Freeman v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMay 27, 2010
DocketANDcv-09-199
StatusUnpublished

This text of Freeman v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC (Freeman v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freeman v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC, (Me. Super. Ct. 2010).

Opinion

, '

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-09-199

BRIANNA FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. DECISION

REALTY RESOURCES HOSPITALITY, LLC, d/b/ a DENNY,S OF AUBURN, ,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Bruce Freeman, also known as Brianna, a male-to female transgender

individual, alleges unlawful public accommodation discrimination based upon sexual

orientation, disability, and sex by defendant Realty Resources Hospitality d/b/a

Denny~s of Auburn ("Defendant:'' or "Denny's"). This :matter is before the court on

Denny's motion for judgment on the pleaclings, plaintiff's second motion to amend and

plaintiff's motion to strike defen.dant's jury trial request.

BACKGROUND

The facts in the pleadings may be briefly summarized as follows: Ms. Freeman is

a male-to-female transgender individual who at the time of the alleged discrimination

was undergoing a medically recommended male-to-female transgender process. In

mid-summer of 2007 Ms. Freeman discussed the process with a Denny's manager and

received permission to use the women's restroom. In late October of 2007 a new

manager ordered her not to. use the women's restroom any more because Ms. Freeman

was biologically Q1ale.. Ms. Freeman expresses herself as a female in that she wears

women's clothing, makeup, jewelry, and perfume. Using the men's restroom· at

) Denny's was unacceptable to her and this lawsuit was the eventual result. The issue is whether Ms. Freeman has adequately alleged facts that, when

viewed in the light most favorable to her, survive the defendant's claim that the Maine

Human Rights Act ( 0 MHRA 11 ) does not provide her with any protections. As stated

above, Ms. Freeman has stated three claims:

DISCUSSION

The MHRA states:

To protect the public health, safety and welfare, it is declared to be the policy of this State ... to prevent discrimination in ... public accommodations on account of ... sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability. •I

Sexual Orientation

5 M.R.S.A. § 4552 (2009). 0 Sexual orientation is defined as a person's achtal or perceived heterosexuality,

bisexuality, homosexuality, or gender identity or expression." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(9-C). 1

The court bases its decision on the plain language of the statute and concludes that,

when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Ms. Freeman has

adequately plead a claim that Denny's prohibited he~ from using the women's restroom

because of her sexual orientation. These facts are adequate to overcome a motion to

dismiss the claim for unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 1 The court also finds the Maine Human Rights Commission's definition of "sexual orientation" helpful in determining who is protected under the MHRA. The·Commission defines "sexual orientation" exactly as it is defined under statute, but provides further clarity in its statements that: The teqn "gender identity" means an inclividu.al's gendel"-related 1dentily, whether or not that identity is different from that traditionally associated with that individual's assigned sex at birth, including, but not llmited to, a gender identity that is trans gender or androgynous. [)The term "gender expression" means the manner in which an individual's gender identity is expressed, including, but not limited to, through dress, appearance, manner, speech, or lifestyle, whether or not that expression ls different from that traditionally associated with that individual's assigned sex at birth. . 94-348 C.M.R. ch. 003 § 3.02(C) (2010).

2 DisabiJity

Ms. Freeman also claims discrimination based upon disability. However, the

Legislature made it dear that "physical or mental disability does not include ... any

condition covered under" the definition of "sexual orientation as found in section 11

4553(9-C). 5 M.R.S.A. § 4533-A(3)(B).

Sexual Discrimination

The Law Court has never held that a person being discriminated against because

of her sexual orientation is a victim of sexual discrimination under the Maine Human

Rights Act. The Legislature clearly believed that discrimination based on sexual

orientation was not covered by the prohibition against sexual discrimination.2 That is

why the Legislature amended the MHRA in 2005 to prohibit discrimination based on

·sexual orientation.

Federal courts have, as a policy matter, taken it upon themselves to expand the

definition of sexual discrimination to include sexual orientation. See Barnes v. City of ' Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737-38 (6th Cir. 2005); Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, . 62-64 (D.D.C. 2007). Ms. Freeman has asked this court to do so as well. That kind of

judicial expansion would not be appropriate on a complex issue such as this, especially

when the Legislature has already attended to the matter.

Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend and Motion to Strike

Ms. Freeman has filed a second motion to amend and a motion to strike Denny's

request for a jury trial.

2 See e.g. Legis. Rec. S-338 (Mar. 28, 2005); Legis. Rec. S-351 (Mar. 29, 2005); Leg-ls. Rec. House H­ 293 (Mar. 29, 2005); Legis. Rec. House H-296 (Mar. 29, 2005); Legis. Rec. House H-300 (Mat·. 29, 2005).

3 I •

Denny's asked for a jury trial because Ms. Freeman asked for compensatory and

punitive damages. Ms. Freeman's second motion to amend seeks to eliminate her

request for compensatory and punitive damages.

Because this is an accommodation case and not an employment case, I .think Ms.

Freeman's right to compensatory and punitive damages was dubious_at best. Because

this is an accommodation case and not an employment case, Denny's right to a jury trial

was equally dubious. In any event, Denny's has consented to Ms. Freeman's second

motion to amend. There will be no compensatory and punitive damages. There wiU be

no jury trial.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Freeman's second motion to amend as to eliminate compensatory and

punitive damages is granted.

Ms. Freeman's motion to strike Denny's request for a jury trial is granted.

Denny's' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in regard to sexual

orientation is denied.

Denny's' motion to disiniss for failure to state a claim in regard to disability and

sexual discrimination is granted.·

The clerk_will enter this decision on the docket by reference.

DATED: . May 27, 2010

William S. Brodrick Jus lice, Superior Court Active Retired

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Related

Philecia Barnes v. City of Cincinnati
401 F.3d 729 (Sixth Circuit, 2005)
Schroer v. Billington
525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (District of Columbia, 2007)

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