ClaeKSON, J.
The lease herein involved was recorded ten minutes prior to the deed of plaintiffs. Accordingly, if the acknowledgment, probate and registration of defendant’s lease was regular, it takes precedence. N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), secs. 3308, 3311.
Knowles v. Wallace,
210 N. C., 603 (606). However, plaintiffs contend that the acknowledgment of the lessors’ execution of the lease was in form insufficient to predicate a valid probate and registration of the lease.
Immediately following the signature and seals of the lessors at the end of the lease, there appeared the following:
“Witness:
Clay L. Church.
(Seal.)
“Acknowledged to before me, this June 4th, 1936.
Mary L. Mathis, N. P.
“My commission expires June 25 — 36.”
Upon this acknowledgment the order of probate and the registration were made. Was this acknowledgment sufficient? The answer is “Yes.”
As early as
Horton v. Hagler,
8 N. C., 48, it was held that when the clerk of a court of record certifies that an instrument has been “duly proved,” it is implied that everything required by law has been complied with, upon the maxim,
res judicate pro veritate accipitwr.
But when the record also states how it was to he proved and admits a material circumstance required by law the certificate of due proof is disregarded because the certificate itself shows that it was not duly proved. See
Starke v. Etheridge,
71 N. C., 240, 246;
McClure v. Crow,
196 N. C., 657, 660. In the instant ease, section 3323, N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), is pertinent; there a model form of acknowledgment is given as follows :
“North Carolina, .County.
“I (here give name of the official and his official title), do hereby certify that (here give the name of the grantor or maker), personally appeared before me this day and acknowledged the due execution of the foregoing instrument. Witness my hand and (where an official seal is required by law) official seal, this the.day of . (year).
“(Official Seal.) .
Signature of Officer.”
This section requires that “the form of acknowledgment shall be in substance” that of the statutory model. The precise question here is whether the acknowledgment of the lease is a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute; this question is here answered in the affirmative.
Upon analysis of the statute it is apparent that the following facts should appear in the certificate, either by incorporation or direct reference to the instrument acknowledged: (1) Name and title of the official taking the acknowledgment; (2) name of grantor; (3) personal appearance of the grantor before the officer; (4) acknowledgment of grantor to the officer of the execution of the instrument; (5) date; and (6) signature of the officer, and, if required by law otherwise, his seal. An examination of the lease and acknowledgment in the instant case, when taken together, clearly reveals each of these facts, with the possible exception of the fact of the personal appearance of the lessor before the notary. As to this item, it does not affirmatively appear that the lessor did not come before the notary; the contrary is clearly implied in the statement that he “acknowledged” the lease before the notary. The factual possibility of this assumption is strengthened by the realization that the word “acknowledge,” as used with respect to the execution of instruments, is a “short-hand” expression descriptive of the act of personal appearance before a proper officer and there stating to him the fact of the execution of the instrument as a voluntary act. In both
Starke v. Etheridge,
71 N. C., 240, and
Moore v. Quickle,
159 N. C., 129, the single word “jurat” was interpreted to mean “proved,” within the requirements of our law, and in
Finance Co. v. Cotton Mills,
182 N. C., 408, “subscribed and sworn to” was treated as the equivalent of “acknowledged.” Such a liberal interpretation of the meaning of the word “acknowledge” is here adopted in this case. The presumption of regularity attaching to the act of every public officer also supports this view. In
Power Corp. v. Power Co.,
168 N. C., 219, 221, it was stated: “In
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly,
114 N. C., 147, it is said: ‘There was no evidence to show that the probate here was insufficient. The presumption is that it was properly taken.’ ” This presumption of regularity attaches generally to judicial acts, and, as pointed out in
McClure v. Crow,
196 N. C., 657, at pp. 659-660, “Taking the acknowledgment of proof of a deed or admitting it to probate is a judicial or ^wasi-judicial act.” To the same effect, see
Best v. Utley,
189 N. C., 356, 362.
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ClaeKSON, J.
The lease herein involved was recorded ten minutes prior to the deed of plaintiffs. Accordingly, if the acknowledgment, probate and registration of defendant’s lease was regular, it takes precedence. N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), secs. 3308, 3311.
Knowles v. Wallace,
210 N. C., 603 (606). However, plaintiffs contend that the acknowledgment of the lessors’ execution of the lease was in form insufficient to predicate a valid probate and registration of the lease.
Immediately following the signature and seals of the lessors at the end of the lease, there appeared the following:
“Witness:
Clay L. Church.
(Seal.)
“Acknowledged to before me, this June 4th, 1936.
Mary L. Mathis, N. P.
“My commission expires June 25 — 36.”
Upon this acknowledgment the order of probate and the registration were made. Was this acknowledgment sufficient? The answer is “Yes.”
As early as
Horton v. Hagler,
8 N. C., 48, it was held that when the clerk of a court of record certifies that an instrument has been “duly proved,” it is implied that everything required by law has been complied with, upon the maxim,
res judicate pro veritate accipitwr.
