Frelinghuysen v. Key

110 U.S. 63, 3 S. Ct. 462, 28 L. Ed. 71, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1659
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 7, 1884
Docket891
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 110 U.S. 63 (Frelinghuysen v. Key) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 3 S. Ct. 462, 28 L. Ed. 71, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1659 (1884).

Opinion

Me. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.

If we understand correctly the positions assumed by the different counsel for the relators, they are:

1. That the awards under the convention vested in the several claimants an absolute right to the amounts awarded them respectively, and that this right was property which neither *71 the United States alone, nor the United States and Mexico together, could take away; and,

2. That, if this were not so, the action of President Hayes, under the 5th section of the act of 1878, was conclusive on President Arthur, and deprived him of any right he might otherwise have had to investigate the charges of fraud presented by the Mexican government, or to withhold from the' relators their distributive shares of any moneys thereafter paid to the Secretary of State under the authority of the first section.

1. There is no doubt that the provisions of • the convention as to the conclusiveness of the awards are as strong as language can make them. The decision of the commissioners, or the umpire, on each claim, is to be “ absolutely final and conclusive ” and “ without appeal.” The President of the United States and the President of the Mexican Republic are “to give full effect to such decisions, without any objection, evasion, or delay whatsoever,” and the result of the proceedings of the commission is to be considered “ a full, perfect, and final settlement of every claim upon either government arising out of transactions prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the .... convention.” But this is to be construed as language used in a compact of two nations “ for the adjustment of the claims of the citizens of either . . . against the other,” entered into “ to increase the friendly feeling between” republics, and “so to strengthen the system and principles of republican government o'n the American continent.” No nation treats with a citizen of another nation except through his government. The treaty, when made, represents a compact between the governments, and each government holds the other responsible for everything done by their respective citizens under it. The citizens of the United States having claims against Mexico were not parties to this convention. They induced the United States to assume the responsibility of seeking redress for injuries they claimed to have sustained by the conduct of Mexico, and as a means of obtaining such redress the convention was entered into, by which not only claims of citizens of the United States against Mexico *72 were to be adjusted and paid, but those of citizens of Mexico against the United States as well. By the terms of the compact the individual claimants could not themselves submit their claims and proofs to the commission to be passed upon. Only such claims as were presented to the governments respectively could be “referred” to the commission, and the commissioners ■ were not allowed' to investigate or decide on ,any evidence or information except such as was furnished by or on behalf of the governments. After all the decisions were made and the business of the commission concluded, .the total amount awarded to the citizens of one country was to-be deducted from the amount awarded to the citizens of the other, and the balance only paid in money by the government in favor of whose citizens the smaller amount was awarded, and this payment was to be made, not to the citizens, but to their government. Thus, while the claims of the individual citizens were to be considered by the commission in determining amounts, the whole purpose of the convention- was to ascertain how much was due from one government to the other on account of the demands of their respective citizens.

. As between the United States and Mexico, the awards are final and conclusive until set aside by agreement between the two-governments or otherwise. Mexico cannot, under the terms of the treaty, refuse to make the payments at the times agreed on if required by the United States. This she does not now seek to do. Her payments have all been made promptly as they fell due, as far as these records 'show. "What she asks is the consent of the United States to her release from liability under the convention on account of the particular awards now in dispute, because of the alleged fraudulent character of the proof in support of the claims which the United States were induced by the claimants to furpish for the consideration of the commission.

As to the right of the United States to treat with Mexico for a retrial, we entertain no doubt. Each government, when it entered into the compact under which the awards were made, relied on the honor and’ good faith, of the other for protection as far- as possible against frauds and impositions by the indi *73 vidual claimants. It was for this reason that all claims were excluded from the consideration of the commission except such as should be referred by the several governments, and no evidence in support of or against a claim was to be submitted except through or by the governments. The presentation by a citizen of a fraudulent claim or false testimony for reference to the commission was an imposition on his own government, and if that government afterwards-discovered that-it had in this way been made an instrument of wrong towards á friendly ■ power, it would be not only its right but its duty, to repudiate the act and make reparation as far as possible for the consequences of its neglect if any there had been. International arbitration must always proceed on the highest' principles of national honor and'integrity. Claims presented and evidence' submitted to such a tribunal - must necessarily bear the impress of the entire good faith of the government from which they come, and it is not to be presumed that , any government will for a moment allow itself knowingly to be made the instrument of wrong in any such proceeding. No technical rules of pleading as applied in municipal courts ought ever to be allowed to stand in the way of the national power to do what is right under all the circumstances. Every citizen who asks the intervention of his own government against another for the redress of his personal- grievances must necessarily subject himself and his claim, to these requirements of international comity. None of the cases cited by counsel are in opposition to this. They all relate to the disposition to be' made of the proceeds of inter-, national awards after they have passed beyond the reach of • the governments and into the hands of private parties. The language of the opinions must- be construed in connection with this fact. ■ The opinion of the Attorney-General in Oibbe,s’ Case, 18 Opinions, 19, related to the authority of the executive officers to submit the claim of Gibbes to the second commission after it had been passed on by the 'first, without any new treaty between the governments to that effect; not to the power to make such a treaty.

2. The first section of the act of. 1878 authorizes and requires the Secretary of State to receive the moneys paid by Mexico *74

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Bluebook (online)
110 U.S. 63, 3 S. Ct. 462, 28 L. Ed. 71, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frelinghuysen-v-key-scotus-1884.