Freeman v. Molding Products

• Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana
• Decided: May 30, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-00070
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION DECARLOS FREEMAN, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-70 RLM-MGG ) MOLDING PRODUCTS, et al., ) ) Defendant ) OPINION AND ORDER De Carlos Freeman filed a discrimination charge with the South Bend Human Rights Commission alleging that Molding Products had wrongfully terminated his employment based on his race. The Commission found that there was no probable cause to support the allegations of discrimination, denied Mr. Freeman’s request for reconsideration, and dismissed the charge. After the EEOC adopted the Commission’s finding and issued a notice of right to sue, Mr. Freeman filed a complaint under Title VII against Molding Products, and two of his supervisors, Dwayne Coop (incorrectly identified as Dwayne Cooper), and Neal Hinds, asserting claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, harassment, and wrongful termination, and seeking to hold them jointly and severally liable. Mr. Coop and Mr. Hinds contend that they can’t be held individually liable under Title VII and moved to dismiss the claims asserted against them. Mr. Freeman hasn’t responded to those motions or sought an extension of time within which to do so. For the following reasons, the court grants the motions. Pro se complaints are construed liberally, see Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031,

1033 (7th Cir. 1994), so the court assumes that Mr. Freeman intended to sue Mr. Coop and Mr. Hinds in both their official capacities as supervisors and their individual capacities. An employer may be held vicariously liable under Title VII for the acts of its supervisors, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013), but Mr. Coop and

Mr. Hinds aren’t employers within the meaning of the statute, and can’t be held individually liable under Title VII. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). To the extent Mr. Freeman seeks to hold them liable in their official capacities as agents of Molding Products, his claims are redundant of the claims against Molding Products itself. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dept., 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n official capacity suit is another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which the officer is an agent.”); Smith v. Metro. School Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1021 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (claims against principal and assistant principal redundant of claims against School District and Board); Aku v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 290 F.Supp.3d 852, 860 (N.D. Ill 2017) (dismissing Title VII official capacity claims against school principal because they were redundant

of claims against the School Board).

2 Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motions to dismiss the claims against Mr. Coop and Mr. Hinds in their individual capacities [Doc. Nos. 12 and 14]. SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 30, 2019

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. Judge United States District Court