Frunzi v. Sonn

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Frunzi v. Sonn

2017 NY Slip Op 3492, 150 A.D.3d 700, 51 N.Y.S.3d 432

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 3, 2017

Docket2015-05366

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 3492 (Frunzi v. Sonn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Frunzi v. Sonn, 2017 NY Slip Op 3492, 150 A.D.3d 700, 51 N.Y.S.3d 432 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Troia, J.), dated May 1, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, a detective with the New York City Police Department, allegedly was injured while responding to an automobile accident caused by the intoxicated defendant. The plaintiff was about one-half block away from the accident when he slipped on an oily substance and injured his right knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e.

A police officer injured in the line of duty seeking to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e must, among other things, “set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm” (Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 NY2d 423, 441 [1995]). To satisfy the requirement of direct or indirect causation, “a plaintiff need only establish a ‘practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury” (Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 81 [2003]). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that there was no connection between the statutory violation at issue and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Menard v Highbridge House, Inc., 82 AD3d 532 [2011]; Kenavan v City of New York, 267 AD2d 353 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Driscoll v Tower Assoc., 16 AD3d 311 [2005]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Troia, J.), dated May 1, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, a detective with the New York City Police Department, allegedly was injured while responding to an automobile accident caused by the intoxicated defendant. The plaintiff was about one-half block away from the accident when he slipped on an oily substance and injured his right knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e.

A police officer injured in the line of duty seeking to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e must, among other things, “set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm” (Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 NY2d 423, 441 [1995]). To satisfy the requirement of direct or indirect causation, “a plaintiff need only establish a ‘practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury” (Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 81 [2003]). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that there was no connection between the statutory violation at issue and the plaintiff’s injuries (see Menard v Highbridge House, Inc., 82 AD3d 532 [2011]; Kenavan v City of New York, 267 AD2d 353 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Driscoll v Tower Assoc., 16 AD3d 311 [2005]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 3492, 150 A.D.3d 700, 51 N.Y.S.3d 432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frunzi-v-sonn-nyappdiv-2017.

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