But when the record also states how it was to he proved and admits a material circumstance required by law the certificate of due proof is disregarded because the certificate itself shows that it was not duly proved. See
Starke v. Etheridge,
71 N. C., 240, 246;
McClure v. Crow,
196 N. C., 657, 660. In the instant ease, section 3323, N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), is pertinent; there a model form of acknowledgment is given as follows :
“North Carolina, .County.
“I (here give name of the official and his official title), do hereby certify that (here give the name of the grantor or maker), personally appeared before me this day and acknowledged the due execution of the foregoing instrument. Witness my hand and (where an official seal is required by law) official seal, this the.day of . (year).
“(Official Seal.) .
Signature of Officer.”
This section requires that “the form of acknowledgment shall be in substance” that of the statutory model. The precise question here is whether the acknowledgment of the lease is a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute; this question is here answered in the affirmative.
Upon analysis of the statute it is apparent that the following facts should appear in the certificate, either by incorporation or direct reference to the instrument acknowledged: (1) Name and title of the official taking the acknowledgment; (2) name of grantor; (3) personal appearance of the grantor before the officer; (4) acknowledgment of grantor to the officer of the execution of the instrument; (5) date; and (6) signature of the officer, and, if required by law otherwise, his seal. An examination of the lease and acknowledgment in the instant case, when taken together, clearly reveals each of these facts, with the possible exception of the fact of the personal appearance of the lessor before the notary. As to this item, it does not affirmatively appear that the lessor did not come before the notary; the contrary is clearly implied in the statement that he “acknowledged” the lease before the notary. The factual possibility of this assumption is strengthened by the realization that the word “acknowledge,” as used with respect to the execution of instruments, is a “short-hand” expression descriptive of the act of personal appearance before a proper officer and there stating to him the fact of the execution of the instrument as a voluntary act. In both
Starke v. Etheridge,
71 N. C., 240, and
Moore v. Quickle,
159 N. C., 129, the single word “jurat” was interpreted to mean “proved,” within the requirements of our law, and in
Finance Co. v. Cotton Mills,
182 N. C., 408, “subscribed and sworn to” was treated as the equivalent of “acknowledged.” Such a liberal interpretation of the meaning of the word “acknowledge” is here adopted in this case. The presumption of regularity attaching to the act of every public officer also supports this view. In
Power Corp. v. Power Co.,
168 N. C., 219, 221, it was stated: “In
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly,
114 N. C., 147, it is said: ‘There was no evidence to show that the probate here was insufficient. The presumption is that it was properly taken.’ ” This presumption of regularity attaches generally to judicial acts, and, as pointed out in
McClure v. Crow,
196 N. C., 657, at pp. 659-660, “Taking the acknowledgment of proof of a deed or admitting it to probate is a judicial or ^wasi-judicial act.” To the same effect, see
Best v. Utley,
189 N. C., 356, 362.
The conclusion here adopted is in agreement with the authorities generally. “Probably in all jurisdictions the courts strongly advocate a liberal interpretation of the statutes, in order that acknowledgments may be upheld whenever there has been a substantial compliance with the law and no suspicion of fraud or unfairness attaches to the transaction. . . . Acknowledgments also are aided by the presumption that public
officers do tbeir duty, and in further support of tbe officer’s certificate resort may be bad to tbe instrument acknowledged.” 1 Am. Jur., “Acknowledgments,” sec. 169, at p. 388. “Tbe courts uniformly give to certificates of acknowledgment a liberal construction, in order to sustain them if tbe substance be found, and tbe statute bas been substantially observed and followed. It is accordingly a rule of universal application tbat a literal compliance witb tbe statute is not to be required of a certificate of acknowledgment, and tbat, if it substantially conforms to tbe statutory provisions as to tbe material facts to be embodied therein, it is sufficient.” 1 C. J., “Acknowledgment,” sec. 183, p. 841. See, also, secs. 183, 184, pp. 842-843. “Tbe certificate, as regards its form and contents must substantially meet tbe requirements of tbe statute. . . . Tbe form is sometimes given in tbe statute, but usually such form is only a suggestion of what is sufficient, and not strictly obligatory.” 4 Thompson, Real Property, sec. 3774, p. 846. “Tbe policy of tbe law favors registration and will not suffer its purpose and effect to be defeated on account of immaterial omissions, patent mistakes, and inartificial expressions in tbe certificate. As a rule, tbe courts have given a liberal construction to tbe ordinary certificate of acknowledgment, and have permitted tbe omission of entire phrases of a formal character, although contained in tbe specific form prescribed by tbe statute.” Webb, Record of Title, 2nd Ed., 79, p. 136. “It is not necessary tbat tbe exact language of tbe statutory requirements be followed, provided tbe necessary facts are expressed in words of substantially equivalent import. In fact, it is tbe policy of tbe law to construe certificates of acknowledgment liberally, and not allow them to be defeated by technical or unsubstantial objections, provided they are sufficient to serve tbe purpose for which used, and are in fairly substantial conformity witb tbe requirements of statute.” Patton, Land Titles, sec. 204, pp. 689-690.
We bold tbat tbe acknowledgment in tbe lease herein considered, although technically inexact and informally stated, to be in substantial conformity to tbe requirement of our statute.
We find in tbe record
No error.