1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 SHAWN KEVIN FROST, 4 Case No. 17-cv-07228-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 6 INJUNCTION; AND DENYING HIS D. WILCOX, et al., MOTION TO COMPEL 7 Defendants. 8
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff Shawn Kevin Frost, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State 11 Prison-Sacramento (“SAC”), has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 12 operative complaint in this action is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff alleged 13 constitutional rights violations at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP” or “Pelican Bay”) where he 14 was previously incarcerated. Dkt. 10 at 3-7.1 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has named the 15 following Defendants at PBSP and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 16 (“CDCR”): Warden Clark E. Ducart; Chief Deputy Warden D. W. Bradbury; Associate Warden C. 17 Olsen; Captain T. S. Buchanan; Lieutenant D. Higgerson; Sergeant J. Schrag; Correctional Officer 18 T. Toussaint; Correctional Counselor II D. Wilcox; Office of Appeals Chief M. Voong; and Office 19 of Appeals Captain M. Hodges. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has sought declaratory relief and monetary 20 damages. Id. at 3, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from Defendants’ alleged retaliation 21 for his filing an appeal, log no. PBSP-16-01431, on July 6, 2016 naming several supervisorial and 22 custody staff as co-conspirators of malfeasance. Plaintiff alleged that three days later, on July 9, 23 2016, he was rehoused in a cell “which lacked a seat/stool, no desk or table to eat meals [or] write, 24 no electrical power to use his approved personal property . . . and a broken sink . . . .” Id. at 3. 25 Plaintiff claimed that he was placed in such inadequate housing for approximately 5 months or 26 until around November 2016 before he was “moved back to adequate and appropriate/normal 27 1 general population housing.” Id. at 5-6. According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff filed 2 another appeal, log no PBSP-16-01584, in which he raised his claims in this action. Plaintiff’s 3 specific claims have been isolated as follows: (1) Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan 4 retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of his First Amendment rights; and (2) Defendants Olsen, 5 Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, Voong, and Toussaint were aware of the unconstitutional actions 6 but failed to take correct action by denying Plaintiff’s related grievance, also in violation of his 7 First Amendment rights. In an Order dated January 16, 2019, the Court found the aforementioned 8 claims to be cognizable and dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Defendant 9 Ducart without prejudice. 10 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 11 Dkt. 30. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and Defendants have filed a 12 reply. Dkts. 35, 38. Plaintiff has also filed two motions entitled as follows: “Plaintiff’s Request 13 for an Immediate Issuing of the Court’s Order for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)” and 14 “Plaintiff’s Second Set of Documents Requesting the Court to Order Defendants to Authenticate.” 15 Dkts. 22, 24. Defendants have filed responses to Plaintiff’s two pending motions. Dkts. 23, 26. 16 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s two pending motions are DENIED, and 17 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be resolved in a separate written Order. 18 II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 19 Plaintiff’s first pending motion, which is entitled “Plaintiff’s Request for an Immediate 20 Issuing of the Court’s Order for a [TRO],” is styled as a request for a TRO. Dkt. 22. As 21 Defendants point out, a TRO “maintains the status quo until there is an opportunity to give all 22 parties notice and determine whether a preliminary injunction should be issued.” Dkt. 23 at 3 23 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(b)). Defendants further point out that “Plaintiff’s motion is better 24 understood as a motion for a preliminary injunction, given that Defendants now have the 25 opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 3. The Court agrees with Defendants and thus it construes the 26 pending motion as Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 27 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (a motion for preliminary injunction cannot be decided until the parties to 1 The standard for issuing either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same. See Beaty v. 2 Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s denial of the 3 appellant’s motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction discussing either as under the same 4 standard for issuing preliminary injunctive relief). However, an injunction is binding only on 5 parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and those "in active 6 concert or participation” with them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). To enforce an injunction against an 7 individual or entity, the district court must have personal jurisdiction over them. In re Estate of 8 Ferdinand Marcos, 94 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). An injunction against a party over whom 9 the court lacks personal jurisdiction would be futile because the court would be powerless to 10 enforce it. Id. 11 Here, in his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff claims that unnamed correctional 12 staff at SAC revealed information related to his conviction offenses of kidnapping and several sex 13 crimes, specifically acting with deliberate indifference to his health and safety in providing other 14 inmates with documents detailing his conviction of such crimes. See Dkt. 22 at 1-2. 15 As mentioned, Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 16 injunction. See Dkt. 23. They argue that the motion should be denied because the Court “lacks 17 subject matter jurisdiction over the new allegations in the instant motion,” stating as follows:
