Frost v. United States

71 F. Supp. 793, 35 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1515, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2597
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 18, 1947
DocketCiv. A. Nos. 1749, 1840
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 71 F. Supp. 793 (Frost v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frost v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 793, 35 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1515, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2597 (W.D. La. 1947).

Opinion

DAWKINS, District Judge.

These cases were consolidated for the purposes of trial. For the year 1940 plaintiffs reported and filed individual income tax returns, which included dividends paid by the Frost Lumber Industries, Inc., a Missouri corporation, hereafter called the Missouri Company, amounting, for each, to the sum of $45,501. In addition, the husband received, as head of the community ■of acquets and gains, under the Louisiana law, as a life beneficiary, from W. J. Paulk, and State National Bank of Texarkana, Arkansas, as trustees, the sum of $6,503.56, in which was included the sum of $3,617.50, likewise representing dividends paid on stock of the Missouri Company. One-half ■of this latter sum of $1,808.75 wag included and reported by each of the plaintiffs in their income tax returns for 1940. The wife also received and reported from a trust, created in her favor by the husband, the sum of $7,067.67, representing dividends on stock of the Missouri Company, held by said trust.

The husband and wife during the year 1940 held individually 7738 and 1367 shares respectively of the stock of the said Missouri Company, of which there was outstanding total stock of 60,000 shares of the par value of $100. The husband was president of this corporation.

The, Missouri Company owned all the outstanding stock of the Union Sawmill Company, an Arkansas corporation, hereafter called the Arkansas Company, as well as all outstanding stock of the Frost Lumber Industries, Inc., of Texas, a Texas corporation, hereafter called the Texas Company.

Or. February 10, 1944, plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed individual claims for the refunding of their income taxes, amounting to the sums of $22,597.89 and $27,568.13, respectively, giving as a basis in both instances the following: “A large portion of taxpayer and his wife’s income, in community, is derived from dividends from Frost Lumber Industries, Inc. Said corporation has for some time been endeavoring to have the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determine what portion of said dividends are taxable and what portion represent return of capital. The Statute of Limitation will shortly run, against taxpayer’s 1940 return, therefore he at this time files this blanket claim for refund of all the tax; paid for that year, same to be later properly determined by The Commissioner. The dividends from Perfection Oak Flooring Company, Inc. (now Frost Hardwood Floors, Inc.), is in the same classification.”

Upon a review of the returns, in response to these claims, the Collector found that the sum of $2,627.77, principal and interest, should be refunded to the husband, and the sum of $3,296.45, principal and interest, should be repaid to the wife, but otherwise denied the claims. The amounts thus found to be proper refunds were [794]*794under a formula by which the Collector determined that 90.845 per cent of the total dividend declared by the Missouri Company of $597,788 was taxable income of the corporation, and that 9.155 per cent of said dividend was nontaxable and should be attributed to capital.

It was and is contended by plaintiffs that a proper application of the law to the facts in these cases justifies the conclusion that not more than 62.23441 per cent of the total dividend of the Missouri Company was taxable, and that 37.76559 per cent was nontaxable. Accordingly, plaintiffs have sued for the difference between the amounts which would be due under their contention and the sums awarded by the Collector under the percentages of nontaxable portions of the dividend stated. The demands are for the sums of $6,663.40 and $8,607.18 for the husband and wife, respectively.

The controversy turns upon the point as to whether monies received from the Arkansas and Texas Companies should be treated as income, or should be applied to indebtedness due the Missouri or parent corporation, thereby leaving for taxation only the earnings of the parent for the year 1940.

The Collector’s figures showed “total earnings available for dividends $543,058.-00”, but that the distribution in dividends had been at the rate of $10 or the total sum of $597,788, or $54,730 more than the actual earnings for the year 1940 by the three compánies. He further attributed the latter sum to payment from capital and apportioned the taxable and nontaxable percentages of the dividends paid the plaintiffs in these cases according to those figures. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the met income of the Missouri Company was the sum of $372,029.84 and was the gross sum subject to taxation; and that all the monies, amounting to $171,028.35, received from the two subsidiaries, the Arkansas and Texas Companies, should be applied to their indebtedness and hence the remainder of the total dividend declared of $597,788 or the sum of $225,758.16 should be held to be nontaxable. Plaintiffs also contend that all the earnings of the Missouri Company, since March 1, 1913, up to and including December 31, 1939,. the year immediately preceding the taxable period in question, 1940, had been disbursed by the parent company and the only source from which the amount of the dividend declared in the latter year, in excess of $372,-029.84 could have been paid was “out of-whatever surplus there was on February-28, 1913.”

Both the Arkansas and Texas Companies-filed income tax returns for the year 1940r the former reporting taxable income of $177,079.95 and the Texas Company showing a deficit with no income taxes due. Pri- or to December 31, 1936, the Missouri Company operated the two subsidiaries, the Arkansas and Texas Companies, as branches of its own business, receiving and selling all their products, absorbing the proceeds as well as the expenses and losses when such occurred. No separate records, books or bank accounts were kept for these subsidiaries except such as were necessary to operations of the mills owned by them, in meeting payrolls, purchasing timber, etc.

In 1929, Pope’s Dig. § 14024 et seq., an income tax was imposed in the state of Arkansas and in 1935 the income tax law of Louisiana became effective. Act No. 21 of 1934. The condition of the books, in which the records of the parent and subsidiaries were kept, was such that the accountant who looked after income tax matters for the whole group, found it very difficult to segregate the business of the Arkansas' and Texas Companies from those of the parent or Missouri Company. For this reason he “prevailed on the management to separate the three corporations” and to set them up as three separate corporate entities with their own books, so they could deal with one another accordingly in their bookkeeping. As of January 1, 1937, therefore, “there. was a complete divorcement”. of these companies. Their books showed separate assets and liabilities, including accounts receivable and accounts payable. Prior to that time, the books did not disclose the amounts of the investments by the Missouri Company in the capital stock of the subsidiaries. In the new set-up the figures showed not only those investments, but “monies that had been expended for lands, timber, and' properties, and things [795]*795of that character — advances for operating costs and a counter entry was made on the subsidiaries’ books — was set up as a liability by the subsidiary to the parent company and the subsidiaries’ books were brought up separately.” Since that date they have been operated as separate corporations, made payments on accounts, borrowed monies from the parent company and credits and debits have accordingly been entered on the records of the parent. See testimony of accountant, J. B. McGuire, pp. 33 and 34 of the note of evidence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Frost v. United States
168 F.2d 705 (Fifth Circuit, 1948)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
71 F. Supp. 793, 35 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1515, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frost-v-united-states-lawd-1947.