J-A15032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
FREUNDLICH & LITTMAN, LLC AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GREGORY CREED LITTMAN, : PENNSYLVANIA ESQUIRE, : : : v. : : : EDWARD T. FEIERSTEIN, BRUCE : No. 498 EDA 2020 CHASAN, ESQUIRE AND THE LAW : OFFICES OF BRUCE J. CHASAN, LLC : : : APPEAL OF: BRUCE CHASAN, : ESQUIRE AND THE LAW OFFICES OF : BRUCE J. CHASAN, LLC :
Appeal from the Order Entered January 14, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): No. 150401569
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2021
Bruce Chasan, Esquire, and The Law Offices of Bruce J. Chasan, LLC
(collectively, “Chasan”), appeal from the Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s November 21, 2019, “Bench Order” in this
abuse of process action. We quash the appeal.
Pertinently, Chasan and Gregory Creed Littman, Esquire (together with
Freundlich & Littman, LLC, hereinafter “Littman”), were opposing counsel in
the underlying negligence action among neighboring condominium owners
(“the condo action”). See Complaint, 4/16/15, Exhibit A (Condo Action
Complaint). Littman represented the plaintiffs, GJRPA, LP (“GJRPA”), and J-A15032-21
Chasan represented the defendant, Edward Feierstein (“Feierstein”). Chasan
filed a counterclaim on Feierstein’s behalf, personally naming the principals of
GJRPA and Littman as counterclaim defendants, and seeking attorneys’ fees
and expenses. Id., Exhibit B (Answer, New Matter, and Counterclaim).
Littman subsequently sent Chasan a “Dragonetti Notice” (the
“Dragonetti Letter”),1 stating that the counterclaim was baseless and had been
raised improperly. Id., Exhibit C (Dragonetti Letter), at 1-3. Additionally,
Littman alleged that Chasan and Freierstein were engaging in witness
intimidation, citing the involvement of Littman’s brother in Freierstein’s
criminal trial. Id. at 3. Littman requested that Chasan withdraw his
counterclaim within 3 days. Id. at 4. Chasan responded with a letter stating,
“The only thing [Freierstein] said that is printable is that he will not withdraw
his counterclaim. He’s not concerned if his counterclaim is bifurcated. As to
____________________________________________
1 Our Supreme Court has explained as follows:
The Dragonetti Act[, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8351-8354,] is a codification of the common law cause of action for wrongful or malicious use of civil proceedings: a Dragonetti defendant may be held liable when he “takes part in the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings against another” and in doing so “acts in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 8351(a), (a)(1). For a successful claim under the Act, the underlying proceedings must have terminated in favor of the Dragonetti plaintiff. Id. § 8351(a)(2).
Raynor v. D’Annunzio, 243 A.3d 41, 52-53 (Pa. 2020).
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the rest of your letter, I am not going to dignify it with any substantive
response. Your letter is a thin-skinned rant.” Id., Exhibit D (Chasan’s Letter).
The two attorneys exchanged additional contemptuous letters throughout
these proceedings.2
On April 16, 2015, Littman initiated the instant abuse of process action
by filing a Complaint against Chasan and Feierstein. Littman alleged that
Chasan and Feierstein had knowingly pursued a baseless lawsuit, and had
“maliciously refused to discontinue” it, which caused Littman “great financial
and emotional cost[.]” Complaint, 4/16/15, at 4. Littman sought
compensatory and punitive damages. Chasan filed Preliminary Objections,
seeking dismissal of Littman’s Complaint, based on, inter alia, judicial
2 Following the close of the condo action, Chasan filed a defamation action against Littman, alleging that Littman had published the Dragonetti Letter to third parties. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Littman, and dismissed the defamation action. This Court, finding that Chasan had waived his claims, subsequently affirmed the grant of summary judgment. See Law Office of Bruce J. Chasan, LLC v. Freun[d]lich & Littman, LLC, 188 A.3d 587 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Chasan’s Petition for allowance of appeal, reversed this Court’s Order, and remanded for consideration of the merits of Chasan’s claims. See id., appeal granted, 197 A.3d 1178 (Pa. 2018). On remand, this Court again affirmed the trial court’s Order granting summary judgment in favor of Littman and dismissing Chasan’s defamation action, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Chasan v. Littman, 209 A.3d 535 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2019).
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privilege.3 Littman filed an Answer, and the trial court ultimately sustained
Chasan’s Preliminary Objections based on judicial immunity. Littman filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied. On direct appeal,
this Court concluded that judicial privilege does not apply to Littman’s claim.
