissal de novo. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). While we give “special solicitude” to pro se submissions, Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2006); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that, after Twombly and Iqbal, “we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”), Fuentes’s complaint plainly fails to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, Fuentes does not contend that he should have been permitted leave to amend. Our de novo review of his complaint and his arguments to this court confirms that, in any event, amendment would have been futile. See, e.g., Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir.2003).

We have considered Fuentes’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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376 F. App'x 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fuentes-v-tilles-ca2-2010.

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