18 In this instance, the events giving rise to the claims in this action occurred between June and August 2016 that occurred at Pelican Bay. 19 The events of which Plaintiff complains in his motion, are events that occurred since those dates, and after his transfer out of Pelican Bay. 20 The issues of Plaintiff’s alleged safety issues related to disseminated documents regarding his conviction offenses, the adequacy of his 21 access to SAC’s law library, and SAC’s alleged failure to meet his current housing needs, are not being litigated in this action. The Court 22 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these new issues and, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue the order sought. 23 Id. at 3-4. Defendants further argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the 24 unnamed correctional officers at SAC because they are not parties to this action, stating: 25 Also in this instance, the events giving rise to the claims in this action 26 concern alleged actions and decisions by named Pelican Bay and CDCR Headquarters’ defendants. This motion, however, refers to 27 alleged actions by unnamed correctional officers at SAC. Of those Appeals, which is the entity of CDCR tasked with the third-level 1 review of inmates’ custody-related grievances and appeals received from CDCR’s adult institutions. Staff at the Office of Appeals have 2 no direct oversight of the operations of CDCR’s adult institutions.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 SHAWN KEVIN FROST, 4 Case No. 17-cv-07228-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 6 INJUNCTION; AND DENYING HIS D. WILCOX, et al., MOTION TO COMPEL 7 Defendants. 8
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff Shawn Kevin Frost, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State 11 Prison-Sacramento (“SAC”), has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 12 operative complaint in this action is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff alleged 13 constitutional rights violations at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP” or “Pelican Bay”) where he 14 was previously incarcerated. Dkt. 10 at 3-7.1 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has named the 15 following Defendants at PBSP and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 16 (“CDCR”): Warden Clark E. Ducart; Chief Deputy Warden D. W. Bradbury; Associate Warden C. 17 Olsen; Captain T. S. Buchanan; Lieutenant D. Higgerson; Sergeant J. Schrag; Correctional Officer 18 T. Toussaint; Correctional Counselor II D. Wilcox; Office of Appeals Chief M. Voong; and Office 19 of Appeals Captain M. Hodges. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has sought declaratory relief and monetary 20 damages. Id. at 3, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from Defendants’ alleged retaliation 21 for his filing an appeal, log no. PBSP-16-01431, on July 6, 2016 naming several supervisorial and 22 custody staff as co-conspirators of malfeasance. Plaintiff alleged that three days later, on July 9, 23 2016, he was rehoused in a cell “which lacked a seat/stool, no desk or table to eat meals [or] write, 24 no electrical power to use his approved personal property . . . and a broken sink . . . .” Id. at 3. 25 Plaintiff claimed that he was placed in such inadequate housing for approximately 5 months or 26 until around November 2016 before he was “moved back to adequate and appropriate/normal 27 1 general population housing.” Id. at 5-6. According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff filed 2 another appeal, log no PBSP-16-01584, in which he raised his claims in this action. Plaintiff’s 3 specific claims have been isolated as follows: (1) Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan 4 retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of his First Amendment rights; and (2) Defendants Olsen, 5 Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, Voong, and Toussaint were aware of the unconstitutional actions 6 but failed to take correct action by denying Plaintiff’s related grievance, also in violation of his 7 First Amendment rights. In an Order dated January 16, 2019, the Court found the aforementioned 8 claims to be cognizable and dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Defendant 9 Ducart without prejudice. 10 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 11 Dkt. 30. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and Defendants have filed a 12 reply. Dkts. 35, 38. Plaintiff has also filed two motions entitled as follows: “Plaintiff’s Request 13 for an Immediate Issuing of the Court’s Order for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)” and 14 “Plaintiff’s Second Set of Documents Requesting the Court to Order Defendants to Authenticate.” 15 Dkts. 22, 24. Defendants have filed responses to Plaintiff’s two pending motions. Dkts. 23, 26. 16 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s two pending motions are DENIED, and 17 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be resolved in a separate written Order. 18 II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 19 Plaintiff’s first pending motion, which is entitled “Plaintiff’s Request for an Immediate 20 Issuing of the Court’s Order for a [TRO],” is styled as a request for a TRO. Dkt. 22. As 21 Defendants point out, a TRO “maintains the status quo until there is an opportunity to give all 22 parties notice and determine whether a preliminary injunction should be issued.” Dkt. 23 at 3 23 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(b)). Defendants further point out that “Plaintiff’s motion is better 24 understood as a motion for a preliminary injunction, given that Defendants now have the 25 opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 3. The Court agrees with Defendants and thus it construes the 26 pending motion as Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 27 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (a motion for preliminary injunction cannot be decided until the parties to 1 The standard for issuing either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same. See Beaty v. 2 Brewer, 649 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s denial of the 3 appellant’s motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction discussing either as under the same 4 standard for issuing preliminary injunctive relief). However, an injunction is binding only on 5 parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and those "in active 6 concert or participation” with them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). To enforce an injunction against an 7 individual or entity, the district court must have personal jurisdiction over them. In re Estate of 8 Ferdinand Marcos, 94 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1996). An injunction against a party over whom 9 the court lacks personal jurisdiction would be futile because the court would be powerless to 10 enforce it. Id. 11 Here, in his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff claims that unnamed correctional 12 staff at SAC revealed information related to his conviction offenses of kidnapping and several sex 13 crimes, specifically acting with deliberate indifference to his health and safety in providing other 14 inmates with documents detailing his conviction of such crimes. See Dkt. 22 at 1-2. 15 As mentioned, Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 16 injunction. See Dkt. 23. They argue that the motion should be denied because the Court “lacks 17 subject matter jurisdiction over the new allegations in the instant motion,” stating as follows:
