Frost Railway Supply Co. v. United States

39 C.C.P.A. 90, 1951 CCPA LEXIS 84
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 7, 1951
DocketNo. 4668
StatusPublished

This text of 39 C.C.P.A. 90 (Frost Railway Supply Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frost Railway Supply Co. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 90, 1951 CCPA LEXIS 84 (ccpa 1951).

Opinion

Johnson, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division, C. D. 1281, overruling the protest of the importer.

Merchandise described on the consular invoice and entry papers as “Railroad Truck Spring Snubbers” was classified by the Collector of Customs as “Articles or wares not specially provided for, * * * if composed wholly or in chief value of iron, steel * * * or other metal,” under paragraph 397 (19 U. S. C. 1001, par. 397) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Duty was accordingly assessed at the rate of 45 per centum ad valorem.

The importer protested the collector’s assessment, claiming the merchandise to be dutiable at 15 per centum ad valorem as “structural shapes” under the provisions of paragraph 312 (19 U. S. C. 1001, par. 312) of that act as modified by the trade agreement between the United States and Belgium, 67 Treas. Dec. 470, T. D. 47600.

The paragraph in question reads as follows:

Par. SIS. Beams, girders, joists, angles, channels, car-truck channels, tees, columns and posts, or parts or sections of columns or posts, and deck and bulb, together with all other structural shapes of iron or steel; any of the foregoing machined, drilled, punched, assembled, fitted, fabricated for use, or otherwise advanced beyond hammering, rolling, or casting * * * 15 per centum ad valorem. [Italics ours.]

[92]*92The “Frost No. 360 snubber,” the imported article, consists of a center coil of metal in spring shape having inclined surfaces on both sides forming a wedge between the inclined surfaces. Spiralled on this central coil are three outer coils of metal having inclined surfaces in juxtaposition to those of the central coil and forming wedges which cooperate with the wedges of the inside coil. As the spring is compressed the turns of the inner coil get closer together and rub transversely of each other on the outer coil. The outer coil gets a larger radius because it is pushed out by its own wedge and the wedge of the inner coil, thus forcing the ends of the outer coil to travel around the inner coil. Friction is thus created by the rubbing in two directions between the inner and outer coils. A sample of one of the imported snubbers, weighing approximately 23 pounds, was received in evidence, as was a miniature snubber, one-quarter size.

The snubbers were invented by a Mr. Frost, the father of Harry W. Frost, a witness and one of the principals of the appellant company. Similar snubbers had been manufactured by the Detroit Steel Products Co. of Detroit, Mich., whereas the present importation was manufactured in Canada by B. J. Coghlin Co., Ltd.

Appellant took the testimony of three witnesses. Harry W. Frost, one of the principals of the Frost Railway Spring Co., stated that the snubber acted on a freight car the same as a shock absorber acts on an automobile, that it limits the movements of the springs, eliminates the violence of the action of the car body, eliminates breakage of coil springs and reduces the damage to the lading of the car. The witness Frost further stated that the snubbers were used among the springs in the suspension nests of the car; that in a four spring nest, one spring being replaced with a snubber, the snubber would carry, on compression, a quarter of the weight supported by that nest; that when the car went back upwards, relieving the compression, the snubber would carry about a fifth of the weight it had carried on compression.

Harry G. Love, a retired railroad shop superintendent with 47 years experience, testified that he had inserted hundreds of these snubbers in freight cars and that the purpose of such snubbers was to prevent spring breakage.

Louis E. Endsley, an eminently qualified consulting engineer, stated that the Frost snubber was not a spring, that it was a machine for absorbing energy, that it takes out that energy which is put in when the car hits a low spot, as it does at each rail joint, that it prevents the springs from going solid, that other hydraulic snubbers are in existence similar to those used on automobiles, that snubbers are indispensable for low cost transportation, and that they are an integral part of a railway car.

This court has had occasion in the past to define “structural shapes” as that term is applied to specific merchandise. No precise definition, [93]*93"'however, can be laid down to cover the term, each case depending on its own record for determination. Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. United States, 20 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 229, 235, T. D. 46038; Otis McAllister & Co. v. United States, 27 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 4, 6, C. A. D. 52.

In the case of Simon, Buhler & Baumann (Inc.) v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. Appls. 273, T. D. 37537, this court made its first inquiry into the scope of paragraph 104 of the tariff act of 1913, the forerunner of paragraph 312 of the current act. Steel channel irons, steel bars or grates, and frames, plates, center pieces, posts, and heads or end pieces of cast iron, materials ready to be assembled as parts of a mash filter, had been refused classification, as structural shapes, the government contending that none of the articles were ejusdem generis with those provided in paragraph 104, and that they were not intended to be used in the construction of buildings or of ships. This court could not agree that Congress intended to confine the materials of paragraph 104 to such as are used for buildings, ships and similar erections, but was of a mind that the structures there intended were of a more general nature. The belief was professed that “the expression 'structural shapes’ does import to people in general a capacity to sustain heavy weights or to resist great tension or both.” As the merchandise before the court was deemed of that nature it was held ■classifiable as structural shapes.

In United States v. Frank, 15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 97, T. D. 42184, certain steel sheet piling was held to be properly classified as structural shapes of iron or steel under paragraph 312 of the Tariff Act of 1922. We there noted that for years the material had been definitely, uniformly, and generally treated and used by the steel trade as structural shapes, and citing the Simon, Buhler case, supra, we held the sheet piling to be within the purview of the definition there annunciated.

In the case of United States v. Henry L. Exstein Co., Inc., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 328, T. D. 43079, so-called deformed steel bars for reinforcing concrete came before the court. The bars were the familiar reinforcing bars whose surfaces bore ridges and protuberances to aid the bars in holding when imbedded in concrete. As imported the bars were straight. This court, observing that the bars were bought and sold in the markets of the United States and used precisely as other structural shapes of steel, pointed out that though these bars might be considered a border line material, they were nevertheless classifiable as structural shapes in accordance with the teaching of the Simon, Buhler and Frank cases, supra.

In the case of Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. United States, supra,

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Related

Simon, Buhler & Baumann (Inc.) v. United States
8 Ct. Cust. 273 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1918)
Myers v. United States
12 Ct. Cust. 350 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1924)
United States v. Frank
15 Ct. Cust. 97 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1927)
United States v. Henry L. Exstein Co.
16 Ct. Cust. 328 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1928)
Soule v. United States
16 Ct. Cust. 524 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1929)

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39 C.C.P.A. 90, 1951 CCPA LEXIS 84, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frost-railway-supply-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1951.