321 Ga. 665 FINAL COPY
S25A0421. FRENCH v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A jury found Timothy French guilty of malice murder and
related crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Arthur
James Mosley.1 Following the denial of his motion for new trial,
French appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in four respects.
Because French has failed to show error, we affirm.
The evidence at trial showed that, in January 2008, Mosley, an
elderly farmer, was found deceased in his home. An autopsy
1 The crimes occurred in January 2008. In April 2014, a Lee County
grand jury indicted French for malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. An April 2015 jury trial ended in a mistrial. French was tried again in June 2015, and the jury found him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced French to serve life in prison for malice murder and a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Thereafter, French filed a timely motion for new trial through new counsel. The transcript for the hearing on the motion for new trial indicates that French amended the motion sometime before the July 2024 hearing, but the amended motion is not part of the appellate record. The trial court entered an order denying French’s motion, as amended, on August 27, 2024. French filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. revealed Mosley’s cause of death to be more than ten sharp-force
injuries to the chest and more than 20 sharp-force injuries to the
head and neck. Mosley’s wallet was not found in his home. Several
days later, a neighbor of French’s discovered Mosley’s wallet, which
had been chewed and partially burned, in her yard. According to the
neighbor, her dogs frequently returned home with trash from the
surrounding area, and the residents of French’s home had
previously complained about her dogs going into their yard and
getting into the trash. From the neighbor’s back yard, there was a
clear line of sight to French’s back yard, where there was an actively
smoking burn pile.
Following advancements in DNA testing between 2008 and
2013, the pants Mosley was wearing at the time of his death were
tested for “contact DNA.” DNA obtained from the back pocket
contained a partial DNA profile consistent with French. The DNA
analyst testified that the partial DNA profile would appear with a
frequency of “approximately 1 in 100,000,000 in the African-
American population.” As a result of the DNA testing, investigators
2 obtained a warrant for French’s arrest.
1. French first argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his
Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a black
potential juror.2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712,
90 LE2d 69) (1986). We disagree.
A Batson challenge involves three steps:
(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent’s discriminatory intent.
Thomas v. State, 309 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (847 SE2d 147) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). Because the trial court here went on to
the second step of the analysis and the State articulated its reasons
for the peremptory strike, the issue of whether French has
2 The trial court also found that the Batson challenge was untimely, and
French complains on appeal that this finding was erroneous. However, because the trial court also rejected the Batson challenge on the merits, we do not address the timeliness issue. See Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 77, 78 (4) (343 SE2d 695) (1986) (“[Appellant] claims the trial court erred in entertaining arguments by the State that the motion was untimely filed and eventually ruling that the motion was untimely. But since the judge also ruled correctly on the merits of the case, we need not reach issues of timeliness.”). 3 established a prima facie case under step one is moot. See Arrington
v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 339 (9) (687 SE2d 438) (2009) (“[T]he trial
court did require the State to articulate its reasons for the
peremptory strikes, rendering moot the issue of whether [the
appellant] had established a prima facie case.”).
“At step two, the proponent of the strike need only articulate a
facially race-neutral reason for the strike.” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga.
624, 631 (3) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Here, the prosecutor explained that he struck the
prospective juror based on her employment with the Division of
Family and Children Services (“DFCS”). The prosecutor elaborated
that, during his career, he had experienced three trials ending with
a hung jury, and in two of those instances, the juries “were hung
essentially by DFCS workers who took . . . a hardline stance, as I
understood it from other jurors.” And based on that experience, the
prosecutor decided that he “would never seat another person who
was employed, or had been substantially employed by DFCS in the
history of their employment.” Contrary to French’s argument on
4 appeal, the prospective juror’s employment is race-neutral on its
face, and we have previously held that such a reason is sufficient to
satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under Batson. See Taylor, 303 Ga. at
632 (3) (noting that a potential juror’s employment is a race-neutral
characteristic); Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) (464 SE2d 205)
(1995) (affirming denial of Batson challenge where prosecutor’s
reason for striking prospective juror was based on juror’s
employment and prosecutor’s prior experience with lack of
cooperation by employees of the same company and noting that
“[t]he nature of a prospective juror’s employment is not a
characteristic that is peculiar to any race” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Finally, at step three, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuasion [is
on] the opponent of the strike” to prove discriminatory intent.
Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 720, 723, 724 (4) n.7 (804 SE2d 24) (2017).
In assessing whether that burden has been carried, the trial court
“makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of
the strike opponent’s prima facie showing and the explanations
5 given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances
that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.” Johnson v. State, 302
Ga. 774, 779-780 (3) (b) (809 SE2d 769) (2018) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “A trial court’s finding as to whether the
opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent is entitled to
great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”
Id. at 780 (3) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). In arguing this
issue below, French broadly implied that the prosecutor had acted
with discriminatory intent in striking the prospective juror, pointing
to the fact that the two jurors who voted “not guilty” at French’s first
trial, which ended in a mistrial, were black. French did not attempt
to refute the prosecutor’s previous factual experience and instead
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321 Ga. 665 FINAL COPY
S25A0421. FRENCH v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A jury found Timothy French guilty of malice murder and
related crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Arthur
James Mosley.1 Following the denial of his motion for new trial,
French appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in four respects.
Because French has failed to show error, we affirm.
The evidence at trial showed that, in January 2008, Mosley, an
elderly farmer, was found deceased in his home. An autopsy
1 The crimes occurred in January 2008. In April 2014, a Lee County
grand jury indicted French for malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. An April 2015 jury trial ended in a mistrial. French was tried again in June 2015, and the jury found him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced French to serve life in prison for malice murder and a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Thereafter, French filed a timely motion for new trial through new counsel. The transcript for the hearing on the motion for new trial indicates that French amended the motion sometime before the July 2024 hearing, but the amended motion is not part of the appellate record. The trial court entered an order denying French’s motion, as amended, on August 27, 2024. French filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. revealed Mosley’s cause of death to be more than ten sharp-force
injuries to the chest and more than 20 sharp-force injuries to the
head and neck. Mosley’s wallet was not found in his home. Several
days later, a neighbor of French’s discovered Mosley’s wallet, which
had been chewed and partially burned, in her yard. According to the
neighbor, her dogs frequently returned home with trash from the
surrounding area, and the residents of French’s home had
previously complained about her dogs going into their yard and
getting into the trash. From the neighbor’s back yard, there was a
clear line of sight to French’s back yard, where there was an actively
smoking burn pile.
Following advancements in DNA testing between 2008 and
2013, the pants Mosley was wearing at the time of his death were
tested for “contact DNA.” DNA obtained from the back pocket
contained a partial DNA profile consistent with French. The DNA
analyst testified that the partial DNA profile would appear with a
frequency of “approximately 1 in 100,000,000 in the African-
American population.” As a result of the DNA testing, investigators
2 obtained a warrant for French’s arrest.
1. French first argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his
Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a black
potential juror.2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712,
90 LE2d 69) (1986). We disagree.
A Batson challenge involves three steps:
(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent’s discriminatory intent.
Thomas v. State, 309 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (847 SE2d 147) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). Because the trial court here went on to
the second step of the analysis and the State articulated its reasons
for the peremptory strike, the issue of whether French has
2 The trial court also found that the Batson challenge was untimely, and
French complains on appeal that this finding was erroneous. However, because the trial court also rejected the Batson challenge on the merits, we do not address the timeliness issue. See Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 77, 78 (4) (343 SE2d 695) (1986) (“[Appellant] claims the trial court erred in entertaining arguments by the State that the motion was untimely filed and eventually ruling that the motion was untimely. But since the judge also ruled correctly on the merits of the case, we need not reach issues of timeliness.”). 3 established a prima facie case under step one is moot. See Arrington
v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 339 (9) (687 SE2d 438) (2009) (“[T]he trial
court did require the State to articulate its reasons for the
peremptory strikes, rendering moot the issue of whether [the
appellant] had established a prima facie case.”).
