Freeman v. United States

48 F.2d 233, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213
District Court, E.D. Kentucky·Decided February 17, 1931·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

ANDREW M. J. COCHRAN, District Judge.

This cause is before me on final hearing. It is an action on an insurance policy issued under* the World War Veteran’s Act (38 USCA § 421 et seq.), after the end of such war, to an enlisted man employed in active service under the Navy Department. He enlisted April 17, 1919 and was honorably discharged April 8, 1921. The claim is that at the time of his discharge he was totally and permanently disabled and by reason thereof his policy was then matured, and hence did not lapse by his failure thereafter to pay the premiums on it. I find in the decisions stater ments as to policies so maturing thereafter so lapsing. As I view it a policy which matures never lapses.- In order to the existence of such disability at that time he. must then have been suffering from a personal injury or disease which incapacitated him permanently from following continuously any substantially gainful occupation. The matter is thus put in the last reported decision dealing with cases of that character, to wit .United States v. Meserve (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 549, 550; “Total disability within the meaning of, the policy is any disability of mind or body, which renders it impossible for the disabled person to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation, and such disability is deemed to - be permanent whenever it is. founded upon conditions which render, it reasonably certain that it will continue throughout the life of the person suffering from it.”.

As I make it, the occupation which he is disabled from following continuously must be one that he is adapted to follow. It is immaterial that he is physically able to follow such an occupation if he is not otherwise' adapted to so do. The question may arise in a given ease where the disability is rested on a* certain disease whether such disease must then be existent, or will it be sufficient that the seed of the disease is then in his body. It would seem that, if, in any case, it would be sufficient that the seed of the disease so existed, it is essential that necessarily and inevitably the disease must thereafter develop from; such disease so that it can then be said that-he is potentially so diseased, and hence po-. tentially so disabled. * i

The burden is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence.the existence of such disease or seed and eonse-i quent disability -at the time of the discharge.. In order to do this the plaintiff must intro-,’ duce substantial evidence to this effect, and, even though he may do so, he cannot recover, if it is overcome or equalized by substantial! evidence introduced by the defendant. The plaintiff’s failure to so establish cannot be supplied by grace. This court is not the government passing on the question whether the-, plaintiff should have a pension. The question before it is whether plaintiff is entitled to recover on his policy of insurance and- to this end he must bring himself within its terms. Hence it is that it is not sufficient for.plaintiff to establish the subsequent incurrence or existence of such disease ox' seed; thereof and consequent disability.;. It mjisjt; have existed at the time of the-discharge.

[234] Coming then to the ease in hand, what do we find? In argument the disease on which plaintiff’s ease is rested is goiter. There is no direct evidence of his having it before March 23,1923, nearly two years after his discharge. A Bureau examination was made on that date, because, no doubt, of a pending application for compensation and the diagnosis was “Exopthalmie Goiter.” In the report thereof it is said that the thyroid gland was “moderately enlarged,” and that exopthalmos was “moderate.” On a subsequent examination made October 13, 1923, the diagnosis was “Exopthalmie goiter toxic” and prognosis “poor.” Not a solitary witness testifies to his having goiter before March 23,1923. Of course he must have had it for some time before that, but how long does not appear. The plaintiff himself'gave no testimony as to when he first took notice of it. It is said in brief for defendant that he made an application for compensation in December, 1922, and that he made no mention therein of his then having a goiter, but that he testified that he then had it. I find no such testimony, and the application or any testimony in relation thereto is not in the record. It is certain that he did not have the goiter at the time of his discharge because he testified as. to his then condition and he makes no mention of it. Nor is there any other evidence of his then having it. If then the plaintiff is to recover, it is essential that the evidence establishes that he then had the seed of it, and that it was the necessary and inevitable outcome of it, or he must have then had some other disease which not only then totally but also permanently disabled him.

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Freeman v. United States, 48 F.2d 233, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213 (E.D. Ky. 1931).

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