Freeport Transport, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

568 A.2d 151, 523 Pa. 491, 85 A.L.R. 4th 963, 1990 Pa. LEXIS 1, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3089
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 3, 1990
DocketNos. 6-8 W.D. Appeal Dkt. 1988
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 568 A.2d 151 (Freeport Transport, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freeport Transport, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 568 A.2d 151, 523 Pa. 491, 85 A.L.R. 4th 963, 1990 Pa. LEXIS 1, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3089 (Pa. 1990).

Opinions

OPINION

ZAPPALA, Justice.

This matter involves cross-appeals filed by Freeport Transport, Inc. (Freeport), the original plaintiff, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-housemen and Helpers of America (“IBT”) and Local 538 of that union, the original defendants, from the Superior Court’s per curiam order affirming the judgment for compensatory damages entered in favor of Freeport against both of the defendants and modifying the judgment for punitive damages which was entered only against IBT. 362 Pa.Super. 628, 520 A.2d 67. IBT and Local 538 challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory and punitive damages; Freeport challenges the remittitur of the punitive damages award by the Superior Court.

[494]*494The underlying action was brought by Freeport, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in trucking operations, against IBT and Local 538 to recover damages for the destruction of its property sustained during a strike by Local 538 in 1977. Freeport and Local 538 were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that terminated on August 3, 1977. Negotiations for a new agreement proved unsuccessful and on August 4, 1977, Local 538 began to picket at Freeport’s place of operations. The strike continued through to November 19, 1977, the date on which an agreement was finally reached. During the strike, there were repeated incidents of violence, which resulted in personal injuries to Freeport employees who had continued to work and extensive damage to Freeport’s equipment and property.

After the non-jury trial, the court entered a verdict on December 27, 1984 in favor of Freeport against IBT and Local 538 and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $33,931.03 plus interest from November 19, 1977. Punitive damages in the sum of $500,000 were awarded to Freeport against IBT only. The verdict was subsequently amended to award compensatory damages totalling $51,-753.82; the punitive damages award was not altered.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment against IBT and Local 538 for compensatory damages. The Superior Court accepted IBT’s argument that the punitive damages award was excessive, however, and ordered that the judgment be remitted to $250,000.00. The parties petitioned for allowance of appeal and we granted allocatur to review the matter in light of our recent decision in Gajkowski v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 519 Pa. 320, 548 A.2d 533 (1988) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court).

In Gajkowski, we addressed the issue of the liability of a union for injuries arising out of violence occurring during strikes under Section 8 of Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act, Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, No. 308, 43 P.S. § 206h. Section 8 of the Act states the nature of the proof [495]*495required to establish the liability of a labor organization for the acts of its officers, members, or agents:

No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute as herein defined, shall be held responsible or liable in any civil action at law or suit in equity or in any criminal prosecution for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and by the weight of evidence in other cases, and without the aid of any presumptions of law or fact, both of — (a) the doing of such acts by persons who are officers, members or agents of any such association or organization; and (b) actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of such act after actual knowledge thereof by such association or organization.

43 P.S. § 206h (emphasis added). We noted that Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Act is substantially similar to the language of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106, which has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to preclude the use of either a standard agency or respondeat superior analysis to hold a union vicariously liable for the torts of its officers, members, and agents. See, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947). In Philadelphia Marine Trade Association v. International Longshoremen’s Association, 453 Pa. 43, 308 A.2d 98 (1973), we indicated that Section 206h of the Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act was intended to have the same purpose as Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

We noted that in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra, the United States Supreme Court addressed Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act stating,

... its [Section 6’s] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations ... and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officer or member of the organization, without clear [496]*496proof that the organization or member charged with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior authorization or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.

330 U.S. at 403, 67 S.Ct. at 779 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court held that “authorization” as used in Section 6 signified a concept different from corporate criminal responsibility for the acts of officers and agents within the scope of their employment, concluding that,

We are of the opinion that the requirement of “authorization” restricts the responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer or employee associations, organizations or their members for unlawful acts of the officers or members of those associations or organizations, although such officers or members are acting within the scope of their general authority as such officers or members, to those associations, organizations or other officers or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from a granted authority, by the association or non-participating member sought to be charged or was subsequently ratified by such association, organization or member after actual knowledge of its occurrence.

330 U.S. at 406-407, 67 S.Ct. at 781 (footnote omitted).

We concluded in Gajkowski, and now reiterate, that, as does Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act requires a higher showing than the common law rules of agency to establish a union’s liability. Imposing a more stringent standard to establish the liability of a union for damages resulting from unlawful acts committed during a strike advances the policy underlying Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act to protect the unions from the potentially crippling effect of lawsuits premised on a showing of fault based on mere agency.

[497]*497No. 6 W.D. Appeal Docket 1988

No. 7 W.D. Appeal Docket 1988

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568 A.2d 151, 523 Pa. 491, 85 A.L.R. 4th 963, 1990 Pa. LEXIS 1, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3089, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freeport-transport-inc-v-international-brotherhood-of-teamsters-pa-1990.