Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp.

119 So. 2d 759, 238 Miss. 775, 12 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, 100 A.L.R. 2d 876, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 463
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedApril 18, 1960
Docket41457
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 119 So. 2d 759 (Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 238 Miss. 775, 12 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, 100 A.L.R. 2d 876, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Mich. 1960).

Opinion

*784 Gillespie, J.

This is a suit to cancel an oil, gas and mineral lease owned by Gulf Oil Corporation, herein called Gulf, as to the undivided one-half mineral interests of complainants, herein called the Frost Group, in 115 acres of land in the Gwinville Field in Jefferson Davis County. From an adverse decree, the Frost Group appeals.

The tract of land involved is the 115 acres owned by one Gholar, who, on June 29, 1937, executed an oil, gas and mineral lease to Gulf for a primary term of 10 years and . . as long thereafter as either oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral is produced in paying quantities.” The lease contained no pooling provision. On October 4, 1937, the Frost Group acquired an undivided one-half interest in the minerals in the Gholar lands subject to the lease to Gulf but including one-half of the benefits accruing to the lessors thereunder.

On May 24, 1945, Gulf completed an oil well on the Gholar lands. The well was drilled to a depth of 9400 feet and casing was set to that depth. Electric logs and drill-stem- tests indicated numerous productive intervals. Production was from performations between 8570-78 feet below surface. We shall refer to this well as the Gholar 011 Well.

On October 11, 1945, Gulf completed a gas well known as the A. L. Norwood No. 1 on lands lying a short distance east of the Gholar tract. The Frost Group declined to sign a pooling agreement proposed by Gulf for a producing unit for the A. L. Norwood No. 1, a gas welJ producing from an interval less than 8300 feet below *785 surface. The pooling agreement finally signed by Gulf and the Frost Group was limited to a depth of 8300 feet below surface, and it expressly provided that production on the Gholar lands below 8300 feet would be in accordance with the Gholar lease. We assume without discussion that under the terms of the pooling agreement signed by the Frost Group for the purposes of integrating their mineral interests in the Gholar lands for the A. L. Norwood No. 1 Unit for production of gas, such production from that well would not extend beyond the primary term the lease as to the Frost Group’s interest in the minerals below 8300 feet in the Gholar lands. The Frost Group have been paid all the royalties due from production from the A. L. Norwood No. 1, which well is still producing gas.

The Gholar Oil Well began making excessive amounts of salt water in the early part of 1955, and the production of oil had declined to 9 barrels a day. Salt water production was 600 to 700 barrels a day. The gas pressure (it was a high ratio oil well) had slightly increased. The production of salt water created disposal problems. After study of the well and its behavior by geologists, petroleum engineers, and management, it was decided by Gulf that the Gholar Oil Well should be reworked for the purpose of squeezing off the salt water and reperforating the upper part of the same Gholar oil sand. On Gulf’s application a permit for the stated purposes was issued by the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board, herein called Board. Pursuant to this permit, Gulf “killed” or shut in the Gholar Oil Well on May 24,1955. The primary term of the Gholar lease had long since expired. The squeeze job was a failure and the well produced only salt water from perforations in the upper part of the Gholar Oils and after the lower part had been squeezed off. The Gholar oil sand was depleted.

Gulf then perforated the interval 8582-8590 feet and gas was produced therefrom in paying quantities from a new sand that became known as the Gholar gas sand *786 and which was not connected with any gas or oil sand then producing in the field. The well was recompleted as a gas well from the interval stated on June 13, 1955, and was allowed to produce and flow into pipe for fifteen days, or until June 29, 1955, when the well was shut in pending action of the Board, as later herein stated, and after order of the Board dated October 19, 1955, the well was put on production October 24, 1955.

The Frost Group contend that when the Gholar oil sand was depleted and there was no further production from that sand interval, the lease terminated, and that Gulf as lessee did not have the right thereafter to perforate another interval and “discover” a new producing interval. They contend that after a producing sand is depleted after the exploration of the primary term, the lessee has no additional period for exploration. Stated in its proper perspective, the first question is: When a well is drilled to a certain depth and electric logs and drill-stem tests indicate several productive sands or intervals, and casing is set and one of the sands produces past the date of expiration of the primary term of the lease and the sand becomes depleted, does the lease then expire, or does the lessee have a reasonable time to bring in production from another sand or interval within the limits of the original depth?

The lessee’s estate is a determinable fee in the minerals. Koenig v. Calcote, 199 Miss. 435, 25 So. 2d 763. Mineral leases are construed against the lessee and in favor of the lessor. Summers Oil & Gas, Perm. Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 372. The same authority recognizes that the rules for construction of a mineral lease are generally the same as those employed to interpret other written instruments.

The authorities agree that temporary cessation of production after the expiration of the primary term does not terminate the lease, ipso facto. A reading of the numerous cases cited by the parties clearly indicate that the courts have generally applied the rule *787 of reasonable construction to tbe question of when and under what circumstances cessation of production after the expiration of tbe primary term will terminate a mineral lease. Consideration must be given to tbe contract itself and tbe circumstances attending tbe cessation and whether tbe cessation is a reasonable incident to tbe continued production of minerals. In Cortner v. Warren (Okla.), 330 P. 2d 217, it was said: .. We conclude that tbe rule quoted above from tbe Lamb v. Vansyckle case is tbe soundest and most equitable and tbe same is adopted. Under that rule, tbe controlling factual finding is whether or not tbe temporary stoppage in production was for an unreasonable length of time. In tbe case now being considered, tbe cessation was for a period of from five to six months.” In Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597, 266 S.W. 253, referred to in Cortner, the Court said that “... we have reached tbe conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to hold that tbe lease continues in force unless tbe period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is for an unreasonable time. ’ ’ Cf. Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 323 S.W. 2d 944 (Tex. 1959); Reynolds v. McNeil, 218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W. 2d 723; Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961; Cole v. Philadelphia Co., 345 Pa. 315, 26 A.2d 920.

The lease in question does not say that it shall be in force so long as minerals are continuously produced. It is clear that tbe parties did not intend that continuous production should be of tbe essence of tbe contract.

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Bluebook (online)
119 So. 2d 759, 238 Miss. 775, 12 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, 100 A.L.R. 2d 876, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frost-v-gulf-oil-corp-miss-1960.