Frey v. Walker

807 So. 2d 887, 1 La.App. 5 Cir. 709, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 3110
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 26, 2001
DocketNo. 01-CA-709
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 807 So. 2d 887 (Frey v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frey v. Walker, 807 So. 2d 887, 1 La.App. 5 Cir. 709, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 3110 (La. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

| .EDWARDS, Judge.

Defendants/Appellants, Beverly and Claude Walker, appeal the trial court’s ruling which granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Nicole and Conrad Frey on the issue of liability for redhibi-tory defects. The Walkers also appeal the court’s denial of their own motion for summary judgment on the same issue, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that no issues of genuine material fact existed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Beverly and Claude Walker, (“the Walkers”), purchased a home from Janet O’Heren and her siblings, with the intention of substantially renovating the home and placing it for sale on the open market. Prior to the sale, Janet O’Heren informed the Walkers that the home had an unstable foundation, and that the home’s prior owner had experienced significant drainage problems caused by tree roots growing into the sewer lines. Before purchasing the home, the Walkers retained the services of James G. Gilbert, an engineer, to “conduct an inspection |3and write a shoring procedure.” Mr. Gilbert observed that there were several cracks in the foundation slab, with one notable crack that had a vertical offset of approximately Vk inches. The Walkers proceeded to purchase the property on October 8, 1998, and began renovations. Among the renovations made to the home was the use of a “slab patching material” to compensate for the “offset” in the cracked foundation. The foundation patch was then covered with “flooring overlays” such as carpeting and vinyl flooring.

On December 16, 1998, the Walkers listed the property for sale with a Prudential [889]*889real estate agent. In January of 1999, Nicole and Conrad Frey, (“the Freys”), expressed an interest in purchasing the renovated home, and met with the Walker’s realtor. Prior to signing a purchase agreement, the Freys were informed that the home had previously been shored seven years prior, and that a crack in the slab had been repaired at that time. The Freys were also told that the Walkers had hired an engineer who found that the slab had a two inch differential from one corner of the home to the other. The Freys signed a purchase agreement for the home, and were provided with a property disclosure. In regard to foundation defects, the Walkers reiterated on the property disclosure that the home had been shored seven years prior, and that a crack in the slab had been repaired at that time. In regard to plumbing defects, the Walkers stated that they had no knowledge of any.

The Freys retained a home inspector to view the home prior to the time of sale. His finding was that there were no structural defects, but that several cracks to exterior walls needed to be repaired. The Walkers made the requested cosmetic repairs. On January, 28,1999 the Freys and the Walkers went to the act of sale on the home. The parties agreed that the home would be sold “As Is,” |4with a waiver of redhibition. On January 29, 1999 the Freys began to move into the home. They immediately noticed popping and cracking noises that were made as they placed boxes on the floor. They also began having problems with low water pressure and drainage on that same day. On February 10, 1999, The Freys hired a plumber to unclog the drains in their home. On February 26, 1999, after receiving an anonymous note which stated that the foundation in the home was defective, the Freys hired a mechanical engineer to inspect the foundation. The engineer’s report stated that after he removed the floor coverings in the home, he discovered that the foundation had extensive and unrepairable cracking which had been poorly repaired in “an apparent attempt to hide and disguise these foundation deficiencies under the flooring overlays.” Near the end of February,1999, sewerage began to back up into the bathtub. On April 13, 1999, a plumber visually inspected the sewer lines of the home and found that some portions were almost completely blocked by vegetation and tree roots.

After unsuccessfully requesting that the Walkers accept return of the home, the Freys filed suit in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. After suit was filed, the Walkers once again hired engineer James G. Gilbert to inspect the home. Gilbert concluded that the repair attempt to the slab made by the Walkers was insufficient and that nothing would prevent further cracking of the slab. The Freys filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against Mr. and Mrs. Walker on November 22, 2000. The Walkers filed a cross motion for summary judgment on February 8, 2001. The trial court held a hearing on both motions, granting the Frey’s Motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability and denying the Walker’s motion for summary | .¡judgment. The Walkers timely filed this appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate.1 An appellate court must ask [890]*890the same questions as does the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is a genuine issue of material fact remaining to be decided, and whether the appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 The appellate court must consider whether the summary judgment is appropriate under the circumstances of the case.3 There must be a “genuine” or “triable” issue on which reasonable persons could disagree.4 Under the amended version of LSA-C.C.P. art. 966, the burden of proof remains on the mover to show “that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is one that would matter on the trial of the merits.5

LSA C.C. Art. 2520 provides that the seller warrants the buyer against redhibi-tory defects, or vices, in the thing sold, and further defines the term “redhibitory” as a defect which “renders the thing useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect.” LSA C.C. Art. 2520 also states that Ifithe existence of such a redhibitory defect gives a buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale. LSA C.C. Art. 2530 further clarifies that the warranty against redhibitory defects covers only defects that exist at the time of delivery and that the defect shall be presumed to have existed at the time of delivery if it appears within three days from that time.

LSA C.C. Art. 2548 allows parties to a sale to agree to exclude or limit the warranty against redhibitory defects, however, the terms of the exclusion or limitation must be clear and unambiguous and must be brought to the attention of the buyer. A buyer is not bound by an otherwise effective exclusion or limitation of the warranty when the seller has declared that the thing has a quality that he knew it did not have. A seller who knows that the thing he sells has a defect but omits to declare it, or a seller who declares that the thing has a quality that he knows it does not have, is liable to the buyer for the return of the price with interest from the time it was paid, for the reimbursement of the reasonable expenses occasioned by the sale and those incurred for the preservation of the thing, and also for damages and reasonable attorney fees.6

In their first assignment of error, the Walkers assert that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.

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Bluebook (online)
807 So. 2d 887, 1 La.App. 5 Cir. 709, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 3110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frey-v-walker-lactapp-2001.