Frouws v. Edgio Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedNovember 3, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00691
StatusUnknown

This text of Frouws v. Edgio Incorporated (Frouws v. Edgio Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frouws v. Edgio Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mehran Esfandiari, No. CV-23-00691-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Edgio Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Peter Frouws’ (“Movant’s”) Motion for Consolidation of 16 Related Actions, Appointment as Lead Plaintiff, and Approval of Selection of Co-Lead 17 Counsel.1 (Doc 15). Three other class members filed similar motions. (See Docs. 10, 11, 18 and 12). These other class members have since acknowledged that Movant has the largest 19 financial interest in this matter and is therefore the most adequate class member to serve as 20 Lead Plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (Private Securities Litigation Reform 21 Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”)). (Docs. 16, 17, and 18). Thus, Movant’s appointment as 22 Lead Plaintiff, choice of Co-Lead Counsel, and request for Consolidation of Related 23 Actions are now unopposed. Having considered Movant’s Motion, as well as the Notices 24 of Non-Opposition from other class members, the Court hereby enters the following Order: 25 I. Consolidation 26 Movant argues in his Motion that two separate actions should be consolidated 27 because they present nearly identical factual and legal issues. (Doc. 15 at 4). Rule 42(a)(2)

28 1 Movant nominates Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP (“Scott+Scott”) and The Schall Law Firm (“SLF”) to serve as co-lead counsel. (Doc. 15 at 1). 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that if an action before the Court “involves 2 a common question of law or fact” the Court may consolidate the actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 42(a)(2). Likewise, under the PSLRA, consolidation is appropriate “[i]f more than one 4 action on behalf of a class asserting substantially the same claim or claims arising under 5 this chapter has been filed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B) (ii). The actions Movant seeks to 6 consolidate are Esfandiari v. Edgio, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00691-DJH, and 7 Marinelli v. Edgio, Inc. et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-01170-SMM. 8 The Complaints in both of these actions allege that Edgio Incorporated, et al., 9 (“Defendants”) defrauded investors in violation of Section 10(b) and 20(a) the Securities 10 Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). ( 2:23-cv-00691-DJH Doc. 1 at 2; 2:23-cv- 11 01170-SMM Doc. 1 at 2). Indeed, as Movant argues, these separate actions assert nearly 12 identical factual and legal allegations. (See id). As well, no party has opposed 13 consolidation of these actions. (Docs. 16, 17, and 18). Therefore, the Court finds that 14 consolidation is proper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42; see also In re MicroStrategy Inc. Sec. 15 Litig., 110 F.Supp.2d 427, 431 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“[C]onsolidation is often warranted where 16 multiple securities fraud class actions ‘are based on the same public statements and 17 reports.’”) (quoting Werner v. Satterlee, Stephens, Burke & Burke, 797 F.Supp. 1196, 1211 18 (S.D.N .Y. 1992)). Thus, Movant’s Motion to Consolidate is granted. 19 The Court also notes that this Court’s local rules provide several factors that may 20 be considered in determining the Judge to whom the case or cases will be assigned, 21 including: “(1) whether substantive matters have been considered in a case; (2) which 22 Judge has the most familiarity with the issues involved in the cases; (3) whether a case is 23 reasonably viewed as the lead or principal case; or (4) any other factor serving the interest 24 of judicial economy.” LRCiv 42.1(d). Here, each of these two actions are in an early stage 25 of litigation and no substantive matters have been ruled on in either case. Given that this 26 Court has considered the instant motions and is currently assigned the case that was filed 27 first, the Court assigns the consolidated case to itself. See Hall v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 28 2009 WL 648626, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2009) (citing LRCiv 42.1(a)(4)) (assigning 1 consolidated cases to the court who considered the motion for consolidation and was 2 assigned the case that was filed first). 3 II. Appointment As Lead Plaintiff 4 Movant has also requested that the Court appoint him as Lead Plaintiff in the 5 consolidated action. Movant argues that he is the most adequate class member to be 6 appointed as Lead Plaintiff as he has the largest financial interest at stake and is otherwise 7 qualified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (Doc. 1 at 6). Three other class 8 members who sought appointment as Lead Plaintiff have also rescinded their motions and 9 have recognized that Movant is the most adequate class member to serve as Lead Plaintiff. 10 (Docs. 16, 17, and 18). 11 In a PSLRA class action, the Court “shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or 12 members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of 13 adequately representing the interests of class members.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a) (3)(B)(i). 14 The Court should “presume” that the most adequate plaintiff is the plaintiff who: (1) has 15 either filed a complaint or moved to be named lead plaintiff, (2) has the largest financial 16 interest in the relief sought by the class, and (3) satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule 17 of Civil Procedure 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). Rule 23(a) requires that 18 “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 19 the class” and that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 20 of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). If a party becomes the presumptive 21 lead plaintiff, that presumption may be rebutted only upon “proof” that the party “will not 22 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” or “is subject to unique defenses 23 that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u– 24 4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 25 In making its determination that the Lead Plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 26 23, the Court need not raise its inquiry to the level required in ruling on a motion for class 27 certification; instead, a prima facie showing that the movant satisfies the requirements of 28 Rule 23 is sufficient. See Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., 2012 WL 3002513, at *3 (D. Ariz. 1 July 23, 2012). The requirements of “typicality” and “adequacy” are particularly important 2 for a movant to meet this prima facie showing under Rule 23. In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 3 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 “Typicality” is satisfied when “each class member’s claim arises from the same 5 course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the 6 defendant's liability.” Hall, 2009 WL 648626, at *3 (internal citations omitted).

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