Fryer v. TAYLOR RENTAL PROPERTIES, INC.
This text of 996 So. 2d 471 (Fryer v. TAYLOR RENTAL PROPERTIES, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Vicki FRYER, Brenda McGee, Charles Parker and Carol Parker, Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
TAYLOR RENTAL PROPERTIES, INC., Fred Namer Kalil, III and Melanie McGraw Kalil, Defendants-Appellants.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
*472 Michael Lee Dubos, Monroe, for Appellants, Fred Namer Kalil, III and Melanie McGraw Kalil.
William H. Hallack, Jr., Dennis W. Hallack, West Monroe, for Appellees, Randal Taylor and Taylor Rental Properties, Inc.
Caroline Hemphill, for Appellees, Vicki Fryer, Brenda McGee, Charles Parker and Carol Parker.
Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and LOLLEY, JJ.
WILLIAMS, J.
Fred and Melanie Kalil, the purchasers of an apartment complex in West Monroe, appeal a trial court judgment dismissing their redhibition claims against the seller, Taylor Rental Properties, Inc., and its principal, Randall Taylor. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTS
The original plaintiffs in this action, Vicki Fryer, Brenda McGee, Charles Parker and Carol Parker, were the owners of condominiums in West Monroe, Louisiana. The defendant, Taylor Rental Properties, Inc., owned by its principal, Randall Taylor (collectively "Taylor"), is a company that develops, owns and manages residential properties. In 2005, Taylor purchased a parcel of property on Wallace Road in West Monroe to build an apartment complex. The purchased property was located to the east of the original plaintiffs' property.
During the construction of the apartment complex, Taylor brought in truckloads of dirt to elevate a portion of the property. The southern portion of the property was elevated approximately three feet, while the northern side was raised approximately thirteen feet. When it rained, the elevation caused the original plaintiffs' backyards to flood and incur sedimentation problems. The plaintiffs complained to Taylor, and he had his employees remove the sediment from their property. Taylor assured the property owners that the problems would resolve once the construction was completed.
When the flooding and sedimentation problems persisted, Taylor erected a wooden retaining wall to hold the elevation in place. Taylor reinforced the retaining wall by packing dirt around it and holding the dirt in place with large rocks ("rip-rap"). Unbeknownst to Taylor, the retaining wall and rip-rap encroached approximately one to three feet onto a 15-foot utility and drainage servitude that burdened the property of the condominium owners.
On August 1, 2005, Taylor sold the property to Fred and Melanie Kalil ("the Kalils") *473 for $750,000. Prior to the sale, Fred Kalil ("Kalil") performed a visual inspection of the property. However, at trial, he denied being aware of the flooding problems and encroachment. Within months of the sale, the Kalils began receiving complaints from the property owners with regard to the continued flooding and sedimentation. Kalil contacted Taylor, who acknowledged a history of problems with the property owners.
The Kalils hired Dr. Dixie Griffin, an engineer, to inspect the property and identify possible solutions. Dr. Griffin opined that the drainage servitude had been obstructed by the dirt and rip-rap, resulting in the flooding and other problems. Based upon Dr. Griffin's recommendation, the Kalils placed sandbags along the property owners' back fence to channel water along its natural course and to prevent flooding. The Kalils also hired another engineer, Mark Thomey, to inspect the retaining wall.
On April 19, 2006, the original plaintiffs filed suit against Taylor and the Kalils, seeking injunctive relief and damages for trespass due to the encroachment by the retaining wall, dirt and rip-rap. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction and ordered the Kalils to "take effective measures, including monitoring the effectiveness of the sandbags that have been put in place to determine whether or not the sandbags arrest the [property owners] from suffering further damage...." The Kalils engaged Dr. Griffin to monitor the sandbags during periods of rainfall and routinely removed the sediment that accumulated against the sandbags. Taylor and the original plaintiffs settled their dispute by Taylor agreeing to buy the condominiums owned by the original plaintiffs. Thereafter, the original plaintiffs' claims against Taylor and the Kalils were dismissed.[1]
On July 26, 2006, the Kalils filed a cross-claim and third party demand against Taylor, seeking a rescission of the sale of the apartment complex and damages, or alternatively, damages in an amount sufficient to remove the encroachment and restore the servitude. The trial court ruled in favor of Taylor, dismissing the Kalils' claims. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
The Kalils contend the flooding of the neighboring properties and the encroachment caused by the retaining wall constitute redhibitory defects. They argue that they purchased the property unaware of the encroachment and flooding issues and would not have purchased the property had they known.
LSA-C.C. art. 2520 provides:
The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or vices, in the thing sold.
A defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing useless or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect.
A defect is redhibitory also when, without rendering the thing totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be presumed that a buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price.
The seller owes no warranty for defects in the thing that were known to the buyer at the time of the sale or for defects that should have been discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer of such things. LSA-C.C. art. 2521. The standard of diligence that must be exercised by the buyer in determining whether the thing purchased *474 is defective is that of a prudent administrator. LSA-C.C. art. 2521, Official Revision Comment (c).
To determine whether a defect is apparent, courts consider whether a reasonably prudent buyer, acting under similar circumstances, would discover it through a simple inspection of the thing sold. A simple inspection is more than a casual observation; it is an examination of the article by the buyer with a view of ascertaining its soundness. LSA-C.C. art. 2521, Official Revision Comment (d); Stuck v. Long, 40,034 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/17/05), 909 So.2d 686, writ denied, 2005-2367 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 546, citing Amend v. McCabe, 95-0316 (La.12/1/95), 664 So.2d 1183. Whether an inspection is reasonable depends on the facts of each case and includes such factors as the knowledge and expertise of the buyer, the opportunity for inspection and the assurances made by the seller. Stuck, supra; Morrison v. Allstar Dodge Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 792 So.2d 9, writ denied, 2001-2129 (La.11/2/01), 800 So.2d 878. If the defect is apparent and could have been discovered by simple inspection, a plaintiff has a duty to make a further investigation. A failure to do so waives the right to sue in quanti minoris. Dage v. Obed, 40,414 (La. App. 2d Cir.12/14/05), 917 So.2d 713.
The existence of a redhibitory defect is a question of fact which cannot be disturbed unless the record establishes that the finding is manifestly erroneous. Fisher v. Batista, 42,642 (La.App. 2d Cir.10/24/07), 968 So.2d 337; Dage, supra.
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996 So. 2d 471, 2008 WL 4330902, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fryer-v-taylor-rental-properties-inc-lactapp-2008.