IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-40715 (Summary Calendar)
MICHAEL J. FRISCHENMEYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAUL W. BOONE, Sheriff Cass County, Tx; MERLE HUFFMAN, Sheriff’s Capt. Cass County Jail; NEAL BIRMINGHAM, Criminal D.A. of Cass County, Tx; ALAN POWELL, In his official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Cass County Sheriff’s Dept.; JAMES BLAIN, Deputy Cass County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (2:94-CV-169)
April 17, 1996 Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael J. Frischenmeyer, a pretrial
detainee in the Cass County, Texas, jail, appeals the dismissal as
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) of some of his civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the dismissal of other
§ 1983 claims in the partial summary judgment granted by the
district court in favor of a number of the defendants. We affirm
all of the district court’s dismissals except the one disposing of
Frischenmeyer’s claim that he was punished, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, when he was left chained in the detox facility of
the jail for five days. That one we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Frischenmeyer filed this civil rights action against Paul
Boone, the Sheriff of Cass County; Captain Merle Huffman, a deputy;
Neal Birmingham, the District Attorney; Allen Powell and Jim Blain,
his jailers; and all personnel at the Cass County Jail.1 In his
complaint and at a hearing held pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766
F.2d 179, 181-82 (1985), Frischenmeyer raised a plethora of issues,
both initially and subsequently. We have carefully reviewed the
record and the arguments of the parties and find none meriting
discussion or further consideration on appeal, save only the one
regarding being held in chains in the detox facility, which we now
address.
Frischenmeyer alleges that he was placed in solitary
confinement on September 21, 1994; and, upon his release from such
Frischenmeyer was confined in the jail from August 1994, until February 1995.
2 confinement on October 7, 1994, was returned to the cellblock in
which two inmates who had allegedly attacked him were housed.
Frischenmeyer asserts that after he threatened to commit suicide if
he were left in the cellblock with his alleged attackers, Captain
Huffman ordered that he be taken to detoxification, put in belly
chains, leg irons, and drag chains, and made to sleep on the floor
in chains without a mattress or blanket. He further alleges that
he was left in that condition for five days, which he classifies as
a due process violation. At some point, he alleges, Huffman
changed her mind and ordered the guards to take off the chains, but
the Sheriff ordered that the chains be put on again. In an amended
complaint, Frischenmeyer added claims that, inter alia, he was
placed in detox without a hearing and was removed from detox and,
without a hearing, again placed in solitary confinement but without
a loss of privileges.
Frischenmeyer consented to proceed before the magistrate
judge.
The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss, supported
by affidavits and exhibits, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
noting that their motion should be treated as one for summary
judgment. Huffman, Powell, and Blain made a number of assertions in
their summary judgment motion, and Huffman added that jail records
indicate that Frischenmeyer was placed in administrative
segregation on September 23, 1994, for his own protection, and not
to punish or discipline him. Unfortunately, Huffman did not
mention Frischenmeyer’s placement in detox in chains.
3 Frischenmeyer filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants [sic]
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief
May Be Granted." The magistrate judge properly treated this motion
as Frischenmeyer's response to the defendants' motion for summary
judgment because it contained materials outside of the pleadings.
Frischenmeyer does not challenge the criteria for placing
pretrial detainees in jail cells or the general practices
concerning pretrial confinement. His claims are based on episodic
acts by Huffman, Powell, and Blaine; therefore, the subjective
deliberate indifference standard of Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct.
1970 (1995), applies. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633,
643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Frischenmeyer contends that he threatened suicide and asked to
be returned to a segregated cell because, upon his earlier release
from segregation, Huffman had ordered that he be placed in cell
number 156 with one or two of his alleged attackers. Instead of
placing him in cell number 163, as he requested, he was taken to
the "detox" tank because of his the suicide threat. According to
Frischenmeyer, he spent five days sleeping on the floor in leg
irons, handcuffs, belly chain, and drag chain. The question thus
presented is whether Huffman punished Frischenmeyer by placing him
in detox in chains for five days.
The magistrate judge stated that the "[o]fficials in the
present case acted responsibly to protect the plaintiff from
himself," and that Frischenmeyer's due process rights were not
triggered because he "was placed in the detoxification tank for his
4 own protection, as opposed to a punitive measure." The magistrate
judge dismissed this claim as frivolous without inquiring further
concerning Frischenmeyer's allegations that he was placed in chains
for five days. Although it is not absolutely clear, the magistrate
judge appears to have dismissed this claim under § 1915(d).
Frischenmeyer's allegations that Huffman and the Sheriff
punished him in the detox/chains incident, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, are not "fanciful, fantastic, and delusional." See
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The magistrate
judge's characterization of the official conduct granting
Frischenmeyer's request to place him in a protected cell may have
been inaccurate. There is no indication that Frischenmeyer had
known suicidal tendencies. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d
386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992). Given the allegations of a previous
attack on Frischenmeyer and severe resulting injuries,
Frischenmeyer's suicide threat may have been his own hyperbole
uttered out of concern for being housed once more with his alleged
attackers. Even if the placement in a protected cell was a
response to the suicide threat, though, that does not explain why
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-40715 (Summary Calendar)
MICHAEL J. FRISCHENMEYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAUL W. BOONE, Sheriff Cass County, Tx; MERLE HUFFMAN, Sheriff’s Capt. Cass County Jail; NEAL BIRMINGHAM, Criminal D.A. of Cass County, Tx; ALAN POWELL, In his official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Cass County Sheriff’s Dept.; JAMES BLAIN, Deputy Cass County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (2:94-CV-169)
April 17, 1996 Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael J. Frischenmeyer, a pretrial
detainee in the Cass County, Texas, jail, appeals the dismissal as
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) of some of his civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the dismissal of other
§ 1983 claims in the partial summary judgment granted by the
district court in favor of a number of the defendants. We affirm
all of the district court’s dismissals except the one disposing of
Frischenmeyer’s claim that he was punished, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, when he was left chained in the detox facility of
the jail for five days. That one we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Frischenmeyer filed this civil rights action against Paul
Boone, the Sheriff of Cass County; Captain Merle Huffman, a deputy;
Neal Birmingham, the District Attorney; Allen Powell and Jim Blain,
his jailers; and all personnel at the Cass County Jail.1 In his
complaint and at a hearing held pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766
F.2d 179, 181-82 (1985), Frischenmeyer raised a plethora of issues,
both initially and subsequently. We have carefully reviewed the
record and the arguments of the parties and find none meriting
discussion or further consideration on appeal, save only the one
regarding being held in chains in the detox facility, which we now
address.
