Fritch v. Orion Manufactured Housing Specialists Incorporated

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-4360
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 9 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS JASON FRITCH, an Arizona resident, No. 23-4360

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00509-JGZ-JR v.

ORION MANUFACTURED HOUSING MEMORANDUM* SPECIALISTS INCORPORATED, an Arizona company; L. JAMES MILLER, an Arizona resident,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 9, 2024** Phoenix, Arizona

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: RAWLINSON and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.

Plaintiff Jason Fritch (“Fritch”) sued his employer, Orion Manufactured

Housing Specialists, Inc., to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The parties settled the case, agreeing that

Fritch was the prevailing party and would receive $7,500 in damages plus attorney’s

fees and costs to be determined by the district court. The district court awarded Fritch

the sum of $25,000 in attorney’s fees—far less than he sought—and he appealed. We

have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Because the parties are familiar with the pertinent facts and procedural history

of this case, we do not recount either in detail.

Fritch challenges the award of attorney’s fees, contending that the district court

erred both in calculating the lodestar amount and in reducing the fee below the

lodestar.

We review the district court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.

See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 97 F.4th 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2024). Under this

standard of review, we must “affirm unless the district court applied the wrong legal

standard or its findings were illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.”

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

2 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted). We must also consider “whether the district court met its obligation ‘to

articulate . . . the reasons for its findings regarding the propriety of the hours claimed

or for any adjustments it makes either to the prevailing party’s claimed hours or to the

lodestar.’” Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001)

(alteration in original) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.

1992)). “The district court’s underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear

error and its legal analysis relevant to the fee determination is reviewed de novo.”

Oscar v. Alaska Dep’t of Educ.& Early Dev., 541 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted).

Although we might have made a different (i.e., greater) award had we been the

district judge in this case, we cannot say under the applicable standard of review that

the district court abused its discretion. In particular, the district court did not apply

the wrong legal standard; its findings are not illogical, implausible, or without support

in the record; and it articulated the reasons for its findings regarding the propriety of

the hours claimed and for the adjustments it made to Fritch’s claimed hours and to the

lodestar. Fritch has failed to demonstrate that the award should be disturbed.

AFFIRMED.