Fry v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc.

139 So. 2d 31, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1723
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 12, 1962
DocketNo. 347
StatusPublished

This text of 139 So. 2d 31 (Fry v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fry v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc., 139 So. 2d 31, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1723 (La. Ct. App. 1962).

Opinion

McBRIDE, Judge.

Plaintiff, individually and for the use and benefit of her minor child, sues defendants (the employer and its insurer) for death benefits and funeral expenses under the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Statute. LSA-R.S. 23:1021 et seq. She claims that her husband, Edwin S. Fry, died on October 1, 1957, as a result of an injury received July 2, 1957, during the course and scope of his employment with the first-named defendant. She has appealed from the judgment which dismissed her suit.

The decedent was employed as a special representative of said employer, and it is undisputed that his employment is covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Statute. The job consisted of advertising and promoting the employer’s business, principally in regard to the chartering of special buses. His hours of employment were both irregular and long. He did considerable traveling by automobile. On July 2, 1957, he sustained a fracture of his right foot by the fall of a large automobile tire while engaged in his occupational duties, and two days later a leg-walking cast, weighing between 8 and 10 pounds, was applied to the injured foot and six weeks afterward the cast was removed and the decedent was medically discharged. Decedent worked regularly without loss of time from the date of the accident to his death. His death occurred on October 1, 1957, while he was driving his automobile on the way home from a visit to his doctor’s office, and there is no question the cause of death was myocardial infarction, which is a condition brought about because [32]*32of a restriction of the blood supply to a section o-f the heart muscle, resulting in necrosis of the muscle tissue. Simply stated, it was a case of heart failure.

Plaintiff carries the burden of showing a causal connection between her husband's accident of July 2, 1957, and the fatal heart attack of October 1. She pleads and contends that as a result of said accident decedent was compelled to wear the 8-10 pound leg cast during the hot weather of a New Orleans summer, and that the stress, and strain produced thereby, coupled with the physical exertions demanded by his long hours of work, resulted in severe physical and mental strain which caused decedent’s physical condition to deteriorate to a point where he suffered the massive heart attack of October 1, and therefore it can be said the accident was the precipitating cause of death.

Decedent had long been a sufferer of a heart condition. Dr. Milton H. Hattaway appeared as plaintiff’s chief medical expert, and we learn from his testimony that he had treated plaintiff since October 1950 for hypertension with disturbance in the rhythm of the heart with ectopic (extra) beats. In April 1952 decedent suffered from a respiratory tract infection. Dr. Hattaway described him as a “hypertensive person.” Dr. I. Tedesco, Jr., who applied the cast to decedent’s leg, was also called as a witness by plaintiff, but his testimony shows he was neither personally acquainted with decedent’s physical condition respecting the heart ailment, nor had he reviewed the decedent’s past medical history. Dr. Tedesco was not in a position to give an opinion as to whether the wearing of the cast produced the heart failure. He pointed out, however, that other factors besides the wearing of the cast could have raised the blood pressure and adversely affected decedent’s hypertensive condition.

•After the removal of the cast, decedent continued under the care of Dr. Hattaway for the heart condition. On September 9, 1957, he was complaining of pain beneath the substernal or chest bone. Dr. Hattaway diagnosed the trouble as stemming from the hypertensive heart disease and recommended that the decedent enter a hospital, but this advice went unheeded. Three days later Dr. Hattaway again saw decedent and thought his condition had improved. Again on September 23,1957, Dr. Hattaway saw the patient and thought his condition was better. The last time Dr. Hattaway saw decedent was on October 1, 1957, when he showed symptoms of having influenza, and Dr. Hattaway advised that he go home and take to bed. Decedent died on his way home.

Dr. Hattaway was asked whether the fact that decedent wore the cast for the six-week period, during which he carried on the usual and customary duties of his occupation, had any connection with the fatal heart attack. Dr. Hattaway answered: “1 think it is probably one of the precipitating factors.”

Counsel for plaintiff place great emphasis on the above statement by Dr. Hattaway, and the argument is made that under the settled jurisprudence of the state the statement made by the witness that “it is probably one of the precipitating factors” is sufficient to prove a connection between the accident of July 2, 1957, and the death occurring three months later. Counsel seem to have lifted the above assertion of Dr. Hattaway out of context, and we think that other statements made by the witness go to show that Dr. Hattaway cannot say whether the accident of July 2, or the wearing of the cast which it occasioned, did anything to hasten or bring about the death of decedent’s husband. To quote Dr. Hattaway:

“Q. As I understand your testimony, apparently any aggravations that he may have sustained or undergone, outside of his work, could have precipitated his condition?
“A. There are many things that could have precipitated it: physical, or emotional or mental — any type of precipitating factors could do it. How[33]*33ever, I do think it is one of the factors that may have caused the myocardial infarction.
“Q. You say ‘may have caused it’?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. It is not your opinion that it did?
“A. I have no opinion either way. I say it may have caused it.
“Q. You have no opinion either way?
“A. Because nobody knows.”

Further:

“Q. Would you have advised him (to go to a hospital) without knowing about his cast because of his condition ?
“A. I would have advised him because I was fearful he was going to have a stroke, and that was not because he was wearing a cast or was not wearing a cast.
“Q. Not because he had been wearing a cast?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. But because of his general condition?
“A. On account of his hypertension.
“Q. That would be your advice with any patient with that type of condition ?
“A. Yes, sir, I think it would be.
“Q. But not with regard to him wearing a cast on his leg?
“A. It didn’t have anything to do with this advice, with my advising him one way or the other.”

Dr. Samuel Nadler, a specialist in the field of internal medicine who had been furnished with a detailed history of the physical condition of decedent, appeared and testified as a witness on behalf of the defendants. After reviewing decedent’s history, he stated that he could find no connection between the wearing of the cast and the myocardial infarction from which death occurred. Dr. Nadler’s testimony shows that decedent’s medical history, which he reviewed, was quite detailed. He points out that decedent had been suffering from hypertension over a period of years.

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Bluebook (online)
139 So. 2d 31, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1723, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fry-v-continental-southern-lines-inc-lactapp-1962.