Freeman v. Stemm Bros., Inc.

265 P.2d 1055, 44 Wash. 2d 189, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 268
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1954
Docket32517
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 265 P.2d 1055 (Freeman v. Stemm Bros., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freeman v. Stemm Bros., Inc., 265 P.2d 1055, 44 Wash. 2d 189, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 268 (Wash. 1954).

Opinion

*190 Finley, J.

— This is an action for rescission of a sale of an orchard-tending machine, purchased by George A. Freeman, an apple orchardist, of Tonasket, Washington, from Stemm Bros., Inc., a corporation, of Leavenworth, Washington. For many years, Stemm Bros., Inc., had manufactured a power-operated, machine, generally known in the trade as a commercial hydraulic hi-tender. This was described in the corporation’s brief as follows:

“The Hi-Tender in this case consists of an assembly of members similar to the human arm, a double boom with elbows. To carry out the illustration the base (human shoulder) is installed on a turntable, and the outer end (human hand) carries a cage in which the workman rides with his tools and materials. The controls are in the cage so the workman can determine his own movements. . . . The turntable is actuated by a gear box in the base of the machine. The machine is operated by hydraulics. Pressure is developed by a hydraulic pump powered by a gasoline engine, and the hydraulic fluid (oil), under pressure, in turn actuates a hydromotor and hydraulic cylinders. 33

Upon learning that Stemm Bros., Inc., was contemplating the manufacture of a variation of the commercial hi-tender for use in pruning, thinning, and picking apples, Mr. Freeman ordered one of the machines. Within three or four days after the orchard hi-tender was delivered to Mr. Freeman, the sprocket chains (holding the hoist) broke. The machine was returned to the manufacturing plant of Stemm Bros., Inc. After replacing the broken chains and strengthening the base of the machine, the corporation redelivered it to Mr. Freeman in September of the same year. Thereafter, Freeman used the machine for some sixty hours for picking apples in his orchard, but claims that it did not work satisfactorily at any time, despite his best efforts to operate, maintain, and adjust it.

According to Mr. Freeman, he was unable to use the orchard hi-tender after the hydraulic arm froze in an upright position and could not be moved. He claims that Stemm Bros., Inc., was notified of the situation and was requested to repair the machine. Stemm Bros., Inc., at this *191 time made no attempt to put the hi-tender into workable operation, and on December 15,1952, Freeman gave written notice to Stemm Bros., Inc., that he was rescinding the sale. He offered to return the machine, and demanded refund of the $4,080.01 which he said he had paid for the machine. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freeman brought this suit, alleging breach of both an express warranty and an implied warranty of fitness. We note that Mr. Zweight, manager of Stemm Bros., Inc., testified that he called at Mr. Freeman’s place a few days after this lawsuit was commenced, and after making a few adjustments, was able to put the machine in operation.

The trial court concluded that there was no breach of either an express or implied warranty, and entered judgment for the defendant. Freeman has appealed.

No error has been assigned to the trial court’s failure to make any finding in regard to an express warranty. From the findings of fact and the conclusions of law which were entered, it is not clear whether the trial court found that an implied warranty of fitness existed. It is not necessary for us to consider this question, because we are convinced that, assuming such an implied warranty did exist, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings on the matter of breach: that is, that there was no breach of a warranty.

In its assignments of error, appellant has challenged all of the trial court’s findings of fact, that there were no defects in the machine. At the trial, appellant offered proof that the hi-tender was unworkable in at least seven important respects. Any of these alleged defects, if established, would tend to show a breach of warranty of fitness. The defects claimed by appellant include the following: (1) The sprocket chains holding up the arms and cage on the hi-tender broke; (2) the counterweights and balances, placed on the machine to keep it from tipping, broke off; (3) the turntable on the hi-tender did not operate fast enough to perform orchard work; (4) the hi-tender did not have sufficient power to rotate the turntable, making it necessary for the operator to descend from the cage and push the turn *192 table manually; (5) the hi-tender was so constructed mechanically that the cage (from which the operator worked) drifted continually into the branches of the trees, thus preventing the operator from picking the fruit; (6) the hi-tender continually leaked excessive amounts of hydraulic fluid; (7) the lubricating system on the machine was defective in that the zerlc plugs would work out, under pressure from the lubricating gun.

As mentioned herein before, the sprocket chains broke shortly after the initial delivery of the machine to appellant. This was in May, 1952. Thereafter, the respondent took the machine back to its shop and replaced the chains with stronger ones. In September, 1952, the appellant accepted the repaired machine. In view of the satisfactory operation of the sprocket chains subsequent to the redelivery, the trial court correctly found that there was no breach of warranty in this respect.

■ Appellant’s evidence showed that the counterweights, placed on the hi-tender to keep it from tipping, broke. There was testimony that, as a result, appellant was unable to demonstrate the machine at a county fair. However, the machine was used for sixty hours in orchard work after the weights had broken. It was not claimed that this defect prevented use of the machine, and -there was no evidence to show that this defect rendered the hi-tender unfit for orchard work. Where a buyer sues for breach of an implied warranty of fitness, it is not enough that he show some defect in the goods purchased. It is essential that he prove that, as a result of the defect, the goods are not fit for his purpose. The trial court did not err in refusing to find a breach of warranty because of the broken counterweights.

Appellant testified that the turntable which rotated the hi-tender turned too slowly. Mr. Zweight testified that, in his opinion, the rotation was not too slow; but that, at appellant’s request, he had installed a bigger gear to increase the speed; that thereafter, the machine lacked sufficient power to rotate the turntable when it was on a grade, making it necessary for the operator to leave the cage and push the turntable by hand in order to get it to the desired *193 position. The court found that, “at the request and. direction of the plaintiff, and because he desired that the turntable operate at a higher speed, the defendant installed a high speed gear for operating said turntable'at a higher speed, although the same required more power than the original gear for such purpose.” The trial court apparently-felt that the lack of power for operating the turntable was due to the installation of the larger gear, and that there was no reliance upon respondent’s skill and judgment in making this installation, since it was made at the request of appellant. We do not think there was error in this finding.

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Bluebook (online)
265 P.2d 1055, 44 Wash. 2d 189, 1954 Wash. LEXIS 268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freeman-v-stemm-bros-inc-wash-1954.