Friedheim v. Crescent Cotton Mill

42 S.E. 119, 64 S.C. 277, 1902 S.C. LEXIS 127
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJune 19, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 42 S.E. 119 (Friedheim v. Crescent Cotton Mill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Friedheim v. Crescent Cotton Mill, 42 S.E. 119, 64 S.C. 277, 1902 S.C. LEXIS 127 (S.C. 1902).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Pope.

The defendant was chartered under the laws of this State, on the nth day of August, 1899. It passed into the hands of a receiver, under an order made in this action because of insolvency, on the 4th day of September, 1900 — aged one year and twenty-three days. In September, 1899, the defendant executed tO‘ the Richmond (Va.) Safe Deposit and Trust Company a mortgage covering all its real and personal property situated in the city of Rock Hill, S. C., which secured $50,000 of negotiable coupon bonds to be issued by said Crescent Cotton Mill. Of this $50,000 of negotiable bonds so issued, not a single bond was ever sold on the open market. On the contrary, every one of such bonds was hypothecated to secure loans; for instance, $18,000 of said bonds were hypothecated to the Charleston Savings Institution of Charleston, S. C., to secure a loan of $13,645; $6,000 to the Hibernia Savings Bank of Charleston, to secure a loan of $3,719.07; $10,000 to the plaintiff, to secure a loan of $7,500; $5,000 to theNationalBank of Char *284 lotte, N. C., to secure a loan of $5,000; $6,000, to secure a loan made by a Rock Hill bank; $5,000, to secure a debt for machinery to the Saco Pettie Machine Co. Nothing but the exhaustion of the supply of the bonds prevented the president and treasurer of the defendant cotton' mill from hypothecating $9,000 of the bonds with one O. K. Eldridge, of New York, to secure a loan to him; and turning over $5,000 to Mr. W. B. Fewell, who paid for them in advance at par. When the affairs of the Crescent Cotton Mills was being examined 'before Mr. W. Bro'wn Wylie, as special referee, it was ascertained that the books of the mill failed to state its operations as to these bonds, as also the condition of subscriptions to its capital stock. Instead, therefore, of being able to trace the history of the issue of the $50,000 of bonds from the books of the mill to the holders thereof, this history had to be traced from the holders back to the mill. So much by way of preface. Under the action a receiver of the mill was appointed and, as before remarked, Mr. W. Brown Wylie was appointed special referee, and directed to advertise for all creditors of the mill to present and prove their respective demands before him. Quite a number of claims which were unsecured came before the special referee, but as no assets could possibly be available for the payment of their claims, no further attention will be paid to' them. The special referee’s report upon claims which had or claimed a preference was made, and upon exceptions came on to be heard before Judge Townsend. His decree must be reported. Many appeals have been taken from this decree, and it remains for this Court to* dispose of the same.

1 First. The Hibernia Savings Bank claims that the Circuit Judge inadvertently allowed too' little interest on its claim. As -we understand the question of this alleged error, it is that the Circuit Judge only allowed interest on its pro rata share up to 1st April, 1901, whereas his decree was rendered on 20th May, 1901, and the distribution was not made until after 20th May, 1901 — say until 1st June, 1901. This error should be corrected — especially as *285 this bank gave up a security which would and did largely yield more than enough to pay its full claim. If the claim, with interest to ist March, 1901, was $2,719.07, and 1st April, 1901 — one month later — was $2,744.60, then by the same rule, on 1st June, 1901 — two* months later — it should be $2,795.66. Let this appellant receive $2,795.66 instead of $2,744.60.

2 Second. It is contended that the claim of James F. Hart, as attorney for the receiver of the mill, as the balance of his fee (say $200),"should not be charged as against the holders of bonds secured by mortgage, and also as against the fund received from A. H. White, as purchaser of the machinery sold separately by the receiver. It is not denied that the sale was pushed forward by the attorney ; that such attorney has represented said receiver in several important suits. Such being the case, we will not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the Circuit Judge involved in his allowance of these fees. This Court admits that A. H. White has had a series of mishaps, which he has met like the man he has proved himself to be, but still it was his contract to protect the machinery company in its sales of machinery to the mill.

Third. It is contended that the other items embraced in the receiver’s account should not be allowed] and if allowed at all, should not require of the holders of the negotiable bonds secured by the mortgage as well as A. H. White, as purchaser of the machinery, to pay 95 per cent, thereof, while the “general account” is only charged five per cent, thereof. Taxes paid by the receiver, amounting to' some $850, were paid from the “general fund.” These taxes arose from property embraced in the mortgage and the separate machinery. The fees of the receiver arose from these sales. The loss met by the receiver in running the mill for twenty-three days was from an honest effort to save the property harmless, as it is well known that intricate mill machinery is better protected from injury when in use than by allowing it to remain *286 idle. Under all the circumstances, these exceptions must be overruled.

3 Fourth. What is the status of the six bonds held by O. K. Eldridge ? The Circuit Judge- decreed that Eldridge was the owner and entitled to set them up as valid claims under the mortgage. This is a serious matter. The facts are not very much complicated, but the deductions to- be made from these facts is the serious question. When R. Tee Kerr, as an individual, borrowed $15,000 from O. K. Eldridge, he pledged as collateral to secure that loan $5,000 of stock held by him (Kerr) in the Rock Hill Land and Investment Co-., and also $10,000 of stock in the Commercial and Farmers Bank of Rock Hill, S. C. The agreement between R. Lee Kerr and O. K. Eldridge is in writing, signed by both parties. In such agreement no reference is made to the Crescent Mill, as to its proposed issue of $50,000 negotiable bonds by said mill. No effort is made by Eldridge to obtain any of these bonds as collateral to his loan already made to Kerr until after it was discovered that the Commercial and Farmers Bank of Rock Hill, S. C., was insolvent, but that in the spring of the year 1900, the said Eldridge came to Rock Hill on two occasions, the last of which was in April, 1900, at which last visit he sought from R. Lee Kerr some of the bonds- of the Crescent Cotton Mill Co.; he knew Kerr was president and treasurer of said mill, and on- the 30th April, 1900, the said R. Lee Kerr turned over to the attorneys of -the said Eldridge six negotiable bonds of said Crescent Mill Co-., secured by a mortgage of its property, under the following circumstances, viz: On- the 31st day of January, A. D. 1900, the Crescent Cotton- Mill Co. made its note payable to the Commercial and Farmers Bank of Rock Hill, S.

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Related

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Bluebook (online)
42 S.E. 119, 64 S.C. 277, 1902 S.C. LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/friedheim-v-crescent-cotton-mill-sc-1902.