See Freundlich & Littman, 157 A.3d at 535. Accordingly, on February 23,
2017, this Court vacated the trial court Order sustaining Chasan’s Preliminary
Objections and remanded the matter to the trial court. See id.
Following further extensive litigation not relevant to the instant appeal,
the case proceeded to a jury trial in June 2018. On June 8, 2018, in the midst
of trial, Chasan’s counsel informed the trial court that the parties had reached
a Settlement Agreement, which was read into the record as follows:
[Littman] agrees to pay [Chasan] the sum of [sealed].
The payments shall be made in the following payment terms: [sealed] will be paid to [Chasan] within 30 days of execution of a mutually acceptable release, and then the remaining [sealed] shall be paid within 90 days thereafter.
[Sealed.]
3 This Court has explained judicial privilege as follows:
The doctrine of judicial privilege provides absolute immunity for communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought. The privilege … encompasses pleadings and even less formal communications such as … correspondence between counsel in furtherance of the client’s interest.
Freundlich & Littman, LLC v. Feierstein, 157 A.3d 526, 530-31 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The [S]ettlement [A]greement shall include no admission of liability or lack thereof.
The parties shall agree that the claims were fully disputed and that the purpose of the party settlement is to avoid the risk and expense and inconvenience of future litigation.
There will be no confidentiality for the [S]ettlement [A]greement.
The [S]ettlement [A]greement shall include a mutual release of all claims or future claims stemming from this lawsuit or the defamation lawsuit filed by [] Chasan, as well as the subject matter that those claims arise from.
And the release shall include the parties, their respective law firms, their employees, attorneys and their respective insurance companies, and those carriers and parties shall be specifically named in the release, and the release shall include all claims known or unknown that now exist or may exist in the future.
The current lawsuit filed by [Littman] shall be voluntarily discontinued with prejudice as against [Chasan].
We ask the [c]ourt to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement if there’s a dispute between the parties or to resolve any dispute that may arise regarding the finalization of the [S]ettlement [A]greement terms.
The appeal that’s currently pending in the defamation lawsuit shall be discontinued with prejudice upon payment of all the settlement funds.
… Littman[] will agree to issue a letter to [] Chasan that states as follows:
Dear Mr. Chasan, on February 5th, 2014, I published a letter copied to a number of individuals which alleged you were involved in witness intimidation in a criminal case in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. It was a misunderstanding, and I apologize.
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Now, the parties agree that this letter shall remain confidential, and [] Chasan will not disclose this letter to anyone for any reason.
However, if … Littman, or his law firm, disseminates any allegation that [] Chasan was actually engaged in witness intimidation, then that will be considered a material breach of the confidentiality clause and [] Chasan may publish the letter to refute those allegations.
The parties shall also agree to a joint statement that may be disclosed for any purposes that shall read as follows:
The parties fully disputed the claims arising in the matter of Freundlich and Littman, LLC[,] versus Bruce Chasan and the Law Offices of Bruce J. Chasan, LLC. The parties have agreed to amicably resolve their dispute; and in furtherance thereof, agree to the following:
[Littman] allege[s] that co-defendant [] Feierstein engaged in witness intimidation by filing a counterclaim against … Littman.
Feierstein defaulted and did not contest liability.
There was and is no evidence that [Chasan was] involved in any alleged witness intimidation engaged in by … Feierstein, nor was there any finding by the finder of fact that [Chasan was] engaged in witness intimidation.
The parties shall also, subject to negotiations between Counsel regarding the [S]ettlement [A]greement, [] craft mutually acceptable language concerning the publication of the joint statement.
It is the intentions of both parties that they shall not publish the joint statement on their firms[’] respective websites or disseminate the joint statement publicly to any legal newspapers, the internet, things of that nature, but that would be subject to further discussion among Counsel. If we cannot reach an agreement, we would ask that the [c]ourt facilitate resolving the dispute over appropriate language for that provision of the agreement.
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Finally, Your Honor, there will be some allowance for a non- disparagement clause but only again, subject to further negotiations among Counsel as far as the specific language.
It is the intention of [Chasan] that we do not wish to be subject to a potential breach of any non-disparagement clause by disseminating truthful information.
Again, to the extent that the parties are unable to reach an agreement on those terms, we may ask the [c]ourt to help facilitate resolving any such dispute.
Your Honor, we also ask that for the purposes of this record that the amounts of the settlement are sealed, but it will not be sealed from the [S]ettlement [A]greement. That will not be confidential.