18 In this instance, the events giving rise to the claims in this action occurred between June and August 2016 that occurred at Pelican Bay. 19 The events of which Plaintiff complains in his motion, are events that occurred since those dates, and after his transfer out of Pelican Bay. 20 The issues of Plaintiff’s alleged safety issues related to disseminated documents regarding his conviction offenses, the adequacy of his 21 access to SAC’s law library, and SAC’s alleged failure to meet his current housing needs, are not being litigated in this action. The Court 22 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these new issues and, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue the order sought. 23 Id. at 3-4. Defendants further argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the 24 unnamed correctional officers at SAC because they are not parties to this action, stating: 25 Also in this instance, the events giving rise to the claims in this action 26 concern alleged actions and decisions by named Pelican Bay and CDCR Headquarters’ defendants. This motion, however, refers to 27 alleged actions by unnamed correctional officers at SAC. Of those Appeals, which is the entity of CDCR tasked with the third-level 1 review of inmates’ custody-related grievances and appeals received from CDCR’s adult institutions. Staff at the Office of Appeals have 2 no direct oversight of the operations of CDCR’s adult institutions. None of the other named Defendants in this action have since taken 3 positions at SAC, or taken positions with direct supervision of correctional officers at SAC. There is no evidence that indicates that 4 any of the named Defendants, in this instant action, possess the authority to take action on a preliminary injunction regarding 5 Plaintiff’s concerns with SAC correctional officers. In this way, there is nothing in Plaintiff’s motion that describes how the named 6 Defendants may be bound by the Court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction on his complained issues. 7 Id. at 4. The Court agrees with Defendants and finds that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s 8 motion for a preliminary injunction, given that his motion concerns new allegations made against 9 unidentified SAC staff, whereas the instant action arises out of alleged incidents that occurred 10 while Plaintiff was housed at PBSP and not from incidents that flowed from, or occurred during, 11 the events alleged in his motion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is 12 DENIED because this Court lacks jurisdiction and cannot order the relief he requests. 13 III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 14 The Court construes Plaintiff’s second pending motion, which is entitled “Plaintiff’s 15 Second Set of Documents Requesting the Court to Order Defendants to Authenticate,” as a motion 16 to compel Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery request. See Dkt. 24. In opposition to 17 this motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has not established that they have failed to timely 18 respond to any discovery request—as relevant here, a request to admit the genuineness of 19 documents, which Plaintiff refers to as his ‘Second Set of Documents Requesting the Court to 20 Order Defendants to Authenticate.’” Id. at 1. Defendants contend that “Plaintiff had never served 21 [them] with any request for admission by which he sought to have the genuineness of any of the 22 documents attached to his motion admitted. Id. (citing Chen Decl. ¶ 4). They argue as follows: 23 The Northern District has held that a court may grant a motion to 24 compel discovery upon certification that the moving party has attempted in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action. 25 See Apple Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. CV 10-04145 JW PSG, 2011 WL 334669, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011). Other districts have 26 required that at a minimum, that the moving party plaintiff has the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery requests are the 27 subject of his motion to compel, (2) which of the defendant’s (5) why the information he seeks through discovery is relevant to the 1 prosecution of this action.” See Johnson v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-02348- LJO, 2014 WL 1419816, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (internal quotations 2 omitted).
3 As applicable here, Plaintiff has never before served [Defendants] with his request for any request for admission by which he sought to 4 have the genuineness of any of the documents attached to his motion admitted. 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants failed to 6 respond to Plaintiff’s request to admit the genuineness of documents, nor that he has attempted to have the genuineness of these documents 7 admitted without court action. 8 Id. at 1 (brackets added). 9 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party seeking discovery may move for 10 an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection if, among other things, a 11 party fails to produce documents as requested under Rule 34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). However, 12 only when the parties have a discovery dispute that they cannot resolve among themselves should 13 they ask the Court to intervene in the discovery process. The Court does not have time or 14 resources to oversee all discovery and therefore requires that the parties present to it only their 15 very specific disagreements. A plaintiff must first attempt to meet and confer with the defendants 16 by sending them a subsequent letter demanding a response and notifying them of his intention to 17 file a motion to compel. Here, the record show that Plaintiff did not serve Defendants with any 18 request for admission nor did he meet and confer with Defendants. The Court agrees with 19 Defendants and finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants failed to respond to his request 20 to admit the genuineness of documents. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED. Dkt. 21 24. The Court further notes that the parties have previously been instructed that discovery “may 22 be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Dkt. 11 at 6. Therefore, to the 23 extent that Plaintiff requests the Court to order Defendants to participate in discovery, such a 24 request is DENIED as unnecessary. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons outlined above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s two motions entitled, 27 “Plaintiff’s Request for an Immediate Issuing of the Court’s Order for a Temporary Restraining 1 Defendants to Authenticate.” Dkts. 22,24. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be 2 || resolved in a separate written Order. 3 This Order terminates Docket Nos. 22 and 24. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: January 3, 2020 YVONNE GONZA ROGE 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12
15 16
= 17
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28