Frevall v. Bache

39 U.S. 95, 10 L. Ed. 369, 14 Pet. 95, 1840 U.S. LEXIS 358
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 10, 1840
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 39 U.S. 95 (Frevall v. Bache) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frevall v. Bache, 39 U.S. 95, 10 L. Ed. 369, 14 Pet. 95, 1840 U.S. LEXIS 358 (1840).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Taney

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes before this Court upon -an appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.

The controversy has arisen out of the shipment of a cargo of cotton, indigo, and coffee, made in the fall of 1809, in the brig Spencer, from Philadelphia to St. Sebastians, or Port Passage. The vessel duly arrived.,- and discharged her cargo. She was afterwards seized and the cargo sequestrated by the French government. In the following year, the vessel was liberated, and returned to the United States: but the cargo was never, restored.

The cargo of the Spencer thus sequestrated, was entitled to share in j.he indemnity provided by the treaty with France, of July 4, 1831. But a dispute arose before the commissioners appointed under that treaty, as to the right to five-sixteenths of the indemnity allowed for this cargo. The opposing claimants were the present appellant, who claimed for the whole of the cargo, and the appellee, who' claimed for the said five-sixteenths. The commissioners awarded in favour of the latter.

The appellant therefore filed his bill against the appellee, in the Circuit Court for Washington county, in the District of Columbia; alleging, among other things, that a certain Andrew Curcier, then a resident merchant in Philadelphia, was the owner of the Spencer *96 and her cargo on the yoyage in question; that the said seizure and sequestration gave him a valid claim against the French government which he afterwards, for a valuable consideration, transferred to the claimant, who took it without notice of any other claim. And he charges also, that if. Dabadie, the appellee’s intestate, ever had an interest in the cargo, it had been relinquished to Curcier by a settlement which took place between them in 1818, long before the assignment to the complainant. And he produces, as an exhibit, the account which, as lie alleges, contains this renunciation: and he prays that the appellee may be enjoined from receiving the five-sixteenths awarded to him by the commissioners-; and that the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Treasurer of the United States may be enjoined from paying it.

To this bill the appellee put in his plea and answer, pleading the award of the commissioners in bar of the complainant’s bill; and also insisting, by way of answer, Dabadie owned the five-sixteenths of the cargo in question, and had a valid claim, on that account, against the French government; that he had never transferred or relinquished it to Curcier; and that his (Dabadie’s) administrator was entitled to receive it out of the indemnity provided by treaty: and he .exhibits as the evidence of his interest in this cargo, an account, signed by Andrew Curcier, in behalf of himself and Stephen Curcier, and dated June 16, ÍS10.

A general replication was put in by the complainant: and the testimony of a witness residing, at Marseilles, in France, was -taken by agreement of parties. This witness; it appears, is a native ,of France, but resided in Philadelphia; and was engaged in commerce there from the year 1796 until 1837, when hé returned to his own country, where he has ever since resided. He was intimate with Curcier and Dabadie; and he states in his testimony, that in the year 1818, at Philadelphia, he, as umpire and mutual friend, settled an account between them, in which all differences were finally adjusted; that the voyage of the Spencer to St. Sebastians, and the ownership of her cargo, were settled in that account; and that by the terms of the settlement, the claim on the French government for indemnity was afterwards to belong to Curcier. The witness mentions circumstances which took place at the settlement, to show that his memory is firm and accurate in relation -to it. He states that it was reduced,to writing in the shape of an account current, as was customary ; and that two accounts were made, exactly the same in every particular, both original, and one of them delivered • to each of the parties. No account current, however, was exhibited to the witness at the time of his examination, and none therefore has been identified by him as the account current settled between the parties in 1818 : and he states that he had not recently seen it, nor had any communication from any one in relation to its contents.

Upon the hearing, the Circuit Court dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the bill: and the case is brought before this Court by the appeal of the complainant.

*97 Two questions have been presented for consideration, heré:— 1. Is the decision of the commissioners appointed under the treaty ■with Francé, conclusive upon the rights of the parties ? > 2. If the case is not concluded by the decision of the commissioners, is the appellant, upon the testimony in the record, entitled to relief ?

Upon the first question, the Court have entertained no doubt. This case cannot, we think, be distinguished from the cases of Comegys vs. Vasse, 1 Peters, 212, and Sheppard and others vs. Taylor and others, 5 Peters, 710. It has been argued on the part of the appellee, that these cases werfe decided under the treaty with Spain ; and that the language of that treaty, and of the act of Congress creating the board of commissioners under it, differs materially from the treaty and act of Congress under consideration, when defining the powers of the board. It is true, that there is a difference in the' words used; but in our judgment, they mean the same thing. The rules by' which the board is directed to govern itself in deciding the cases that come before, it, and fhe manner in which it was constituted and organized, show the purposes for which it was created. It was established for the purpose of deciding what claims were entitled to share in the indemnity, promised by the treaty; and they of course awarded the amount to such person, as appeared from the papers before them, to he the rightful claimant. But there is nothing in the frame of the law establishing this board, or in the manner of constituting and organizing -it, that would lead us to infer that larger powers were intended, to be given than those conferred upon the commissioners under the Spanish treaty. The plea therefore put in by the defendant in bar of the complainant’s bill, cannot be sustained; and the case is fully open before this Court upon its merits.

Upon the second point there has been much more difficulty. It is very clear that Dabadie was the owner of-five-sixteenths of, the cargo of the Spencer, upon the yoyage in the fall of 1809, from Philadelphia, to. St. Sebastians or Pori Passage. This is abundantly proved by the account stated and signed -by Andrew Curcier, for himself and Stephen Curcier, in June, 1810. For Dabadie, in this account, is. charged with thirteen thousand seven hundred dollars and thirteen cents, for his five-sixteenths of the cargo, and with- three thousand nine hundred and ninety-three' dollars and- ninety-five-cents, for insurance upon it. He was therefore entitled to indemnity fo the extent of his interest in the cargo, and had a valid and just claim for it against the French government.

Has this interest been transferred to Curcier ? The witness above mentioned deposed that it was relinquished to him, and the agreement reduced to writing in an account current, settled in June, 1818.

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Bluebook (online)
39 U.S. 95, 10 L. Ed. 369, 14 Pet. 95, 1840 U.S. LEXIS 358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frevall-v-bache-scotus-1840.