N.T., 6/8/18, at 3-8 (some emphasis added; some emphasis omitted); see
also id. at 10 (wherein Littman’s counsel indicated that he had nothing to add
regarding the terms of the agreement, as read into the record). The docket
entry following the June 8, 2018, hearing states that the matter was settled
after assignment to the trial judge, and the parties had settled after the jury
was sworn and testimony had begun.
On September 24, 2018, Chasan filed a Petition to Enforce Settlement.
Therein, Chasan alleged that on July 17, 2018, his counsel “transmitted to
opposing counsel a written agreement memorializing the terms of the
settlement reached by the Parties[,]” and that Littman’s counsel returned a
revision with redlined changes and comments. Petition to Enforce Settlement,
9/24/18, ¶¶ 16-17. Chasan argued that his counsel returned another revised
agreement, but that, even after a conference call to discuss the disputed
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terms, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Id., ¶¶ 18-20. Chasan
therefore requested that the trial court enforce the settlement, and require
Littman to execute the July 17, 2018, Settlement Agreement and joint
statement. Id., ¶ 22. Chasan argued generally that the parties had agreed
to the material terms of the settlement on the record during the June 8, 2018,
and that the Settlement Agreement was therefore enforceable. See id., ¶¶
64-86.
Littman filed a Response, arguing that the parties had not reached an
agreement on all material terms. Response and Memorandum, 10/17/18,
Response at 2 (unnumbered). According to Littman, the parties agreed to
“almost all of the terms,” but that they had not agreed to the content of the
joint statement. Id. at 1-3 (unnumbered). Additionally, in Littman’s
Memorandum in support of opposition to the Petition to Enforce, Littman
argued that, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the parties had agreed
to a payment schedule, which provided for the first payment only after the
parties had executed a mutually-acceptable release. Id., Memorandum at 3-
4 (unnumbered). On November 27, 2018, Chasan withdrew the Petition to
Enforce. The trial court conducted a conference on December 4, 2018, after
which the trial court advised the parties to continue to work toward reaching
an agreement. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/20, at 1.4
4 We note that there is no record of this conference in the docket.
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On November 21, 2019, the trial conducted a status hearing. Id. At
the time of the hearing, the trial court found that “[m]utual releases had not
been signed[;] Littman had not paid Chasan[;] Chasan had not dropped his
defamation suit—in fact, he had seen it through to its completion—and there
had been no agreement about distribution of the joint statement.” Id.; see
also N.T., 11/21/19, at 6 (wherein Littman’s counsel stated that Chasan had
failed to discontinue the defamation action). During the hearing, Chasan’s
counsel specifically stated as follows:
The settlement terms which were read into the record on June 8, 2018[,] specifically said that conditions of the settlement, among other things, required that the parties would formally memorialize the terms of their settlement into a written agreement which would include a mutual release of any and all claims arising out of [the] abuse of process case or the defamation lawsuit.
To date, none of the parties have signed a written settlement agreement, [and] none of the parties have performed under the agreement. There’s been no release signed.
N.T., 11/21/19, at 7-8. Chasan’s counsel also stated, “We have not signed
the settlement agreement and neither parties have [sic] performed pursuant
to the settlement that was reached on the record in June 2018.” Id. at 11-
12.
Further, Chasan’s counsel argued that in the June 8, 2018, Order, the
trial court retained jurisdiction “in the event there was a dispute over the
terms of the written [S]ettlement [A]greement that counsel wanted to
address.” N.T., 11/21/19, at 8-9. Littman’s counsel countered that the trial
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court had retained jurisdiction only as to dissemination of the joint statement,
i.e., under what circumstances the parties could release the joint statement.
Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 26 (wherein Littman’s counsel stated, “The only
issue is … Chasan’s alleged right to disseminate that joint statement to
whoever he sees fit at whatever time he sees fit….”).
At the close of the hearing, the trial judge stated his findings as follows:
I retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. I find that because [] Chasan did not comply with discontinuing the defamation action, [Littman is] not required to make the payments that [he] said [he] was going to make. What I do still find enforceable is the joint statement.
We’ll bring this back in a month and I will impose sanctions, as necessary, if I believe either side has not in good faith worked towards that joint statement which shall include a non[-]disparagement clause.
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added);5 see also Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/20, at 1
5Throughout the hearing, the trial court observed that the defamation action had been fully litigated, and thus, the related term from the initial proposed Settlement Agreement could no longer be performed. See N.T., 11/21/19, at 16, 23, 25, 26.
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(wherein the trial court specifically stated its conclusion that the Settlement
Agreement was enforceable).6 Notably, the trial court did not memorialize its
November 21, 2019, conclusion in a written order, nor did it otherwise indicate
its findings on the docket.
