Freyer Santoni v. First Federal

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedOctober 5, 1993
Docket93-1155
StatusPublished

This text of Freyer Santoni v. First Federal (Freyer Santoni v. First Federal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freyer Santoni v. First Federal, (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


October 5, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 93-1155

JOSE ANGEL FREYRE-SANTONI, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Jose Angel Freyre-Santoni on brief pro se.
_________________________
Carlos G. Latimer and Latimer, Biaggi, Rachid, Rodriguez-Suris &
_________________ ___________________________________________
Godreau on brief for appellee.
_______

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. Pro se appellants Jose Angel Freyre
__________

Santoni, Jose A. Freyre Del Manzano, Anna M. Freyre, Doris C.

Del Manzo Vazquez, and Vilma I. Castro ("appellants") appeal

the district court's dismissal of their suit against the

First Federal Savings Bank. The district court found that it

had no subject matter jurisdiction over the suit under 12

U.S.C. 632, which grants district courts original

jurisdiction over suits "arising out of transactions

involving . . . banking in a dependency or insular possession

of the United States, . . . ."1 We affirm.

I. Background
__________

In May 1989, appellants were evicted from their

house pursuant to a default judgment of foreclosure the bank

had received from a superior court of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico.2 A few months later appellants sued the bank in

the district court. Their complaint alleged that the bank

____________________

1. Another prerequisite to suit under section 632 is that a
"corporation organized under the laws of the United States
shall be a party" to the suit, but there is no question that
the bank meets that requirement. We also note that section
632 applies to banking transactions in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico although it is no longer a United States
territory. See First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ruiz de
______________________________________ _______
Jesus, 644 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir. 1981).
_____

2. The record suggests that not all appellants were living
in the house at the time the eviction took place, and that
the appellants who actually had title to the house were
living elsewhere. For convenience, we do not distinguish
among the appellants in the opinion, but refer simply to
"appellants" even when reference to only certain appellants
would be correct.

had harassed and threatened them by visiting and telephoning

them and then evicting them after it had obtained the default

judgment and bought their house at public auction. The

appellants also alleged that the superior court's default

judgment of foreclosure was invalid for several reasons. The

bank had obtained the default judgment by reopening a

previously dismissed foreclosure case without notice to

appellants even though it knew their mailing address and

phone number; it had submitted false affidavits to the court

and not told the court that the parties had voluntarily

dismissed the previous foreclosure case after reaching a

settlement; and the previous dismissal had become final and

nonappealable before the bank had reopened the case.3

According to the complaint, the bank's harassing conduct and

eviction of appellants from their property caused them

physical injuries and mental or emotional distress. Its

allegedly illegal foreclosure had transferred title of their

house to the bank, depriving them of their property. In

addition, the eviction had been carried out maliciously.

Although the family had no place to move to, they were

ordered out of the house in the evening in violation of the

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3. After filing its complaint in federal court, appellants
apparently moved the local court to annul its default
judgment of foreclosure. The state court did so, and its
action was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. The
proceedings in the local court are not relevant to the issue
on appeal.

-3-

court order, and their belongings were removed to the street

where they were damaged by rain and vandalism. Furthermore,

one appellant had been ridiculed for being short, and her

son's dog had been kicked in his presence. The complaint

alleged that the bank's actions from the time the parties had

settled the initial foreclosure action had been undertaken

maliciously, and appellants sought compensatory and punitive

damages.

II. Discussion
__________

We have held that jurisdiction under section 632

exists when a cause of action arises out of "traditional

banking activities." Diaz v. Pan American Federal Savings &
____ ______________________________

Loan Association, 635 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980).4 In
_________________

order to determine whether the appellants' suit arose out of

traditional banking activities, we review the complaint to

determine the nature of the transaction or activity giving

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