Freeman v. C R Bard Incorporated

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided February 11, 2022·No. 2:19-cv-01572·Unknown

Opinion

1 ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6840 2 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 4 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 Email: swanise@gtlaw.com 5 CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN, ESQ.* GREGORY R. TAN, ESQ. 6 *Admitted Pro Hac Vice GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 7 1144 15th Street, Suite 3300 Denver, Colorado 80202 8 Telephone: (303) 572-6500 Facsimile: (303) 572-6540 9 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com tangr@gtlaw.com 10 LORI G. COHEN, ESQ. 11 Admitted Pro Hac Vice GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 12 3290 Northside Parkway Atlanta, GA 30327 13 Telephone: (678) 553-2385 Facsimile: (678) 553-5386 14 Email: cohenl@gtlaw.com 15 C ounsel for Defendants IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 16 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA 17

18 REECE FREEMAN and BRITTANY Case No. 2:19-cv-01572-RFB-BNW FREEMAN, 19 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] Plaintiffs, ORDER TO STAY 20

21 v.

22 C. R. BARD, INCORPORATED and BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INCORPORATED, 23 Defendants. 24

26 Plaintiffs Reece Freeman and Brittany Freeman (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendants C. R. Bard, 27 Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (“Defendants”) (Plaintiffs and Defendants are collectively 28 referred to herein as the “Parties”) pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 26 and this Court’s inherent powers, 1 respectfully request that this Court enter an Order temporarily staying discovery and all pretrial 2 deadlines imposed by the Court, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for ninety 3 (90) days to permit the parties to finalize their settlement of all claims. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiffs claim injuries related to the purported implantation of an Inferior Vena Cava 6 (“IVC”) filter allegedly manufactured by Defendants. (ECF No. 1). The Parties have conducted 7 various discovery, including depositions of Mr. Freeman and medical providers, medical records 8 collection, and initial and supplemental disclosures, but have reached an agreement in principle to 9 resolve all claims. As such, the Parties hereby jointly move this Court to enter a stay of all discovery 10 and pretrial deadlines in this case for a period of ninety (90) days. 11 II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 12 A. This Court Has Authority to Grant the Requested Stay 13 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b) and 26, and this Court’s inherent authority 14 and discretion to manage its own docket, this Court has the authority to grant the requested stay. Fed. 15 R. Civ. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time the court may, for good 16 cause, extend the time…”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is 17 sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending…The Court may, 18 for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 19 oppression, or undue burden or expense.”). Therefore, this Court has broad discretion to stay 20 proceedings as incidental to its power to control its own docket – particularly where, as here, a stay 21 would promote judicial economy and efficiency. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); 22 Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Clinton v. 23 Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)). 24 A stipulation to stay proceedings, like the Parties seek here, is an appropriate exercise of this 25 Court’s jurisdiction. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (explaining a court’s 26 power to stay proceedings is incidental to its inherent power to control the disposition of the cases 27 on its docket to save the time and effort of the court, counsel, and the parties.) 28 The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 1 for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 2 balance. 3 Id. (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)); see also, CMAX, Inc. 4 v. Hall, 300 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (district courts possess “inherent power to control the 5 disposition of the cases on its docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and effort for 6 itself, for counsel, and for litigants”); Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (In 7 re Pittsburgh Corning Corp.), No. 11-1406, 11-1452, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86193, at *11 (W.D. 8 Mo. June 21, 201) (noting a court’s power to stay proceedings is incidental to its power to control 9 the disposition of the cases on its docket). 10 Furthermore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (26(c) and 26(d) also vest the Court with 11 authority to limit the scope of discovery or control its sequence and may grant a stay to allow parties 12 to negotiate a settlement. Britton, 523 U.S. at 598. 13 B. Good Cause Exists to Grant the Requested Stay 14 As noted herein, the Parties have reached a settlement in principle and are currently working 15 to finalize all necessary documentation regarding the same. As such, the Parties do not seek the stay 16 requested herein in bad faith but instead seek to stay all proceedings in the interest of efficiency and 17 judicial economy. Granting the stay here will unquestionably save the time and effort of this Court, 18 counsel, and the parties, and provide counsel with an opportunity to finalize the settlement of this 19 case without any additional litigation expense. 20 Facilitating the Parties’ efforts to resolve this dispute entirely through settlement is reasonable 21 and constitutes good cause for granting the requested stay. The Parties agree that the relief sought 22 herein is necessary to handle and resolve this case in the most economical fashion, and that the relief 23 sought in this stipulation is not for delay, but in the interest of efficiency. 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties respectfully request that this Court enter a stay of al 3 || activity in this case, for a period of ninety (90) days. If Plaintiffs have not filed dismissal paper 4 || within ninety (90) days from the stay being granted, the Parties request the opportunity to file a join 5 || status report regarding the status of the settlement. 6 IT IS SO STIPULATED. 7 Dated this 10™ day of February 2022. 8 WETHERALL GROUP, LTD. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 9 By: _/s/ Peter C. Wetherall By: _/s/ Eric W. Swanis 10 PETER C. WETHERALL, ESQ. ERIC W. SWANIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4414 Nevada Bar No. 6840 ll 9345 W. Sunset Road, Suite 100 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 12 pwetherall@wetherallgroup.com Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Email: swanise@gtlaw.com eee 13 Counsel for Plaintiffs CHRISTOPHER J. NEUMANN, ESQ.* GREGORY R. TAN, ESQ. 14 *Admitted Pro Hac Vice GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 15 1144 15" Street, Suite 3300 Denver, Colorado 80202 16 Email: neumannc@gtlaw.com tangr@gtlaw.com V7 LORI G. COHEN, ESO. 18 Admitted Pro Hac Vice GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 19 3290 Northside Parkway Atlanta, GA 30327 Email: cohenl@gtlaw.com 20 1 Counsel for Defendants 22 3 ORDER IT IS ORDERED that ECF No. 52 is 24 GRANTED.

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