On December 13, 2019, the trial court entered an Order, stating that
“counsel is permitted to file a motion for reconsideration from my oral ruling
on Thursday, November 21, 2019.” Order, 12/13/19.7 On December 23,
2019, Chasan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 21, 2019,
“Bench Order.” Chasan argued, in part, that Littman should be estopped from
claiming that the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, after first arguing to
the contrary. Motion for Reconsideration, 12/23/19, at 2-3. Additionally,
6 The trial court additionally voiced its frustration:
I was expecting everyone to act as grown-ups and comply with their agreement. That didn’t happen, which is unfortunate.
….
I fervently wish that I had not accepted a settlement and had let this case go to verdict.
N.T., 11/21/19, at 15-16.
7 From the docket, it is unclear whether any party formally requested permission to seek reconsideration. However, Chasan asserts that he attempted to file the Motion on Reconsideration on December 11, 2019, but was informed that no order had been entered on the docket. Motion for Reconsideration, 12/23/19, ¶ 82. Evidently, the trial court’s solution was to enter an Order to permit the filing, rather than to enter the Bench Order on the docket.
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Chasan claimed that the trial court erred by effectively rewriting the
Settlement Agreement. See id. Littman filed a Response.8 Following a
hearing, the trial court denied Chasan’s Motion for Reconsideration on January
14, 2020.
Chasan filed a Notice of Appeal on January 24, 2020. The trial court
subsequently ordered Chasan to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal, and Chasan timely complied.9, 10
Chasan now raises the following issues for review:
1. Does the Superior Court have jurisdiction of an appeal from an undocketed bench [O]rder enforcing a mid-trial settlement (which [O]rder was adhered to in a later docketed written [O]rder denying Chasan’s [M]otion for [R]econsideration), where Chasan had withdrawn his prior [M]otion to enforce settlement after Littman had opposed it on the basis that there was no agreement ____________________________________________
8 Littman stated that immediately following the November 21, 2019, hearing, Littman’s counsel informed Chasan’s counsel that Littman had signed the joint statement, and Chasan’s counsel replied that he had no intention of complying with the “Bench Order.” Response, 1/12/20, at 1 (unnumbered).
9 On March 26, 2021, Chasan filed an Application for Relief, seeking recusal of Judge Dubow, President Judge Emeritus Stevens, Judge Nichols, Judge Murray, President Judge Emeritus Gantman, and Judge McLaughlin. This Court granted the Application as to Judge Dubow, Judge Nichols, Judge Murray, Judge McLaughlin, and President Judge Emeritus Stevens, and denied the Application as to President Judge Emeritus Gantman.
10 On March 3, 2020, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why the appeal should not be quashed, as the denial of reconsideration is not a final, appealable order. In Response, Chasan argued that, because the Bench Order had not been entered on the docket, it did not become appealable until the entry of the Order denying reconsideration. Alternatively, Chasan claimed that the Bench Order constitutes a collateral order. This Court subsequently discharged the Rule to Show Cause, and referred the issue to the merits panel for review.
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on certain material terms, and the court imposed terms that the parties had not agreed upon?
2. Does the record support the trial court’s finding in the Rule 1925(a) [O]pinion that Littman changed his position and was thus judicially estopped from asserting that the mid-trial settlement is enforceable?
3. Does the record support the trial court’s finding in the Rule 1925(a) [O]pinion that Chasan did not breach the mid-trial settlement to dismiss his defamation lawsuit against Littman because Littman did not perform the prerequisites to Chasan’s performance, namely: (a) sign the joint statement to the effect there was and is no evidence that Chasan was involved in criminal witness intimidation; (b) deliver a letter of apology to Chasan; and (c) pay Chasan $25,000?
4. Should the court’s [B]ench [O]rder enforcing the settlement on modified terms different from what the parties had ostensibly agreed to in mid-trial (but later disagreed that there was agreement to all material terms) be reversed?
Brief for Appellant at 6.
As an initial matter, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction to
address the merits of Chasan’s claims. “The question of appealability of an
order goes directly to the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt asked to review the order.”
Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
We recognize that “[a]s a general rule, an appellate court’s jurisdiction
extends only to review of final orders. An order denying a motion for
reconsideration is not a final order and, thus, not appealable.” Oliver v.
Irvello, 165 A.3d 981, 983 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
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Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines final orders as
follows:
(b) Definition of final order. A final order:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties;
(2) (Rescinded);
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule; or
(4) is an order pursuant to paragraph (f) of this rule.