“At step two, the proponent of the strike need only articulate a
facially race-neutral reason for the strike.” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga.
624, 631 (3) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Here, the prosecutor explained that he struck the
prospective juror based on her employment with the Division of
Family and Children Services (“DFCS”). The prosecutor elaborated
that, during his career, he had experienced three trials ending with
a hung jury, and in two of those instances, the juries “were hung
essentially by DFCS workers who took . . . a hardline stance, as I
understood it from other jurors.” And based on that experience, the
prosecutor decided that he “would never seat another person who
was employed, or had been substantially employed by DFCS in the
history of their employment.” Contrary to French’s argument on
4 appeal, the prospective juror’s employment is race-neutral on its
face, and we have previously held that such a reason is sufficient to
satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under Batson. See Taylor, 303 Ga. at
632 (3) (noting that a potential juror’s employment is a race-neutral
characteristic); Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) (464 SE2d 205)
(1995) (affirming denial of Batson challenge where prosecutor’s
reason for striking prospective juror was based on juror’s
employment and prosecutor’s prior experience with lack of
cooperation by employees of the same company and noting that
“[t]he nature of a prospective juror’s employment is not a
characteristic that is peculiar to any race” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
Finally, at step three, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuasion [is
on] the opponent of the strike” to prove discriminatory intent.
Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 720, 723, 724 (4) n.7 (804 SE2d 24) (2017).
In assessing whether that burden has been carried, the trial court
“makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of
the strike opponent’s prima facie showing and the explanations
5 given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances
that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.” Johnson v. State, 302
Ga. 774, 779-780 (3) (b) (809 SE2d 769) (2018) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “A trial court’s finding as to whether the
opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent is entitled to
great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”
Id. at 780 (3) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). In arguing this
issue below, French broadly implied that the prosecutor had acted
with discriminatory intent in striking the prospective juror, pointing
to the fact that the two jurors who voted “not guilty” at French’s first
trial, which ended in a mistrial, were black. French did not attempt
to refute the prosecutor’s previous factual experience and instead
simply pointed to the prospective juror’s race and argued that he did
not think that working for DFCS was “a reason to strike someone.”
In response, the prosecutor again emphasized that he struck the
prospective juror based on her employment with DFCS, noted that
he did not use a peremptory strike against any black potential jurors
at French’s first trial, and argued that it is not his “modus operandi”
6 to use peremptory strikes for race-based reasons.
On this record, we see no clear error in the trial court’s implicit
determination that French failed to meet his burden of persuasion,3
and French advances no argument to the contrary. Indeed, French’s
attempt to refute the prosecutor’s explanation for the strike was far
from compelling. See Thomas, 309 Ga. at 493 (2) (trial court’s finding
of no discriminatory intent not clearly erroneous where appellant
“expressed doubt about the prosecutor’s rationales for using
peremptory strikes” but “failed to make any factual argument in
support of those doubts or in support of his claim that the prosecutor
acted with discriminatory intent”). See also, e.g., Demery v. State,
287 Ga. 805, 808 (2) (700 SE2d 373) (2010) (“The opponent of the
strike may carry its burden of persuasion by showing that similarly-
situated members of another race were seated on the jury.” (citation
3 The trial court did not make an express finding on the third step of the
Batson inquiry, but it heard French’s argument on the issue, as well as the State’s response, before denying French’s Batson challenge. See Coleman, 301 Ga. at 723-724 (4) (trial court “implicitly engaged in the third step” of Batson by hearing arguments from the defense as to why each reason proffered by the prosecutor was inadequate and then making its own findings as to each juror). 7 and punctuation omitted)). And under the circumstances of this
case, whether to credit the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral
explanation, as the trial court did here, necessarily entailed an
“evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and
credibility”; that evaluation “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s
province” and will not be disturbed on appeal. Johnson, 302 Ga. at
780 (3) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). In short, the trial
court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory strike was not
racially motivated was not clearly erroneous, and this claim fails.
