Freeman v. Carter

District Court, N.D. Indiana·Decided October 22, 2024·No. 3:20-cv-00631·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

VERNELL FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-631-JD

KIMBERLY MYERS and NOE MARANDET,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Vernell Freeman, a prisoner without a lawyer, is currently proceeding in this case on two claims. All other claims raised against other defendants have been previously dismissed by the Court in a series of orders. First, he is proceeding “against NP Kimberly Myers in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for continuing Mr. Freeman on a medication containing a blood thinner after he suffered a head injury on [April] 30, 2018, and after a CT scan revealed a subdural hematoma on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 242 at 10. Second, he is proceeding “against Dr. Noe Marandet in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for continuing Mr. Freeman on a medication containing a blood thinner after a CT scan revealed a subdural hematoma on his brain on June 8, 2018, in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. Freeman filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 346. The defendants filed a response and a cross motion for summary judgment. ECF 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366. Freeman filed a reply to the defendants’ response, along with a response to the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment. ECF 367, 371. The defendants filed a reply. ECF 372. Both

summary judgment motions are now fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). This standard does not change when parties file cross- motions for summary judgment. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 176 v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 293 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2002). “When considering the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the

light reasonably most favorable to the defendants, and vice versa.” Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (S. D. Ind. 2000); see also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (“With crossmotions, our review of the record requires that we construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.”) (citation omitted). A party opposing a properly supported

summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v. Milwaukee Cty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of “callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being

harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has explained: [M]edical professionals are not required to provide proper medical treatment to prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment that reflects professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one proper way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field. A medical professional’s treatment decisions will be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances. Id. at 697-698. Negligence, incompetence, or even medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference. Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, a prisoner is not entitled to demand specific care, nor is he entitled to the “best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Where the defendant has provided some level of care for a prisoner’s medical condition, in order to establish deliberate indifference the prisoner must show that “the defendants’ responses to [his condition] were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere disagreement with medical professionals about the appropriate treatment does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Forbes v. Edgar
112 F.3d 262 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
Herbert L. Board v. Karl Farnham, Jr.
394 F.3d 469 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Hayes v. Snyder
546 F.3d 516 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Duckworth v. Ahmad
532 F.3d 675 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Jackson v. Kotter
541 F.3d 688 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Eaton v. Onan Corp.
117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Indiana, 2000)
James Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
982 F.3d 451 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Reed v. Indiana Department of Corrections
30 F. App'x 616 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)