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b); see also Barak, 196 A.3d at 215 (explaining that “[a]n
order is final ... if it prevents a party from presenting the merits of its claim in
the trial court.” (citation omitted)).
Chasan urges us to consider the November 21, 2019, Bench Order as a
final order, because “its practical effect was to put him out of court.” Brief for
Appellant at 31. Upon review, we conclude that there is no final order of
record. The Settlement Agreement, as read into the record on June 8, 2018,
expressly that the parties would continue negotiations regarding “mutually
acceptable language” concerning the publication of a joint statement, as well
as a non-disparagement clause. See N.T., 6/8/18, at 7-8. The parties also
expressly requested that the trial court retain jurisdiction to oversee disputes
regarding these ongoing negotiations. See id.; see also id. at 5 (wherein
the parties “ask[ed] the [c]ourt to retain jurisdiction … to resolve any dispute
that may arise regarding the finalization of the [S]ettlement [A]greement
terms.” (emphasis added)).
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The ensuing negotiations were unfruitful, and the trial court instructed
the parties to continue working toward an agreement. On November 21,
2019, the case proceeded to an apparent status hearing. At the time of the
hearing, the parties had not reached an agreement about the parties’ rights
to disseminate the joint statement, i.e., one of the terms left open following
the June 8, 2018, hearing. N.T., 11/21/19, at 26; Trial Court Opinion,
9/28/20, at 1. Additionally, the record reflects that the parties had not signed
mutual releases. N.T., 11/21/19, at 7-8; Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/20, at 1.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court indicated that the parties should
continue working to draft the joint statement, and specifically stated that it
would “bring this [case] back in a month….” N.T., 11/29/19, at 29. As the
trial court itself stated,
In all cases, but particularly those such as this one where there is a great deal of ill will, parties entering mid-trial into a prospective but non-finalized settlement agreement assume the risk that settlement will not be consummated and that they will be back to square one. This case can be considered Exhibit A for this proposition.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/20, at 3 (emphasis added).
Significantly, there is no order entered on the docket following this
hearing from which an appeal could be filed. Further, even if an order had
been filed, such order would not be final, as the court’s decision did not fully
dispose of all claims and parties or prevent either party from presenting the
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merits of his claims.11 See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b); Barak, 196 A.3d at 215. Thus,
this appeal was not properly filed from a final order.
Alternatively, Chasan argues that the Bench Order is appealable as a
collateral order. Brief for Appellant at 38. Chasan claims that the Bench Order
is separable from the main cause of action, because a settlement agreement
is not an adjudication of the merits of a claim. Id. at 40. Chasan additionally
asserts that the Bench Order “effectively deprived Chasan’s [sic] of his
fundamental constitutional right to defend himself against Littman’s claims at
a jury trial.” Id. at 41. Finally, Chasan argues that if this Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction, there will be no judgment from which the parties may
appeal. Id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure provides as follows:
Rule 313. Collateral Orders
(a) General rule.--An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of a trial court or other government unit.
(b) Definition.--A collateral order is an order separate from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313.
To satisfy the collateral order doctrine, the appellant must demonstrate that the order 1) is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; 2) involves a right too important to be ____________________________________________
11 For similar reasons, the Order denying Chasan’s Motion for Reconsideration also cannot be considered a final order.
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denied review; and 3) presents a question that, if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost. The first prong, separability, occurs when we can address the issue surrounding the disputed order without analyzing the ultimate issue in the underlying case. As for the second prong, importance, it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Instead, the issue must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand. We must interpret the collateral order doctrine narrowly, and each of the above prongs must be clearly present for us to deem an order collateral.
Cabot Oil and Gas Corp. v. Speer, 241 A.3d 1191, 1196-97 (Pa. Super.
2020) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the Bench Order is separable from the main cause of action,
as it relates to the Settlement Agreement, rather than the merits of the abuse
of process action. See id. at 1196. Regarding the second prong, our Supreme
Court has previously rejected a contention that “the right to avoid trial on
account of a settlement agreement is important enough for immediate
appeal….” Geniviva v. Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (Pa. 1999). The Court
stated that “it likewise defies common sense to maintain that allowing appeals
as of right from orders denying enforcement … or … denying approval of a
settlement agreement, promotes the ‘efficient, expeditious and judicious
resolution of disputes.’ Any efficiencies gained in reduced trial litigation would
be at the expense of increased appellate litigation.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Further, Chasan’s claim would not be irreparably lost, as the trial court has
not yet issued a final order. Accordingly, the November 21, 2019, Bench Order
is not appealable as a collateral order.
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Appeal quashed.
Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2021
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