Frischenmeyer alleges that he was placed in solitary
confinement on September 21, 1994; and, upon his release from such
Frischenmeyer was confined in the jail from August 1994, until February 1995.
2 confinement on October 7, 1994, was returned to the cellblock in
which two inmates who had allegedly attacked him were housed.
Frischenmeyer asserts that after he threatened to commit suicide if
he were left in the cellblock with his alleged attackers, Captain
Huffman ordered that he be taken to detoxification, put in belly
chains, leg irons, and drag chains, and made to sleep on the floor
in chains without a mattress or blanket. He further alleges that
he was left in that condition for five days, which he classifies as
a due process violation. At some point, he alleges, Huffman
changed her mind and ordered the guards to take off the chains, but
the Sheriff ordered that the chains be put on again. In an amended
complaint, Frischenmeyer added claims that, inter alia, he was
placed in detox without a hearing and was removed from detox and,
without a hearing, again placed in solitary confinement but without
a loss of privileges.
Frischenmeyer consented to proceed before the magistrate
judge.
The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss, supported
by affidavits and exhibits, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
noting that their motion should be treated as one for summary
judgment. Huffman, Powell, and Blain made a number of assertions in
their summary judgment motion, and Huffman added that jail records
indicate that Frischenmeyer was placed in administrative
segregation on September 23, 1994, for his own protection, and not
to punish or discipline him. Unfortunately, Huffman did not
mention Frischenmeyer’s placement in detox in chains.
3 Frischenmeyer filed a "Motion to Strike Defendants [sic]
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief
May Be Granted." The magistrate judge properly treated this motion
as Frischenmeyer's response to the defendants' motion for summary
judgment because it contained materials outside of the pleadings.
Frischenmeyer does not challenge the criteria for placing
pretrial detainees in jail cells or the general practices
concerning pretrial confinement. His claims are based on episodic
acts by Huffman, Powell, and Blaine; therefore, the subjective
deliberate indifference standard of Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct.
1970 (1995), applies. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633,
643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Frischenmeyer contends that he threatened suicide and asked to
be returned to a segregated cell because, upon his earlier release
from segregation, Huffman had ordered that he be placed in cell
number 156 with one or two of his alleged attackers. Instead of
placing him in cell number 163, as he requested, he was taken to
the "detox" tank because of his the suicide threat. According to
Frischenmeyer, he spent five days sleeping on the floor in leg
irons, handcuffs, belly chain, and drag chain. The question thus
presented is whether Huffman punished Frischenmeyer by placing him
in detox in chains for five days.
The magistrate judge stated that the "[o]fficials in the
present case acted responsibly to protect the plaintiff from
himself," and that Frischenmeyer's due process rights were not
triggered because he "was placed in the detoxification tank for his
4 own protection, as opposed to a punitive measure." The magistrate
judge dismissed this claim as frivolous without inquiring further
concerning Frischenmeyer's allegations that he was placed in chains
for five days. Although it is not absolutely clear, the magistrate
judge appears to have dismissed this claim under § 1915(d).
Frischenmeyer's allegations that Huffman and the Sheriff
punished him in the detox/chains incident, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, are not "fanciful, fantastic, and delusional." See
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The magistrate
judge's characterization of the official conduct granting
Frischenmeyer's request to place him in a protected cell may have
been inaccurate. There is no indication that Frischenmeyer had
known suicidal tendencies. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d
386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992). Given the allegations of a previous
attack on Frischenmeyer and severe resulting injuries,
Frischenmeyer's suicide threat may have been his own hyperbole
uttered out of concern for being housed once more with his alleged
attackers. Even if the placement in a protected cell was a
response to the suicide threat, though, that does not explain why
Huffman and the Sheriff authorized placing Frischenmeyer in chains.
At the Spears hearing, the magistrate judge stated that he
would have the Sheriff and Huffman answer regarding the placing of
Frischenmeyer in detox in chains; however, the magistrate judge
does not appear to have had the Sheriff answer. Further, the
magistrate judge permitted Frischenmeyer to proceed on the due
process claims against Huffman; however, she limited her response
5 to the issue of placing Frischenmeyer in isolation and failed to
address the detox/chains incident. As a further development of the
facts through a response by the defendants was called for, we are
left with no choice but to conclude that the magistrate judge
abused his discretion in dismissing this claim as frivolous under
§ 1915(d).
Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Frischenmeyer's claim
concerning his confinement in detox in chains and remand for
further proceedings. The magistrate judge's dismissal of all other
claims that Frischenmeyer asserted is affirmed. See Brinkmann v.
Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.
1987).
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.