2. In his second claim of error, French argues that the trial
court erred by denying his motion for funds to retain a defense
expert. Again, we disagree.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for an expert
witness for abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. 474, 476
(2) (813 SE2d 384) (2018). As we have explained, where an indigent
defendant seeks to obtain funds for an expert witness, his motion
should disclose to the trial court, with a reasonable degree of precision, why certain evidence is critical, what type of scientific testimony is needed, what that expert proposes
8 to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for services. Lacking this information, a trial court will find it difficult to assess the need for assistance.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, French’s motion for funds indicated that he sought to
retain an otherwise unidentified “independent lab qualified in
forensic DNA analysis and testing” to review the test results
showing that a partial profile of French’s DNA was obtained from
Mosley’s pants. But other than these general assertions, French’s
motion failed to make any specific showing as to who the expert
witness might be or the anticipated costs for the expert’s services.
See Finn v. State, 274 Ga. 675, 677 (2) (558 SE2d 717) (2002)
(explaining that a motion for funds to retain an expert witness must
provide “specific information necessary for the trial court to fully
consider [the] request” because “[w]ithout detailed information,
neither the trial court, nor an appellate court, can determine
whether the funds are necessary to protect the defendant’s due
process rights”). And in light of French’s failure to provide
sufficiently detailed information to allow the trial court to make an
9 informed decision about his need for assistance, we cannot say that
the court abused its discretion by denying the motion for funds. See
Williams, 303 Ga. at 476-477 (2) (affirming denial of motion for
funds for expert witness that did not indicate what the expert
proposed to do regarding the evidence at issue or what the
anticipated cost for the expert’s services would be); Finn, 274 Ga. at
677 (2) (affirming denial of motion for funds that “did not identify
the expert [appellant] proposed to use, how that expert would
examine the evidence, whether [appellant’s] examination would
differ in any material aspects from the State’s expert and the
independent expert, or the cost of the expert”); Roseboro v. State, 258
Ga. 39, 40-41 (3) (c) (365 SE2d 115) (1988) (affirming denial of
motion for funds for expert witness where motion “made no effort to
demonstrate to the trial court what type of expert was needed, nor
the qualifications of this expert, nor what tests the expert would
perform” and did not “identif[y] by name and qualifications a specific
expert” or “indicate[ ] the amount in fees that any expert likely
would charge” (emphasis omitted)).
10 3. In his third and fourth enumerations of error, French
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for change of venue
and motion for mistrial, respectively. Beyond vaguely recounting the
procedural history underlying these claims, however, French
neither engages in substantive argument nor cites any legal
authority in support of these alleged errors. Supreme Court Rule 22
(1) states that in all briefs filed in cases other than death-penalty
matters, “[a]ny enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error
not supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to
the record shall be deemed abandoned.” And as we recently
explained, “litigants must do more than just make an argument or
cite authority” to comply with Rule 22. Byrd v. State, 321 Ga. 222,
225 (2) (913 SE2d 667) (2025). Rather, to avoid having an
enumeration deemed abandoned, litigants must “ensure that
argument, citation to authority, and citation to the record are all
present” with respect to each and every error enumerated in their
briefs. Id. (emphasis supplied). By omitting any legal analysis or
citation of authority in support of his third and fourth enumerations
11 of error, French has failed to comply with Rule 22, and, accordingly,
we conclude that he has abandoned those claims of error. See
id.; Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 (7) (f) n.21 (901 SE2d 124)
(2024) (“[appellant] makes no specific argument and cites no
authority to support any of these claims, so we do not address
them”).
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur.
Decided May 28, 2025.
Murder. Lee Superior Court. Before Judge Smith.
Kevin Kwashnak, for appellant.
Lewis R. Lamb, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C.
Malcolm, Matthew B. Crowder, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
for appellee.